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Full-Text Articles in Law
Class Actions And Private Antitrust Litigation, Albert H. Choi, Kathryn E. Sprier
Class Actions And Private Antitrust Litigation, Albert H. Choi, Kathryn E. Sprier
Law & Economics Working Papers
When firms collude and charge supra-competitive prices, consumers can bring antitrust lawsuits against the firms. When the litigation cost is low, firms accept the cost as just another cost of doing business, whereas when the cost is high, the firms lower the price to deter litigation. Class action is modeled as a mechanism that allows plaintiffs and attorneys to obtain economies of scale. We show that class actions, and the firms' incentive to block them, may or may not be socially desirable. Agency problems, settlement, fee-shifting, treble damages, public enforcement, and sustaining collusion through repeat play are also considered.
How Many Plaintiffs Are Enough? Venue In Title Vii Class Actions, Piper Hoffman
How Many Plaintiffs Are Enough? Venue In Title Vii Class Actions, Piper Hoffman
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Article critiques the recent rash of federal district court opinions holding that all named plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must satisfy the venue requirements in the court where they filed the action. Neither the text nor the history of Title VII requires this prevailing interpretation; to the contrary, requiring every named plaintiff to satisfy venue requirements in the same court undermines the legislative purpose behind both Title VII and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by creating a new obstacle to employees seeking to enforce …