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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, Charles K. Whitehead
The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, Charles K. Whitehead
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading by banking entities - in effect, reintroducing to the financial markets a substantial portion of the Glass-Steagall Act’s static divide between banks and securities firms. This Article argues that the Glass-Steagall model is a fixture of the past - a financial Maginot Line within an evolving financial system. To be effective, new financial regulation must reflect new relationships in the marketplace. For the Volcker Rule, those relationships include a growing reliance by banks on new market participants to conduct traditional banking functions.
Proprietary trading has moved to less-regulated businesses, in many cases, to hedge …
Making Sense Of The New Financial Deal, David A. Skeel Jr.
Making Sense Of The New Financial Deal, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
In this Essay, I assess the enactment and implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress’s response to the 2008 financial crisis. To set the stage, I begin by very briefly reviewing the causes of the crisis. I then argue that the legislation has two very clear objectives. The first is to limit the risk of the shadow banking system by more carefully regulating the key instruments and institutions of contemporary finance. The second objective is to limit the damage in the event one of these giant institutions fails. While the new regulation of the instruments of contemporary finance—including clearing and exchange …
Transparency Is The New Opacity: Constructing Final Regulation After The Crisis, Caroline Bradley
Transparency Is The New Opacity: Constructing Final Regulation After The Crisis, Caroline Bradley
Articles
No abstract provided.
Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital And The Need For Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, John C. Coffee Jr.
Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital And The Need For Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Because the quickest, simplest way for a financial institution to increase its profitability is to increase its leverage, an enduring tension will exist between regulators and systemically significant financial institutions over the issues of risk and leverage. Many have suggested that the 2008 financial crisis erupted because flawed systems of executive compensation induced financial institutions to increase leverage and accept undue risk. But that begs the question why such compensation formulas were adopted. Growing evidence suggests that shareholders favored these formulas to induce managers to accept higher risk and leverage. Shareholder pressure, then, is a factor that could cause the …
Pay For Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation For Risk Regulation, Frederick Tung
Pay For Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation For Risk Regulation, Frederick Tung
Faculty Scholarship
Excessive risk taking by firm managers did not originate with the Financial Crisis of 2007-08. Though bankers had special incentives to take big risks in the period before the Crisis, the incentive effects of equity-based compensation have been understood for some time. Among other things, equity compensation tends to induce greater risk taking by aligning managers’ risk preferences with those of equity holders. Longstanding government guaranties of bank liabilities additionally served to intensify bankers’ risk taking incentives.
I propose to ameliorate this gambler’s incentive with a new approach to compensation at the largest banks, one that explicitly accounts for the …