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Conflicts Of Interest And Institutional Litigants, Curtis E.A. Karnow
Conflicts Of Interest And Institutional Litigants, Curtis E.A. Karnow
ExpressO
This paper uses techniques borrowed from the field of game theory to describe rational bargaining among institutional litigants, and explains how the results, while often not leading to the rational outcome in a given case, do rationally serve a more general strategy. The paper then reviews the law on conflicts of interests and concludes that such conflicts—as between attorney and client, and among clients—will often result when institutional litigants bargain. The paper continues with a review on the law of waiver and provides a basis to accommodate the conflicts of interests. That accommodation however will often not be practical, and …
Who Decides?: A Critical Look At Procedural Discretion, Robert G. Bone
Who Decides?: A Critical Look At Procedural Discretion, Robert G. Bone
ExpressO
Federal civil procedure today relies extensively on trial judge discretion to manage litigation, promote settlements, and otherwise tailor process to individual cases. Even those rules with decisional standards leave trial judges considerable interpretive freedom to make case-specific determinations. This Article criticizes these choices and recommends stricter rules. Many judges and procedure scholars applaud the discretionary approach, and the Advisory Committee seems content to draft vague rules that implement it. The assumption seems to be that trial judges have the expertise and experience to do a good job of tailoring procedures to the needs of particular cases. The assumption is wrong, …
No Free Lunch: How Settlement Can Reduce The Legal System's Ability To Induce Efficient Behavior, Abraham Lee Wickelgren
No Free Lunch: How Settlement Can Reduce The Legal System's Ability To Induce Efficient Behavior, Abraham Lee Wickelgren
ExpressO
While there is widespread agreement that it is better for cases to settle than go to trial, the arguments in favor of settlement have typically overlooked how settlement affects one of the most important functions of the legal system: influencing the behavior that gives rise to lawsuits. This essay argues that, in some cases, settlement can impair the ability of the legal system to deter harmful behavior without chilling desirable behavior. Where it exists, this effect is a fundamental property of settlement in that there is no way to change other legal rules to eliminate it. Because settlements also have …