Law Commons^™

Confessions In An International Age: Re-Examining Admissibility Through The Lens Of Foreign Interrogations, Julie Tanaka Siegel

Michigan Law Review

In Colorado v. Connelly the Supreme Court held that police misconduct is necessary for an inadmissible confession. Since the Connelly decision, courts and scholars have framed the admissibility of a confession in terms of whether it successfully deters future police misconduct. As a result, the admissibility of a confession turns largely on whether U.S. police acted poorly, and only after overcoming this threshold have courts considered factors pointing to the reliability and voluntariness of the confession. In the international context, this translates into the routine and almost mechanic admission of confessions— even when there is clear indication that the confession …

The Future Of Confession Law: Toward Rules For The Voluntariness Test, Eve Brensike Primus

Michigan Law Review

Confession law is in a state of collapse. Fifty years ago, three different doctrines imposed constitutional limits on the admissibility of confessions in criminal cases: Miranda doctrine under the Fifth Amendment, Massiah doctrine under the Sixth Amendment, and voluntariness doctrine under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. But in recent years, the Supreme Court has gutted Miranda and Massiah, effectively leaving suspects with only voluntariness doctrine to protect them during police interrogations. The voluntariness test is a notoriously vague case-by-case standard. In this Article, I argue that if voluntariness is going to be the framework for …

A Look Back At The "Gatehouses And Mansions" Of American Criminal Procedure, Yale Kamisar

Articles

I am indebted to Professor William Pizzi for remembering—and praising—the “Gatehouses and Mansions” essay I wrote fifty years ago. A great many articles and books have been written about Miranda. So it is nice to be remembered for an article published a year before that famous case was ever decided.

Empty Promises: Miranda Warnings In Noncustodial Interrogations, Aurora Maoz

Michigan Law Review

You have the right to remain silent; anything you say can be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney; if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided to you at the state's expense. In 2010, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to resolve the question of what courts should do when officers administer Miranda warnings in a situation where a suspect is not already in custody-in other words, when officers are not constitutionally required to give or honor these warnings. While most courts have found a superfluous warning to be …

Reply To Richard A. Leo And Jon B. Gould, Samuel R. Gross, Barbara O'Brien

Articles

The following is a letter to the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law received from Professors Samuel Gross and Barbara O'Brien, responding to an article published in the Journal in Fall 2009 by Professors Richard Leo and Jon Gould. This letter is followed by a reply from Professors Leo and Gould. Professors Gross and O'Brien did not see the reply prior to the Journal going to press. As we have indicated before, we welcome letters to the Journal from readers on any topic covered in a prior issue. - Editors

Proximate Cause In Constitutional Torts: Holding Interrogators Liable For Fifth Amendment Violations At Trial, Joel Flaxman

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues for the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in McKinley: a proper understanding of the Fifth Amendment requires holding that an officer who coerces a confession that is used at trial to convict a defendant in violation of the right against self-incrimination should face liability for the harm of conviction and imprisonment. Part I examines how the Supreme Court and the circuits have applied the concept of common law proximate causation to constitutional torts and argues that lower courts are wrong to blindly adopt common law rules without reference to the constitutional rights at stake. It …

Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar

Articles

June marks the 40th anniversary of one of the most praised, most maligned-and probably one of the most misunderstood-U.S. Supreme Court cases in American history, Miranda v. Arizona. The opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren conditions police questioning of people in custody on the giving of warnings about the right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the waiver of those rights. 384 U.S. 436. This ruling represents a compromise of sorts between the former elusive, ambiguous and subjective voluntariness/totality-of-the-circumstances test and extreme proposals that would have eliminated police interrogation altogether. But William H. Rehnquist didn't see Miranda that …

How Earl Warren's Twenty-Two Years In Law Enforcement Affected His Work As Chief Justice, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Before becoming governor of California, Earl Warren had spent his entire legal career, twenty-two years, in law enforcement. Professor Kamisar maintains that this experience significantly influenced Warren's work as a Supreme Court justice and gave him a unique perspective into police interrogation and other police practices. This article discusses some of Warren's experiences in law enforcement and searches for evidence of that experience in Warren's opinions. For example, when Warren was head of the Alameda County District Attorney's Office, he and his deputies not only relied on confessions in many homicide cases but also themselves interrogated homicide suspects. The seeds …

