Law Commons^™

How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: Capm And Ecmh Under Conditions Of Uncertainty And Disagreement, Lynn A. Stout

Lynn A. Stout

No abstract provided.

Foreign Under-Investment In Us Securities And The Role Of Relational Capital, Bryane Michael

Bryane Michael (bryane.michael@stcatz.ox.ac.uk)

Over 70 academic papers attempt to explain why foreigners invest in US securities. All ignore the vital role of the US broker-dealer. Macroeconomic factors like a trade balance or corporate governance may guide foreign investors toward certain markets. But US broker-dealers provide information to foreign investors and execute the actual trades. We hypothesize that particular foreign investors under-invest in US securities because of a lack of relational capital with US broker-dealers. We find that broker-dealer marketing intensity in foreign markets partly explains foreigners’ decisions to invest in US securities. We also estimate “pent-up” demand for US securities in developing countries …

The Legitimate Rights Of Public Shareholders, Lawrence E. Mitchell

Lawrence E. Mitchell

In recent years there has been significant ongoing academic debate over the expansion of public shareholders’ participation rights in corporate governance. The debate has accompanied a dramatic increase in institutional shareholder and hedge fund activism attempting to influence the conduct of corporate affairs.

The legitimacy of shareholder participation rights depends upon the actual role public shareholders play in contributing to the corporation’s function of providing goods and services and, ultimately, to economic growth and social welfare. Nobody in the debate has stopped to examine this question. This paper presents original empirical evidence that demonstrates that public shareholders do not, on …

Minority Discounts And Control Premiums In Appraisal Proceedings, Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law

Richard A Booth

In a merger, a stockholder often has a statutory right of dissent and appraisal under which the stockholder may demand to be paid fair value exclusive of any gain or loss that may arise from the merger itself. Most courts and commentators agree that a dissenting stockholder should ordinarily receive a pro rata share of the fair value of the corporation without any discount simply because minority shares lack control. In several recent cases, the courts have indicated that a minority stockholder is thus entitled to a share of the control value of the corporation even though the merger does …