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Rules Of Origin As International Trade Hindrances, Hatem Mohamed Mabrouk
Rules Of Origin As International Trade Hindrances, Hatem Mohamed Mabrouk
Hatem Mohamed Mabrouk
This paper talks about the usage of Rules of Origin (RoO) as protectionist apparatuses in different regional trade areas, as the North American Free Trade Area, the African Growth and Opportunity Act and the South African Development Community, and the usage of RoO as trade-diverting tools. In addition, the paper talks about the spaghetti-bowl phenomenon, with an emphasis on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation region, and clarifies how to achieve a proper harmonization of both non-preferential and preferential RoO as a solution to overcome the previously mentioned odds facing international trade. Moreover, the paper suggests the adoption of more solutions as …
What Do We Know About Corruption (And Anti-Corruption) In Customs?, Bryane Michael, Nigel Moore
What Do We Know About Corruption (And Anti-Corruption) In Customs?, Bryane Michael, Nigel Moore
Bryane Michael (bryane.michael@stcatz.ox.ac.uk)
What are the lessons from anti-corruption programmes in Customs agencies over the last 20 years? The data suggest that many of the usual activities -- like codes of conduct and posters do not work. Internal inspectorates, and particularly internal audit, has a large effect on reducing corruption. A review of the literature and best practice presented.
Do Customs Trade Facilitation Programmes Help Reduce Customs-Related Corruption?, Bryane Michael, Frank Ferguson, Alisher Karimov
Do Customs Trade Facilitation Programmes Help Reduce Customs-Related Corruption?, Bryane Michael, Frank Ferguson, Alisher Karimov
Bryane Michael (bryane.michael@stcatz.ox.ac.uk)
Customs-related corruption costs World Customs Organisation (WCO) members at least $2 billion in customs revenue each year. Using recent data only about bribe payers’ actual experiences in paying bribes, we show that trade facilitation would only help reduce corruption and improve efficiency – in a large number of customs agencies -- if the customs agency’s director undertakes a big-bang approach to reform. We also find support for the corruption clubs theory – that customs agencies in the process of reform are either moving toward OECD levels of integrity and efficiency; or they are sliding toward a “red zone” group of …