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Corporate governance

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Disaggregating Corpus Christi: The Illiberal Implications Of Hobby Lobby's Right To Free Exercise, Katharine Jackson Sep 2016

Disaggregating Corpus Christi: The Illiberal Implications Of Hobby Lobby's Right To Free Exercise, Katharine Jackson

Katharine Jackson

This paper first examines and critiques the group rights to religious exercise derived from the three ontologies of the corporation suggested by different legal conceptions of corporate personhood often invoked by Courts. Finding the implicated groups rights inimical to individual religious freedom, the paper then presents an argument as to why a discourse of intra-corporate toleration and voluntariness does a better job at protecting religious liberty.


Some Key Things Entrepreneurs Need To Know About The Law And Lawyers, Lawrence J. Trautman, Anthony Luppino, Malika S. Simmons Sep 2015

Some Key Things Entrepreneurs Need To Know About The Law And Lawyers, Lawrence J. Trautman, Anthony Luppino, Malika S. Simmons

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

New business formation is a powerful economic engine that creates jobs. Diverse legal issues are encountered as a start-up entity approaches formation, initial capitalization and fundraising, arrangements with employees and independent contractors, and relationships with other third parties. The endeavors of a typical start-up in the United States will likely implicate many of the following areas of law: intellectual property; business organizations; tax laws; employment and labor laws; securities regulation; contracts and licensing agreements; commercial sales; debtor-creditor relations; real estate law; health and safety laws/codes; permits and licenses; environmental protection; industry specific regulatory laws and approval processes; tort/personal injury, products …


E-Commerce, Cyber, And Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons From Paypal, Lawrence J. Trautman Aug 2015

E-Commerce, Cyber, And Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons From Paypal, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

By now, almost without exception, every business has an internet presence, and is likely engaged in e-commerce. What are the major risks perceived by those engaged in e-commerce and electronic payment systems? What potential risks, if they become reality, may cause substantial increases in operating costs or threaten the very survival of the enterprise? This article utilizes the relevant annual report disclosures from eBay (parent of PayPal), along with other eBay and PayPal documents, as a potentially powerful teaching device. Most of the descriptive language to follow is excerpted directly from eBay’s regulatory filings. My additions include weaving these materials …


The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis Jan 2015

The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis

Alicia Davis

This Article offers evidence that higher quality internal corporate governance is associated with higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. This finding is consistent with the idea that institutions have greater reason than individual investors to prefer well-governed firms, but surprising given the substantial empirical evidence that casts doubt on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms. The study described in this Article also finds that higher quality external governance is associated with lower proportions of ownership by certain types of institutional investors, also a somewhat surprising result given available empirical evidence on the positive relationship between external governance and firm …


Present At The Creation: Reflections On The Early Years Of The National Association Of Corporate Directors, Lawrence J. Trautman Jul 2014

Present At The Creation: Reflections On The Early Years Of The National Association Of Corporate Directors, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

Effective corporate governance is critical to the productive operation of the global economy and preservation of our way of life. Excellent governance execution is also required to achieve economic growth and robust job creation in any country. In the United States, the premier director membership organization is the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). Since 1978, NACD plays a major role in fostering excellence in corporate governance in the United States and beyond. The NACD has grown from a mere realization of the importance of corporate governance to become the only national membership organization created by and for corporate directors. …


E-Commerce And Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons From Paypal, Lawrence J. Trautman Jun 2014

E-Commerce And Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons From Paypal, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

What are the major risks perceived by those engaged in e-commerce and electronic payment systems? What development risks, if they become reality, may cause substantial increases in operating costs or threaten the very survival of the enterprise? This article utilizes the relevant annual report disclosures from eBay (parent of PayPal), along with other eBay and PayPal documents, as a potentially powerful teaching device. Most of the descriptive language to follow is excerpted directly from eBay’s regulatory filings. My additions include weaving these materials into a logical presentation and providing supplemental sources for those who desire a deeper look (usually in …