Stories About Miranda, George C. Thomas Iii

Michigan Law Review

It is no exaggeration to say that Yale Kamisar was present at the creation of Miranda v. Arizona. To be sure, the seeds of Miranda had been sown in earlier cases, particularly Escobedo v. Illinois, but Escobedo was a Sixth Amendment right to counsel case. Professor Kamisar first saw the potential for extending the theory of Escob edo to the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. Escob edo theorized that a healthy criminal justice system requires that the accused know their rights and are encouraged to exercise them. The Escobedo Court read history to teach that no system …

Congress' Arrogance, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Does Dickerson v. U.S., reaffirming Miranda and striking down §3501 (the federal statute purporting to "overrule" Miranda), demonstrate judicial arrogance? Or does the legislative history of §3501 demonstrate the arrogance of Congress? Shortly after Dickerson v. U.S. reaffirmed Miranda and invalidated §3501, a number of Supreme Court watchers criticized the Court for its "judicial arrogance" in peremptorily rejecting Congress' test for the admissibility of confessions. The test, pointed out the critics, had been adopted by extensive hearings and debate about Miranda's adverse impact on law enforcement. The Dickerson Court did not discuss the legislative history of §3501 at all. However, …

The Three Threats To Miranda, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) was the centerpiece of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure. Moreover, as Professor Stephen Schulhofer of the University of Chicago Law School has recently noted, a numbir of the Miranda safeguards "have now become entrenched in the interrogation procedures of many countries around the world." But Miranda is in serious trouble at home.

Chopping Miranda Down To Size, Michael Chertoff

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Confessions, Truth, and the Law by Joseph D. Grano

Police-Obtained Evidence And The Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, Arnold H. Loewy

Michigan Law Review

The article will consider four different types of police-obtained evidence: evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation, confessions and lineup identifications obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel, and coerced confessions. My conclusions are that evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure is excluded because of the police misconduct by which it was obtained. On the other hand, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation is (or ought to be) excluded because use of that evidence compromises the defendant's procedural right not to be compelled to be a witness against …

Duckworth V. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda Case That May Cause Much Mischief, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Professor Yale Kamisar, the country's foremost scholar of Miranda and police interrogation, presents an analysis and critique of the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of Miranda. In Duckworth, a 5-4 Court upheld the "if and when" language systematically used by the Hammond, Indiana, Police Department: "We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." The real issue was whether the police effectively conveyed the substance of a vital part of Miranda: the right to have a lawyer appointed prior to any questioning. Professor Kamisar …

Selling The Idea To Tell The Truth: The Professional Interrogator And Modern Confessions Law, Joseph D. Grano

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (3d edition) by Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid, and Joseph P. Buckley

The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), And Police Investigatory Practices, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

In one sense the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure may be said to. have been launched by the 1956 case of Griffin v. Illinois (establishing an indigent criminal defendant's right to a free transcript on appeal, at least under certain circumstances) and to have been significantly advanced by two 1963 cases: Gideon v. Wainwright (entitling an indigent defendant to free counsel, at least in serious criminal cases) and Douglas v. California (requiring a state to provide an indigent with counsel on his first appeal from a criminal conviction). But these were not the cases that plunged the Warren …

A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

If the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch conversations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I have participated this past summer are any indication, Miranda v. Arizona has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions do not escape attention.

Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island V. Innis And United States V. Henry, Welsh S. White

Michigan Law Review

In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court defined "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda; and in United States v. Henry, it defined "deliberate elicitation" within the meaning of Massiah. This article explores the implications of Innis and Henry, suggests readings of the new tests consistent with their purposes, and applies the tests to several situations where the scope of the fifth and sixth amendment protections remains unclear.

