Law Commons^™

The Confrontation Clause And Co-Defendant Confessions: The Drift From Bruton To Parker V. Randolph, Paul Marcus

Paul Marcus

No abstract provided.

An Overview Of The October 2005 Supreme Court Term, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

No abstract provided.

Confronting Science: Expert Evidence And The Confrontation Clause, David H. Kaye, Jennifer L. Mnookin

David Kaye

In Crawford v Washington, the Supreme Court substantially changed its understanding of how the Confrontation Clause applies to hearsay evidence. Since then, the Court has issued three bitterly contested expert-evidence-related Confrontation Clause decisions, and each one has generated at least as many questions as answers. This article analyzes this trilogy of cases, especially the most recent, Williams v Illinois.

In Williams, the Court issued a bewildering array of opinions in which majority support for admitting the opinion of a DNA analyst about tests that she did not perform was awkwardly knitted together out of several incompatible doctrinal …

The History Of Children's Hearsay: From Old Bailey To Post-Davis, Thomas D. Lyon, Raymond Lamagna

Thomas D. Lyon

The papers in this symposium were originally prepared for the Section on Evidence of the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools.

Admissibility Of Co-Conspirator Statements In A Post-Crawford World, Michael L. Seigel, Daniel Weisman

Michael L Seigel

This Article takes the position that co-conspirator statements must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they are testimonial and thus subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause. Further, in light of the fact that the author of the majority opinions in Crawford and Davis was Justice Antonin Scalia, this Article examines whether interpreting the Sixth Amendment as a bar to the admission of certain coconspirator statements would violate an originalist interpretation of that provision. The conclusion reached is that it would not. In the current era of ever-narrowing rights for criminal defendants, reaffirming the law's commitment to …

Case For A Constitutional Definition Of Hearsay: Requiring Confrontation Of Testimonial, Nonassertive Conduct And Statements Admitted To Explain An Unchallenged Investigation, The , James L. Kainen

James L. Kainen

Crawford v. Washington’s historical approach to the confrontation clause establishes that testimonial hearsay inadmissible without confrontation at the founding is similarly inadmissible today, despite whether it fits a subsequently developed hearsay exception. Consequently, the requirement of confrontation depends upon whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay, testimonial, and, if so, whether it was nonetheless admissible without confrontation at the founding. A substantial literature has developed about whether hearsay statements are testimonial or were, like dying declarations, otherwise admissible at the founding. In contrast, this article focuses on the first question – whether statements are hearsay – which scholars have thus far …

Crawford & Its Progeny In Texas & The Nation's Other State Supreme Courts, Dannye Holley

Dannye Holley

CRAWFORD & ITS PROGENY IN TEXAS & THE

NATION’S OTHER STATE SUPREME COURTS

This article is designed to track three major conceptual themes. First, the elusive pursuit of scholarship which engages both the practicing bar and academics. Second, how our federalism is shaped by the interaction of the “Supreme Courts”. Finally, identifying metrics upon which to base a principled assessment of whether a United States Supreme Court decision is a “watershed” decision.

The article documents that Crawford and its progeny have created a powerful convergence of the interests of academics and the practicing bar. It does so by making reference …

8. Child Witnesses And The Confrontation Clause., Thomas D. Lyon, Julia A. Dente

Thomas D. Lyon

“Bull” Coming From The States: Why The U.S. Supreme Court Should Use Williams V. Illinois To Close One Of Bullcoming’S Confrontation Clause Loopholes, Tara Klimek Price

Tara Price

Imagine that you are selected as a juror in a trial where the defendant is accused of driving while under the influence of alcohol. You listen to the police officer who testifies that he observed the defendant and believed him to be intoxicated. You hear about how after obtaining a warrant, the officer took the defendant to the emergency room for a blood-alcohol test. The police officer finishes his testimony, and the next witness will testify about the results of the defendant’s blood-alcohol test.

But before the witness can testify, defense counsel objects. Apparently, this is not the laboratory analyst …

Avoiding A Confrontation?: How Courts Have Erred In Finding That Nontestimonial Hearsay Is Beyond The Scope Of The Bruton Doctrine, Colin Miller

Colin Miller

The Bruton doctrine holds that the Confrontation Clause is violated by the admission at a joint jury trial of a nontestifying co-defendant’s confession that facially incriminates other defendants but is inadmissible against them under the rules of evidence. Under this doctrine, Co-Defendant’s confession to Police Officer that “Defendant and I killed Victim” could not be admitted unless Co-Defendant testified at trial. But what if Co-Defendant made his confession to his mother, his brother, his lover, or his friend? While the vast majority of courts before 2004 would have held that such “noncustodial” confessions violated the Bruton doctrine, the tables have …

A Defense Attorney’S Guide To Confrontation After Michigan V. Bryant, Kathryn K. Polonsky

Kathryn K Polonsky

In 1603, the Crown charged Sir Walter Raleigh with high treason in part for plotting to murder King James I. In preparing for trial, Lord Cobham, Raleigh’s alleged co-conspirator, was interrogated and signed a sworn confession. During trial, the King used the Crown-procured ex parte testimony of Cobham against Raleigh. Raleigh demanded Cobham be brought before the court so Raleigh might interrogate him “face to face.” Raleigh was sure Cobham would prove his innocence. After all, Cobham had written a letter stating his charges against Raleigh contained no truth.

