Law Commons^™

Co-Belligerency, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Executive branch officials rest the President’s authority in today’s war against ISIS, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups on an expansive interpretation of a 15-year-old statute, the 2001 “Authorization for Use of Military Force” (AUMF), passed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. They rely on that statute to justify force against groups neither referenced in – nor even in existence at the time of – the 2001 statute, by invoking a creative theory of international law they call “co-belligerency.” Under this theory, the President can read his AUMF authority flexibly, to justify force against not only those groups covered …

Interpretation Catalysts And Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have seen much speculation over executive branch legal interpretation and internal decisionmaking, particularly in matters of national security and international law. Debate persists over how and why the executive arrives at particular understandings of its legal constraints, the extent to which the positions taken by one presidential administration may bind the next, and, indeed, the extent to which the President is constrained by law at all. Current scholarship focuses on rational, political, and structural arguments to explain executive actions and legal positioning, but it has yet to take account of the diverse ways in which legal questions arise …

Moral Limits Of Dworkin's Theory Of Law And Legal Interpretation, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

At the foundation of Justice for Hedgehogs is a commitment to moral objectivity – the doctrine that there are right answers to moral questions. This nicely complements Dworkin’s legal theory, which holds that right answers to legal questions depend on right answers to moral questions. Without the doctrine of moral objectivity, Dworkin could not reasonably maintain, as he does, that law provides determinate answers to legal questions.

A Pluralist Approach To Interpretation: Wills And Contracts, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This account of legal interpretation focuses mainly on wills and contracts. It adopts a pluralist approach, one that treats a number of factors as potentially relevant and does not assume that all relevant factors necessarily reduce to one overarching inquiry that is the same whatever legal text is being interpreted.

Original Intent And Legal Interpretation, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

This paper offers a close analysis of intentionalism -- the idea that the meaning or proper application of written law is determined by certain historical facts about the mental states of those who made the law, at the time they did so. Unrestricted intentionalism faces deep-seated problems: it offers no guidance for resolving its own ambiguities, it almost certainly generates contradictions, and it almost certainly implies that some meaningful laws lack meaning or proper application. On purely theoretical grounds, therefore, the unrestricted theory is almost certainly untenable. I suggest further that there's little prospect of refining intentionalism so that it …

Interpretation And Judgment, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

The major conclusions in Georgia Warnke's illuminating Essay, Law, Hermeneutics, and Public Debate are persuasive, but some that appear almost self-evident instead rest on controversial evaluative judgments. Many of my comments deal with these complexities, drawing from her book on interpretation and political theory as well as her Essay. Other remarks develop subjects Warnke barely touches. My thoughts are, thus, some combination of clarification, supplementation, and disagreement.

My initial effort is to refine in just what senses interpretations of texts, social practices, and legal rules must speak to our concerns. I next explore how interpretations of legal texts that are …

How Law Can Be Determinate, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This Article, part of a longer study, considers one problem about the objectivity of law. The problem is whether the law as it exists provides determinate answers to many legal questions for judges, other officials, and citizens. I emphasize the word many. This Article does not focus on "hard cases" and then ask whether single correct answers for them exist. It does not inquire whether in some complicated sense all legal questions have determinate answers. This is a treatment of easy legal questions. To most lawyers, it may seem self-evident that many legal questions do have determinate answers; and that …