How Independent (Outside) Directors’ Compensation Structure, Their Frequency Of Meetings And Concentrated Ownership Effects Shareholder’S Wealth? Evidence From Indian Traded Companies, Rakesh Yadav Jan 2014

How Independent (Outside) Directors’ Compensation Structure, Their Frequency Of Meetings And Concentrated Ownership Effects Shareholder’S Wealth? Evidence From Indian Traded Companies, Rakesh Yadav

Rakesh Yadav

Corporate Governance advocates have strongly encouraged firms to include proper structure in independent directors’ compensation to help align directors’ interested with that of corporate stockholders. While the argument in favor of structure based director compensation is intuitively appealing, there is very little evidence of the efficacy of structure based director compensation .Regulators in India through Clause -49(equivalent to Sarbanes –Oxley act of U.S.A) of stock exchange listing agreement on other side wish to increase market stability and efficiency through new reforms in compensation without examining the impact of ownership structure on the shareholder’s wealth. In an effort to determine the …


E-Commerce And Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons From Paypal, Lawrence J. Trautman Oct 2013

E-Commerce And Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons From Paypal, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

What are the major risks perceived by those engaged in e-commerce and electronic payment systems? What development risks, if they become reality, may cause substantial increases in operating costs or threaten the very survival of the enterprise? This article utilizes the relevant annual report disclosures from eBay (parent of PayPal), along with other eBay and PayPal documents, as a potentially powerful teaching device. Most of the descriptive language to follow is excerpted directly from eBay’s regulatory filings. My additions include weaving these materials into a logical presentation and providing supplemental sources for those who desire a deeper look (usually in …


Why Does Executive Greed Prevail In The United States And Canada But Not In Japan? The Pattern Of Low Ceo Pay And High Worker Welfare In Japanese Corporations, Alberto R. Salazar V. Sep 2013

Why Does Executive Greed Prevail In The United States And Canada But Not In Japan? The Pattern Of Low Ceo Pay And High Worker Welfare In Japanese Corporations, Alberto R. Salazar V.

Alberto R. Salazar V.

According to a list of the 200 most highly-paid chief executives at the largest U.S. public companies in 2013, Oracle’s Lawrence J. Ellison remained the best paid CEO and earned $96.2 million as total annual compensation last year. He has received $1.8 billion over the past 20 years. The lowest paid on the same list is General Motors’ D. F. Akerson who earned $11.1 million. The average national pay for a non-supervisory US worker was $51,200 last year and a CEO made 354 times more than an average worker in 2012. Hunter Harrison, Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd., was the best …


Present At The Creation: Reflections On The Early Years Of The National Association Of Corporate Directors, Lawrence J. Trautman Jul 2013

Present At The Creation: Reflections On The Early Years Of The National Association Of Corporate Directors, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

Effective corporate governance is critical to the productive operation of the global economy and preservation of our way of life. Excellent governance execution is also required to achieve economic growth and robust job creation in any country. In the United States, the premier director membership organization is the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). Now over 36 years old, NACD plays a major role in fostering excellence in corporate governance in the United States and beyond. Over the past thirty-six years NACD has grown from a mere realization of the importance of corporate governance to become the only national membership …


How To Sufficiently Consider Efficiency, Competition, And Capital Formation In The Wake Of Business Roundtable, Ian D. Ghrist Jan 2013

How To Sufficiently Consider Efficiency, Competition, And Capital Formation In The Wake Of Business Roundtable, Ian D. Ghrist

Ian D. Ghrist

This article applies ideas from the Law and Economics movement to the D.C. Circuit's 2011 decision in Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission. The article lays out a framework for cost-benefit analysis that, if followed, should increase new rules' chances of surviving the heightened arbitrary and capricious review standard imposed by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.

The Dodd-Frank Act comprises the broadest financial reforms since the 1930s. The Act, however, makes surprisingly few important decisions and instead, almost exclusively defers to agency rulemaking or the creation of a new organization. The Act mandates the promulgation of …


The Merits Of Cooperative Corporate Governance In The Digital Age, Meredith-Anne Kurz Jan 2013

The Merits Of Cooperative Corporate Governance In The Digital Age, Meredith-Anne Kurz

Meredith-Anne Kurz

No abstract provided.


