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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Law And Economics Of Behavioral Regulation, Avishalom Tor Jan 2022

The Law And Economics Of Behavioral Regulation, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

This article examines the law and economics of behavioral regulation (“nudging”), which governments and organizations increasingly use to substitute for and complement traditional instruments. To advance its welfare-based assessment, Section 1 examines alternative nudging definitions and Section 2 considers competing nudges taxonomies. Section 3 describes the benefits of nudges and their regulatory appeal, while Section 4 considers their myriad costs—most notably the private costs they generate for their targets and other market participants. Section 5 then illustrates the assessment of public and private welfare nudges using cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, and rationality-effects analysis.


Nudges That Should Fail?, Avishalom Tor Jan 2019

Nudges That Should Fail?, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

Professor Sunstein (2017) discusses possible causes for and policy implications of the failure of nudges, with a special attention to defaults. Though he focuses on nudges that fail when they should succeed, Sunstein recognizes that some failures reveal that a nudge should not have been attempted to begin with. Nudges that fail, however, does not consider fully the relationship between the outcomes of nudging and their likely welfare effects, most notably neglecting the troubling case of nudges that succeed when they should fail. Hence, after clarifying the boundaries of legitimate nudging and noting the fourfold relationship between the efficacy of …


Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power For "We The People", Martha T. Mccluskey Jan 2017

Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power For "We The People", Martha T. Mccluskey

Journal Articles

Toward that goal, this essay proposes a structural principle of collective economic power for “we the people.” This principle is both consistent with longstanding Constitutional ideals and tailored to the current challenges of neoliberal ideology and policy. It develops two premises: first, it rejects the neoliberal economic ideology that defines legitimate power and freedom as individualized “choice” constrained by an existing political economy. Instead, this proposed principle recognizes that meaningful political economic freedom and power fundamentally consist of access to collective organizations with potential to create a “more perfect union” with better and less constrained options. Second, the post-Lochner principle …


Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, Avishalom Tor Jan 2014

Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

Behavioral antitrust – the application to antitrust analysis of empirical evidence of robust behavioral deviations from strict rationality – is increasingly popular and hotly debated by legal scholars and the enforcement agencies alike. This Article shows, however, that both proponents and opponents of behavioral antitrust frequently and fundamentally misconstrue its methodology, treating concrete empirical phenomena as if they were broad hypothetical assumptions. Because of this fundamental methodological error, scholars often make three classes of mistakes in behavioral antitrust analyses: First, they fail to appreciate the variability and heterogeneity of behavioral phenomena; second, they disregard the concrete ways in which markets, …


The Methodology Of The Behavioral Analysis Of Law, Avishalom Tor Jan 2008

The Methodology Of The Behavioral Analysis Of Law, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

This article examines the behavioral analysis of law, meaning the application of empirical behavioral evidence to legal analysis, which has become increasingly popular in legal scholarship in recent years. Following the introduction in Part I, this Article highlights four central propositions on the subject. The first, developed in Part II, asserts that the efficacy of the law often depends on its accounting for relevant patterns of human behavior, most notably those studied by behavioral decision scientists. This Part therefore reviews important behavioral findings, illustrating their application and relevance to a broad range of legal questions. Part III then argues that …


Illustrating A Behaviorally Informed Approach To Antitrust Law: The Case Of Predatory Pricing, Avishalom Tor Oct 2003

Illustrating A Behaviorally Informed Approach To Antitrust Law: The Case Of Predatory Pricing, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

One of the core assumptions of the traditional economic approach to antitrust law is that competitors are perfectly rational, profit-maximizing, decision makers. Sometimes, this assumption serves as a useful simplification of business behavior, providing an effective foundation for antitrust doctrine. At other times, however, assuming strictly rational behavior on the part of competitors is not “approximately right” but, instead, “perfectly wrong.” In these latter cases, the reliance on the perfect rationality assumption can lead scholars to mispredict market behavior and, possibly, advocate erroneous prescriptions for antitrust policy. In contrast, a behaviorally informed approach to antitrust law is based on scientific …


Abortion And Legal Rationality, John M. Finnis Jan 1970

Abortion And Legal Rationality, John M. Finnis

Journal Articles

This article concerns the legitimacy of various legal schemes for dealing with abortion. Legitimacy in one sense is secured simply by complying with the formal criteria for valid law-making: enactment within power and in due form. But jurists have learned (or re-learned) that more can be said about legitimacy, without betraying the purity of their discipline by moralizing and advocacy. From this development in jurisprudential thought emerges the range of questions and criteria deployed in the present study.