The Right To Counsel In Police Interrogation Cases: Miranda And Williams, Mitchell Leibson Chyette

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This article will consider some of the theoretical and practical ramifications of the Williams decision and compare its protections to the protections offered by Miranda. The article, focussing on the right to counsel, discusses the nature of the police conduct which is prohibited by each decision, the time at which the protections involved become effective, and the standard by which a waiver of the rights will be measured. The article concludes that there may be significant differences in the application of the two cases and that a uniform rule based on the sixth amendment may be superior to the …

Is The Exclusionary Rule An 'Illogical' Or 'Unnatural' Interpretation Of The Fourth Amendment?, Yale Kamisar

Articles

More than 50 years have passed since the Supreme Court decided the Weeks case, barring the use in federal prosecutions of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the Silverthorne case, invoking what has come to be known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The justices who decided those cases would, I think, be quite surprised to learn that some day the value of the exclusionary rule would be measured by-and the very life of the rule might depend on-an empirical evaluation of its efficacy in deterring police misconduct. These justices were engaged in a less …

Judicial Examination Of The Accused--A Remedy For The Third Degree, Paul G. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

Reprint from 30 Michigan Law Review 1224.

In its report on "Lawlessness in Law Enforcement" the Wickersham Commission concludes that in the police systems of a number of American municipalities the "third degree" is very generally practiced as a means of extorting from accused persons under arrest confessions, incriminating statements, and other information of value to the police. The conclusion of the Commission confirms the results of private investigation made in the same field. It is true that the methods of inquiry pursued by the Commission leave doubt as to the accuracy of some of the facts reported. But the …

Custodial Police Interrogation In Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt To Implement Miranda, Richard J. Medalie, Leonard Zeitz, Paul Alexander

Michigan Law Review

In his attempt to define the meaning of democracy, Carl Becker, looking back to Plato's view of society, observed that "[a]ll human institutions, we are told, have their ideal forms laid away in heaven, and we do not need to be told that the actual institutions conform but indifferently to these ideal counterparts." Becker's observation may well set the perspective from which to view what occurred when the attempt was made in the District of Columbia to implement the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona.

'Custodial Interrogation' Within The Meaning Of Miranda, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

The primary conceptual hurdle confronting the Miranda Court was the "legal reasoning" that any and all police interrogation is unaffected by the privilege against self-incrimination because such interrogation does not involve any kind of judicial process for the taking of testimony; inasmuch as police officers have no legal authority to compel statements of any kind, there is no legal obligation, ran the argument, to which a privilege can apply. See, e.g., the discussion and authorities collected in Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. …

The Citizen On Trial: The New Confession Rules, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Commenting on why it has taken the United States so long to apply "the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel to the proceedings in the stationhouse as well as to those in the courtroom" - as the Supreme Court did in Miranda v. Arizona - this author notes that, "To a large extent this is so because here, as elsewhere, there has been a wide gap between the principles to which we aspire and the practices we actually employ."

Police Interrogation And The Supreme Court--The Latest Round, Jerold H. Israel

Book Chapters

My first task is to explain to some degree the nature of the problem embodied in our title. This book has been designated as "Escobedo-The Second Round." What we will be discussing is a series of cases, decided in June, 1966, the most noteworthy of which is Miranda v. Arizona [384 U.S. 436 (1966)]. In these cases, the United States Supreme Court prescribed a new set of standards governing the introduction in evidence of statements obtained from the defendant through police interrogation. Actually, to a degree these standards were not entirely new. They had been suggested, at least in part, …

A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar

Articles

F the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch conversations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I have participated this past summer3 are any indication, Miranda v. Arizona' has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions do not escape attention.

Evidence-Police Regulation By Rules Of Evidence, John Barker Waite

Michigan Law Review

The judicial rules of Evidence, said their great expounder, "were never meant to be an indirect process of punishment." Yet twice the Supreme Court has promulgated new rules of evidence for precisely that purpose. The rule that evidence is inadmissible, regardless of its relevance and materiality, if it was obtained by unreasonable search was first suggested by Justice Bradley, who wrote the majority opinion in Boyd v. United States in 1886. The other rule was voiced in 1943 by Justice Frankfurter, writing the majority opinion in McNabb v. United States. And each rule demonstrates the inherent evil of judicial …

Judicial Examination Of The Accused-A Remedy For The Third Degree, Paul G. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

In its report on "Lawlessness in Law Enforcement" the Wickersham Commission concludes that in the police systems of a number of American municipalities the "third degree" is very generally practiced as a means of extorting from accused persons under arrest confessions, incriminating statements, and other information of value to the police. The conclusion of the Commission confirms the results of private investigation made in the same field. It is true that the. methods of inquiry pursued by the Commission leave doubt as to the accuracy of some of the facts reported. But the quality of the evidence submitted as the …