The Business Judgment Rule As An Immunity Doctrine, Lori A. Mcmillan Jul 2012

The Business Judgment Rule As An Immunity Doctrine, Lori A. Mcmillan

Lori A. McMillan

The business judgment rule is a judicially created doctrine that protects directors from personal civil liability for the decisions they make on behalf of a corporation. In today’s era of corporate scandals, global financial meltdowns, and directorial malfeasance it has become especially important in setting the bar for when directors are appropriately responsible to shareholders for their actions. Traditionally the business judgment rule has been regarded as a standard of liability, although it has never really been explored or enunciated as such. This view determines eligibility for business judgment rule protection of a decision after an examination of certain preconditions. …


Challenges And Opportunities For The Indonesian Securities Takeover Regulations: General Framework And Analysis From Dutch Law And Theoretical Perspectives, Yozua Makes Mar 2012

Challenges And Opportunities For The Indonesian Securities Takeover Regulations: General Framework And Analysis From Dutch Law And Theoretical Perspectives, Yozua Makes

Yozua Makes

This article examines question of the extent to which the rules in Indonesia concerning takeover of a public listed company: (1) facilitate efficient exchange of shares in the capital market with fair protection for all stakeholders in a takeover transaction pursuant to Good Corporate Governance (GCG) principles; and (2) accommodate principles and protection provided in the securities laws of more developed jurisdictions. These issues are addressed by analyzing the current Indonesian legal framework from the perspective of fairness and efficiency in the securities regulations and corporate governance principles. A comparative discussion of laws and regulations in Indonesia and the Netherlands …


What's Wrong With Shareholder Empowerment?, Bernard S. Sharfman Jan 2012

What's Wrong With Shareholder Empowerment?, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

In his keynote address at the Journal of Corporation Law spring banquet (March 8, 2012), Mr. Sharfman discusses the negative impact shareholder empowerment has on the efficiency of decision making at public companies. Shareholder empowerment is the shifting of decision making from the board of directors and executive management to shareholders.


Why Proxy Access Is Harmful To Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Sharfman Jan 2012

Why Proxy Access Is Harmful To Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

Historically, the SEC has allowed public companies to exclude from their proxy materials shareholder proposals for the nomination of directors by shareholders. This rule has allowed the nomination of directors to remain under the control of the board of directors and its nominating committee. However, under amended Rule 14a-8(i)(8), shareholders will now be able to include proposals on proxy access in a public company’s proxy materials. Public companies can now expect to receive such proposals for inclusion in their proxy materials for the 2012 proxy season.When voting on proxy access proposals, shareholders need to understand that proxy access is a …


Globalization Of Securities Enforcement: A Shift Toward Enhanced Regulatory Intensity In Brazil’S Capital Market?, Eugenio J. Cárdenas Jan 2012

Globalization Of Securities Enforcement: A Shift Toward Enhanced Regulatory Intensity In Brazil’S Capital Market?, Eugenio J. Cárdenas

Eugenio J. Cárdenas

This Paper, written for the “Globalization of the United States Litigation Model” symposium at Brooklyn Law School (October 21, 2011), inquires on whether emerging capital markets are shifting toward enhanced regulatory intensity in the enforcement of their securities laws, under the context of global legal convergence. It ventures into this puzzle of globalization, corporate law enforcement, and financial development, in light of the increasing phenomenon of regulatory convergence and international cooperation among securities regulators, in the realm of capital market surveillance and enforcement.

