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Full-Text Articles in Law
Effective Pollution Control In Industrialized Countries: International Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses, And The Gatt, Frederic L. Kirgis Jr.
Effective Pollution Control In Industrialized Countries: International Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses, And The Gatt, Frederic L. Kirgis Jr.
Michigan Law Review
It is generally recognized that efforts toward meaningful pollution control by an industrialized nation or group of nations raise economic problems at the international level. Discussion has touched upon the balance of trade and the effects for developing countries. Yet there seems to have been little attempt to analyze how these problems will manifest themselves and how they may be resolved within the current international legal-economic ordering system. This Article cannot deal with them all, but will examine closely the international competitive disincentives to truly effective pollution-control efforts in the industrialized countries, where environmental imperatives bear heavily on national decision-makers. …
Adjustment To Hardship Caused By Imports: The New Decisions Of The Tariff Commission And The Need For Legislative Clarification, Carl H. Fulda
Adjustment To Hardship Caused By Imports: The New Decisions Of The Tariff Commission And The Need For Legislative Clarification, Carl H. Fulda
Michigan Law Review
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, known as GATT, embodies the commitments of its contracting parties, now numbering eighty countries, to enter "into reciprocal and mutual advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce."
The Regulation Of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, Warren F. Schwartz, Eugene W. Harper Jr.
The Regulation Of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, Warren F. Schwartz, Eugene W. Harper Jr.
Michigan Law Review
We will begin by examining the basic contours of the present GATT regulation of subsidies. We will then consider the theory of comparative advantage underlying the GATT regime and introduce the complications of externalities and the governmental process designed to take account of them. Finally, we will make some tentative suggestions for changes in rules and institutions that might serve to improve the present state of affairs.