Law Commons^™

The Structural Case For Vertical Maximalism, Tara Leigh Grove

Faculty Publications

Many prominent jurists and scholars, including those with outlooks as diverse as Chief Justice John Roberts and Cass Sunstein, have recently advocated a “minimalist” approach to opinion writing at the Supreme Court. They assert that the Court should issue narrow, fact-bound decisions that do not resolve much beyond the case before it. I argue that minimalism, as employed by the current Supreme Court, is in tension with the structure of the Constitution. Article III and the Supremacy Clause, along with historical evidence from the Founding Era, suggest that the Constitution creates a hierarchical judiciary and gives the Court a “supreme” …

Federal And State Judicial Selection In An Interest Group Perspective, Rafael Gely, Michael E. Solimine

Faculty Publications

The literature on judicial selection systems has given considerable attention to the role that politicians and their parties - through their legislative roles - have played in the adoption and operation of these judicial selection systems. Less attention, however, has been given to both the effect that interest groups, broadly defined, have in the creation and implementation of judicial selection systems and the effect that these systems have on the strategies adopted by interest groups to accomplish their goals. This Article seeks to fill this gap. Using the framework advanced by William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner in their …

Legal Holes, Noa Ben-Asher

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

In the years that followed the events of September 11, 2001, a debate crystallized between those who think that “legal grey and black holes”—which I call simply “legal holes”—are necessary and integral to U.S. law and those who think that they are dangerous and should be abolished. Legal black holes “arise when statutes or legal rules ‘either explicitly exempt[] the executive from the requirements of the rule of law or explicitly exclude[] judicial review of executive action.’” Grey holes, in contrast, “arise when ‘there are some legal constraints on executive action . . . but the[y] are so insubstantial …