The Judges refused to allow Raleigh the use of Cobham’s exonerating …

When Originalism Attacks: How Justice Scalia's Resort To Original Expected Application In Crawford V. Washington Came Back To Bite Him In Michigan V. Bryant (Forthcoming In 59 Drake L Rev ___ (Symposium Issue)(Summer 2011)), Brendan T. Beery

Brendan T Beery

Faint-Hearted Fidelity To The Common Law In Justice Scalia’S Confrontation Clause Trilogy, Ellen Yee

ellen yee

FAINT-HEARTED FIDELITY TO THE COMMON LAW IN JUSTICE SCALIA’S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE TRILOGY Ellen Liang Yee ABSTRACT In Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008), the Supreme Court issued the third Confrontation Clause opinion in its recent Crawford trilogy. In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Giles Court reiterated its interpretive approach in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause is “most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding.” The Court’s decision purports to hold that a defendant does not forfeit his Sixth Amendment confrontation …

“I’M Dying To Tell You What Happened”: The Admissibility Of Testimonial Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, Peter Nicolas

Peter Nicolas

In Crawford v. Washington and its progeny, the U.S. Supreme Court has re-theorized the relationship between hearsay evidence and the Confrontation Clause. Post-Crawford, hearsay statements that are “testimonial” in nature are, as a general rule, inadmissible when offered against the accused in a criminal case. Yet in footnote 6 of Crawford, the Supreme Court suggested that an exception to the general rule may exist for dying declarations. This manuscript builds on the dictum set forth in footnote 6 of Crawford, the meaning of which the lower courts are just beginning to explore. In the manuscript, I first demonstrate that the …

Preface: Reclaiming Criminal Procedure, Jeffrey L. Fisher

Jeffrey L Fisher

The key to making sense of Crawford is to appreciate that the decision turned the right to confrontation from an evidentiary principle back into a criminal procedure right. As the Court ultimately put it, the Confrontation Clause "commands . . . that reliability be assessed in a particular manner by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause Thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined.

This way of conceptualizing a constitutional right is unique to criminal procedure. Instead …

Scalian Skepticism And The Sixth Amendment In The Twilight Of The Rehnquist Court, M. Katherine B. Darmer

M. Katherine B. Darmer

While the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist left behind a rich criminal procedure legacy marked by pro-government successes in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts, this paper argues that Rehnquist's vision failed with respect to the Sixth Amendment. In both the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Confrontation Clause contexts, Justice Scalia marked out very different positions than Rehnquist on both the scope of the right to trial by jury and the right of cross-examination. Ultimately, Scalia's views prevailed, and part of the legacy of the Rehnquist Court is now the invalidation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and a testimonial approach to …

Crawford’S Aftershock: Aligning The Regulation Of Non-Testimonial Hearsay With The History And Purposes Of The Confrontation Clause, Fred O. Smith

Fred O. Smith Jr.

This Article explores what the purposes, history and text of the Confrontation Clause have to say about the admission of non-testimonial hearsay statements. Part I examines historical sources such as the common law near the Founding, as well as the text of the clause, and concludes that non-testimonial hearsay was one of the ills that the Confrontation Clause was designed to protect. Part I additionally proposes a two-tiered approach to interpreting the Confrontation Clause, in which testimonial statements receive the most vigorous form of constitutional scrutiny, but non-testimonial statements receive meaningful scrutiny as well. The United States Constitution is no …

Toward A Unified Theory Of Testimonial Evidence Under The Fifth And Sixth Amendments, Michael J.Z. Mannheimer

Michael J.Z. Mannheimer

There is an obvious parallel between the language of the Self-Incrimination Clause and that of the Confrontation Clause: the former forbids the government from forcing a criminal suspect to become a “witness against himself,” while the latter requires the government to allow a criminal defendant to confront the “witnesses against him.” The irresistible inference is that the word “witness” means the same thing in both Clauses. And, indeed, the Supreme Court has hinged the question of whether someone is a "witness" in both contexts on whether he or she has given "testimonial" evidence. Yet, at least at first blush, the …

Sir Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Re-Vamps Two Decades Of Confrontation Clause Precedent In Crawford V. Washington (Or, What You Learned In Law School About Confrontation Is Passé, Christine Hutton

Christine Hutton

No abstract provided.