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Full-Text Articles in Law
“Private” Means To “Public” Ends: Governments As Market Actors, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova
“Private” Means To “Public” Ends: Governments As Market Actors, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova
Saule T. Omarova
Many people recognize that governments can play salutary roles in relation to markets by (a) “overseeing” market behavior from “above,” or (b) supplying foundational “rules of the game” from “below.” It is probably no accident that these widely recognized roles also sit comfortably with traditional conceptions of government and market, pursuant to which people tend categorically to distinguish between “public” and “private” spheres of activity. There is a third form of government action that receives less attention than forms (a) and (b), however, possibly owing in part to its straddling the traditional public/private divide. We call it the “government as …
“Private” Means To “Public” Ends: Governments As Market Actors, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova
“Private” Means To “Public” Ends: Governments As Market Actors, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova
Robert C. Hockett
Many people recognize that governments can play salutary roles in relation to markets by (a) “overseeing” market behavior from “above,” or (b) supplying foundational “rules of the game” from “below.” It is probably no accident that these widely recognized roles also sit comfortably with traditional conceptions of government and market, pursuant to which people tend categorically to distinguish between “public” and “private” spheres of activity. There is a third form of government action that receives less attention than forms (a) and (b), however, possibly owing in part to its straddling the traditional public/private divide. We call it the “government as …
The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical Or Familiar? Idealistic Or Unrealistic?, Stephanie P. Massman
The Orderly Liquidation Authority: Fanatical Or Familiar? Idealistic Or Unrealistic?, Stephanie P. Massman
Stephanie P Massman
The systemic financial crisis of 2008 spurred the failure of numerous financial and non-financial entities. Regulators addressed each of these failures on an ad hoc ex-post basis, granting multiple bailouts in various forms. The refusal to extend these bailouts to one firm, Lehman Brothers, however, caused further panic and contagion throughout the already unstable market as one of the largest financial institutions of the U.S. underwent an extremely lengthy and value-destructive Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Criticism surrounding not only the bailouts, but also the decision to allow Lehman to fail under the Bankruptcy Code, led to the inclusion of the Orderly …
Unfit For Duty: The Officer And Director Bar As A Remedy For Fraud, Renee Jones
Unfit For Duty: The Officer And Director Bar As A Remedy For Fraud, Renee Jones
Renee Jones
Many commentators have questioned the efficacy of the SEC’s enforcement program in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Some criticize the agency for allowing corporate defendants to settle charges without admitting or denying liability. Others dispute the impact of astronomical fines levied against too-big-to-fail financial institutions. Still others urge prosecutors to bring criminal charges against those who led the failed financial firms to ruin. This Article, written for a symposium on SEC enforcement, focuses attention on an underutilized weapon in the SEC’s arsenal: the power to bar officers and directors of public companies from future service in such roles. …
A Preliminary Look At State Structures For Regulating Financial Services, Elizabeth F. Brown
A Preliminary Look At State Structures For Regulating Financial Services, Elizabeth F. Brown
Elizabeth F Brown
Within the past thirty-five years approximately fifty nations have consolidated their financial regulatory agencies into either a single integrated agency or into two semi-integrated agencies. The United States has resisted this trend, due in part to a concern that the costs of such significant consolidation would exceed its benefits. The existing studies that compare the costs of the consolidated regulators around the world with the United States regime have often been discounted because they have been unable to control for differences in culture and regulatory intensity between those other countries and the United States. This article attempts to address this …