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University of Colorado Law Review

2014

Federalism

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Immigration And Cooperative Federalism: Toward A Doctrinal Framework, Ming H. Chen Jan 2014

Immigration And Cooperative Federalism: Toward A Doctrinal Framework, Ming H. Chen

University of Colorado Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Spending Power And Environmental Law After Sebelius, Erin Ryan Jan 2014

The Spending Power And Environmental Law After Sebelius, Erin Ryan

University of Colorado Law Review

In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that portions of the Affordable Care Act exceeded federal authority under the Spending Clause. With that holding, Sebelius became the first Supreme Court decision since the New Deal to limit an act of Congress on spending-power grounds, rounding out the "New Federalism" limits on federal power first initiated by the Rehnquist Court in the 1990s. The new Sebelius doctrine constrains the federal spending power in contexts involving changes to ongoing intergovernmental partnerships with very large federal grants. However, the decision gives little direction for evaluating …


Unbundling Federalism: Colorado's Legalization Of Marijuana And Federalism's Many Forms, Jessica Bulman-Pozen Jan 2014

Unbundling Federalism: Colorado's Legalization Of Marijuana And Federalism's Many Forms, Jessica Bulman-Pozen

University of Colorado Law Review

This short Essay argues that various attributes we associate with federalism should not be deemed necessary components of federalism as a definitional or normative matter. Using Colorado's recent legalization of marijuana as a case study, it shows how two such attributes-an autonomous realm of state action and independent state officials with distinctive interests-can be pulled apart. State officials often further their interests and effectively oppose federal policy when they participate in the same statutory scheme as federal actors instead of operating in a separate, autonomous sphere. At the same time, state officials frequently rely on the autonomous lawmaking and executive …