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Articles 1 - 30 of 55
Full-Text Articles in Law
Hunting Unicorns, Aaron Edlin
Hunting Unicorns, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
2019 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, And Cases, Aaron Edlin
2019 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, And Cases, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
2018 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, And Cases, Aaron Edlin
2018 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, And Cases, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
What's In A Denial? Bayesian Analysis Shows That Kavanaugh Lied About Denials Under Oath And Trump Was Foolish To Believe Mbs, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.This paper is an effort to assist courts and …
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Stereotypes And Affirmative Action In Higher Education Admissions, Prasad Krishnamurthy, Aaron Edlin
Stereotypes And Affirmative Action In Higher Education Admissions, Prasad Krishnamurthy, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
In FTC v. Acta vis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.
This paper is an effort to assist …
Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”This article is an effort to help courts and counsel …
Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to confirm …
Cartels By Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, Aaron Edlin, Rebecca Haw
Cartels By Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, Aaron Edlin, Rebecca Haw
Aaron Edlin
It has been over a hundred years since George Bernard Shaw wrote that "[a]ll professions are a conspiracy against the laity." Since then, the number of occupations and the percentage of workers subject to occupational licensing have exploded; nearly one-third of the U.S. workforce is now licensed, up from five percent in the 1950s. Through occupational licensing boards, states endow cosmetologists, veterinary doctors, medical doctors, and florists with the authority to decide who may practice their art. It cannot surprise when licensing boards comprised of competitors regulate in ways designed to raise their profits. The result for consumers is higher …
2017 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, And Cases.Pdf, Aaron Edlin
2017 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, And Cases.Pdf, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Conservatism And Switcher's Curse, Aaron Edlin
Conservatism And Switcher's Curse, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
2016 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, And Cases, Aaron Edlin
2016 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, And Cases, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Letting Dentists Feel The Bite Of Competition, Aaron Edlin
Letting Dentists Feel The Bite Of Competition, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
The Supreme Court ruling in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission ruling will force state licensing boards to be more reasonable in their regulations and to be less cartel-like.
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron Edlin, Herbert Hovenkamp, Scott Hemphill, Carl Shapiro
The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron Edlin, Herbert Hovenkamp, Scott Hemphill, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered “reverse payment” settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.
This paper is an effort to assist courts …
Professors Update 2015, Antitrust Analysis, 7th Ed., Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Louis Kaplow
Professors Update 2015, Antitrust Analysis, 7th Ed., Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Louis Kaplow
Aaron Edlin
Professors Update for Antitrust Analysis, 7th edition Includes updates to American Express v. Italian Colors, North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, Text Messaging, and ZF Meritor v. Eaton.
Actavis And Error Costs, Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Actavis And Error Costs, Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro
Aaron Edlin
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.
As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to …
Freedom To Trade And The Competitive Process, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell
Freedom To Trade And The Competitive Process, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell
Aaron Edlin
Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. Much of antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firms’ attempts to restrain improving trade between their rivals and customers. In this way, antitrust protects firms’ and customers’ freedom to trade to their mutual betterment.
The Role Of Switching Costs In Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison Of Microsoft And Google, Aaron Edlin, Robert Harris
The Role Of Switching Costs In Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison Of Microsoft And Google, Aaron Edlin, Robert Harris
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin
Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Judge Breyer famously worried that aggressive prohibitions of predatory pricing throw away a bird in hand (low prices during the alleged predatory period) for a speculative bird in the bush (preventing higher prices thereafter). Here, I argue that there is no bird in hand because entry cannot be presumed. Moreover, it is plausibly commonplace that low prices or the threat of low prices produce anticompetitive results by reducing entry, inducing exit, and keeping prices high. I analyze three potential standards for identifying predatory pricing. Two are traditional but have been tangled together and must be distinguished. First, a price-cost test …
Don't Tax The Rich, Tax Inequality, Aaron S. Edlin
Don't Tax The Rich, Tax Inequality, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
A Brandeis tax can stop inequality in its tracks.
Clearings And Thickets, Robert D. Cooter, Aaron Edlin
Clearings And Thickets, Robert D. Cooter, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Abstract: Intellectual property rights create temporary monopoly power for innovators. Monopoly pricing transfers wealth to the innovator from the innovations buyers -- consumers, producers, and other innovators. For innovations mostly used in consumption and production, the transfer from consumers and producers to innovators increases the profitability of innovating and causes more of it. The welfare gains from faster growth quickly overtake the temporary losses from monopoly’s dead weight loss. Thus intellectual property rights should be strong for innovations mostly used by consumers and producers. In contrast, for innovations mostly used by other innovators, the transfer of wealth from one innovator …
Chapter 1: The Importance Of Law In Promoting Innovation And Growth, Robert D. Cooter, Aaron Edlin, Robert Litan, George Priest
Chapter 1: The Importance Of Law In Promoting Innovation And Growth, Robert D. Cooter, Aaron Edlin, Robert Litan, George Priest
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
2011 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis, Problems, Text, And Cases, Philip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin
2011 Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis, Problems, Text, And Cases, Philip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Economists’ Comment, Michael R. Baye, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert, Jerry A. Hausman, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Steven C. Salop, Richard L. Schmalensee, Joshua D. Wright
Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Economists’ Comment, Michael R. Baye, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert, Jerry A. Hausman, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Steven C. Salop, Richard L. Schmalensee, Joshua D. Wright
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
It Works For Mergers, Why Not Finance, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert
It Works For Mergers, Why Not Finance, Aaron S. Edlin, Richard J. Gilbert
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.
Uc System: Layoffs, Not Pay Cuts, Robert D. Cooter, Aaron Edlin
Uc System: Layoffs, Not Pay Cuts, Robert D. Cooter, Aaron Edlin
Aaron Edlin
The University of California should should respond to the financial crisis of 2009 by reducing employment, not salaries. Employment should be reduced by eliminating inferior programs and activities remote from the core mission of teaching and research.
Show Me The Money, Aaron S. Edlin, Dwight Jaffee
What Is The Probability Your Vote Will Make A Difference?, Andrew Gelman, Nate Silver, Aaron S. Edlin