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Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics, And Negotiations Approach, Rafael Gely, Leonard Bierman
Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics, And Negotiations Approach, Rafael Gely, Leonard Bierman
Faculty Publications
In this article, we directly attack Professors Wachter and Cohen's assertion regarding the economic efficiency of the Mackay doctrine. Applying internal and external labor market analysis, we argue that the Mackay doctrine is economically inefficient because it allows employers to behave “opportunistically” with respect to employees that have made “firm-specific” investments in their employing firms. To remedy this problem we propose a new “negotiations approach,” the components of which are: (1) the statutory overruling of Mackay, and (2) the concomitant amendment of the NLRA to make the striker replacement issue a “mandatory” subject of collective bargaining.
The North American Agreement On Labor Cooperation: A New Frontier In North American Labor Relations, Rafael Gely, Leonard Bierman
The North American Agreement On Labor Cooperation: A New Frontier In North American Labor Relations, Rafael Gely, Leonard Bierman
Faculty Publications
During the debate leading to the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), a great deal of concern focused on the effect that a trade agreement such as the NAFTA might have on workers' rights. As a condition for the ratification of the NAFTA, Congress provided that the treaty would not “enter into force until the three countries enact their own national agreement on labor cooperation.” In response to this concern, the three signatory countries negotiated the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (“NAALC” or “Labor Agreement”). The NAALC establishes a formal and elaborate procedure to settle complaints …