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Full-Text Articles in Law
Who Sits On Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are And What They Do, Lawrence J. Trautman
Who Sits On Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are And What They Do, Lawrence J. Trautman
Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.
Corporate directors play an important role in governing American business, in the capital formation process, and are fundamental to the stewardship of economic growth. Texas businesses play a disproportionately important role among the states in aggregate U.S. job creation, responsible for 37% of all net new American jobs since the post 2008-2009 recovery began. It is the job of the board of directors to govern the corporation. The duties and responsibilities of a corporate director include: the duty of care; duty of loyalty; and duty of good faith. This paper results from the author’s previously assembled biographical data for most …
Corporate Conduct That Does Not Maximize Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, The Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, The Prisoner's Dilemma, Sheep's Clothing, Social Conduct, And Disclosure, Melvin Aron Eisenberg
Corporate Conduct That Does Not Maximize Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, The Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, The Prisoner's Dilemma, Sheep's Clothing, Social Conduct, And Disclosure, Melvin Aron Eisenberg
Melvin A. Eisenberg
Deals with the question of nonmaximizing corporate conduct. Types of corporate conduct that appear to be or are non nonmaximizing; Narration of the section 2.01 of the American Law Institute's `Principles of Corporate Governance' to shed understanding on the issue of nonmaximizing corporate conduct; Corporate philanthropy.
An Overview Of The Principles Of Corporate Governance, Melvin Aron Eisenberg
An Overview Of The Principles Of Corporate Governance, Melvin Aron Eisenberg
Melvin A. Eisenberg
Presents an overview of the book 'Principles of Corporate Governance' in the United States. Background architecture of the Principles of Corporate Governance of the American Law Institute; Explanations of the policy reasons of the provisions covered by the Principles; Restatement rules of the relevant law.
The Board Of Directors And Internal Control, Melvin A. Eisenberg
The Board Of Directors And Internal Control, Melvin A. Eisenberg
Melvin A. Eisenberg
No abstract provided.
The Conception That The Corporation Is A Nexus Of Contracts, And The Dual Nature Of The Firm, Melvin A. Eisenberg
The Conception That The Corporation Is A Nexus Of Contracts, And The Dual Nature Of The Firm, Melvin A. Eisenberg
Melvin A. Eisenberg
No abstract provided.
The Duty Of Good Faith In Corporate Law, Melvin A. Eisenberg
The Duty Of Good Faith In Corporate Law, Melvin A. Eisenberg
Melvin A. Eisenberg
An important development in corporate law is the recent explicit recognition, in a series of Delaware cases, that corporate managers owe a fiduciary duty of good faith in addition to their traditional duties of care and loyalty. The duty of good faith was not created by those cases. On the contrary, the duty has long been explicit under the statutes--for example, in statutory provisions that require directors to act in good faith, and in provisions concerning indemnification. The duty of good faith has also long existed implicitly in the case law--for example, in the formulation of the business judgment rule …
Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, Lawrence J. Trautman
Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, Lawrence J. Trautman
Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.
During December 2014, just hours before the holiday recess, the U.S. Congress passed five major legislative proposals designed to enhance U.S. cybersecurity. Following signature by the President, these became the first cybersecurity laws to be enacted in over a decade, since passage of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. My goal is to explore the unusually complex subject of cybersecurity policy in a highly readable manner. An analogy with the recent deadly and global Ebola epidemic is used to illustrate policy challenges, and hopefully will assist in transforming the technological language of cybersecurity into a more easily understandable …
Creditors And Debt Governance, Charles K. Whitehead
Creditors And Debt Governance, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
This chapter from the book Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, eds.), provides an introduction to the law and economic theory relating to creditors and debt governance. The chapter begins with a look at the traditional role of debt, focusing on the impact of debt on corporate governance and, in particular, the effect of an illiquid credit market on creditors’ reliance on covenants and monitoring. It then turns to changes in the private credit market and their effect on lending structure. Greater liquidity raises its own set of agency costs. In response, loans …
Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang
Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, many questions still remain unanswered. In particular, an important puzzle in a bad-law jurisdiction is: why some controlling shareholders (“roving controllers”) loot the entire corporate assets at once, and why others (“stationary controllers”) siphon a part of corporate assets on a continuous basis. To solve this conundrum, this Article provides analytical frameworks exploring the behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. To begin with, I reinterpret Olson’s political theory of “banditry” in the context of corporate governance in developing countries. Based on a new taxonomy of controlling shareholders (“roving controllers” …
Managing Cyberthreat, Lawrence J. Trautman
Managing Cyberthreat, Lawrence J. Trautman
Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.
Cyber security is an important strategic and governance issue. However, because most corporate CEOs and directors have no formal engineering or information technology training, it is understandable that their lack of actual cybersecurity knowledge is problematic. Particularly among smaller companies having limited resources, knowledge regarding what their enterprise should actually be doing about cybersecurity can’t be all that good. My goal in this article is to explore the unusually complex subject of cybersecurity in a highly readable manner. First, an examination of recent threats is provided. Next, governmental policy initiatives are discussed. Third, some basic tools that can be used …
The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis
The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis
Alicia Davis
This Article offers evidence that higher quality internal corporate governance is associated with higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. This finding is consistent with the idea that institutions have greater reason than individual investors to prefer well-governed firms, but surprising given the substantial empirical evidence that casts doubt on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms. The study described in this Article also finds that higher quality external governance is associated with lower proportions of ownership by certain types of institutional investors, also a somewhat surprising result given available empirical evidence on the positive relationship between external governance and firm …
Re-Envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, And Implications, Sang Yop Kang
Re-Envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, And Implications, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
‘Law and Finance’ theory – which offers analytical frameworks to measure the protection of public investors and the quality of corporate governance – has dominated the comparative corporate governance scholarship in the last decade. So far, many proponents and critics have had debates on the relevance of the theory and the implications of the theory’s empirical studies. Several important points in relation to shareholder protection, however, have been highly neglected in these debates. In particular, the significance of one-share-one-vote (OSOV) rule has been inappropriately underestimated. In response, this Article explores (1) why OSOV is an utmost critical component in corporate …