Focus is placed on the emerging Latin American region, namely Brazil’s securities market. The study explores Brazil’s …


"Because That's Where The Money Is": A Theory Of Corporate Legal Compliance, William Bradford Dec 2011

"Because That's Where The Money Is": A Theory Of Corporate Legal Compliance, William Bradford

william bradford

Upon his capture in 1934, the legendary bank robber Willie Sutton was asked by FBI agents, Why do you rob banks, Willie? Sutton, who believed the question to be rhetorical, replied, dryly, Because that's where the money is. In other words, Sutton understood his interrogator to be inquiring as to why he robbed banks rather than, say, homes, or gas stations, or church offering plates. Had he understood the query as intended - i.e., what was it about Willie Sutton the impelled Willie Sutton to crime when many others, struggling to survive the Great Depression, were not? - Sutton could …


The Economic Theory Of Derivative Actions, Diego G. Pardow Oct 2011

The Economic Theory Of Derivative Actions, Diego G. Pardow

Diego G. Pardow

This paper offers a model to formalize the economic theory of derivative actions developed during the last 30 years. From this perspective, the derivative action presents two interrelated problems. The first is how to solve the collective action problem that prevents that minority shareholders file a suit. The second is how to control the risk of collusive settlements between the defendant manager and the plaintiff’s attorney. This model identifies the fundamental tradeoffs that are implicit in these problems, as well as an optimum that could be used as normative benchmark. In brief, it argues that if the goal of derivative …


Who Sits On Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are And What They Do, Lawrence J. Trautman Aug 2011

Who Sits On Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are And What They Do, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

Corporate directors play an important role in governing American business, in the capital formation process, and are key to economic growth. Texas businesses play a disproportionately important role among the states in aggregate U.S. job creation, responsible for 37% of all net new American jobs since the recovery began. It is the job of the board of directors to govern the corporation. Director’s duties and responsibilities include: the duty of care; duty of loyalty; and duty of good faith. The recently published Trautman’s Guide™ to Texas Corporate Directors, provides biographical data for most of the approximately 20,000 for-profit corporate directors …


Assessing The Foundations Of Neo-Classical Professionalism In Law And Business, Robert E. Atkinson Jr. Feb 2011

Assessing The Foundations Of Neo-Classical Professionalism In Law And Business, Robert E. Atkinson Jr.

Robert E. Atkinson Jr.

This paper offers a neo-classical approach to corporate reform: Remodeling the private practice of corporate law and the management of for-profit business to make both occupations better serve, together, their proper public functions. Without dismissing the recent focus of reform on external regulation of corporations or internal restructuring of corporate governance, this paper seeks the foundation for a different approach, encouraging corporate managers and lawyers as professionals to serve their occupation’s correlate values: prosperity and justice. This focus on the primary agents of modern capitalism, corporate managers and lawyers, responds both to early management reformers like Brandeis in the U.S. …


How The Strong Negotiating Position Of Wall Street Employees Impacts The Corporate Governance Of Financial Firms, Bernard S. Sharfman Jan 2011

How The Strong Negotiating Position Of Wall Street Employees Impacts The Corporate Governance Of Financial Firms, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

Several prominent figures in the field of corporate governance have put the blame for the financial crisis of 2008 squarely on the shoulders of greedy shareholders. Moreover, they argued that the financial crisis of 2008 was the result of directors and managers of financial firms focusing too strongly on the short-term interests of its shareholders. If so, the financial crisis can be understood as a corporate governance failure relating to a pernicious form of shareholder primacy.

Yet, how can that argument be reconciled with the behavior of Wall Street firms in regard to the large bonus payments it made to …


Towards A Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory Of Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, Katharine Jackson Jan 2011

Towards A Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory Of Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, Katharine Jackson

Katharine Jackson

The governance regime of the public corporation in America, while tending to promote the concentration of economic and social power in company leadership, often encourages that leadership to advance the interests of their company’s short-term shareholders. The result is a board of directors beholden, if to anything at all, to short-term stock prices. This prioritization often comes at the expense of the corporation’s long-term sustainability and to its other constituents: its work force, creditors, and community. In contrast, governance in Continental European countries like Germany persuades corporate leadership to embrace social obligations and long-term outlooks through, e.g., enforced stakeholder representation …


Is The Eu Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously? An Essay On The Impotence Of Shareholdership In Corporate Europe, Pavlos E. Masouros Oct 2010

Is The Eu Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously? An Essay On The Impotence Of Shareholdership In Corporate Europe, Pavlos E. Masouros

Pavlos E. Masouros

This article critically analyzes the Shareholder Rights Directive ("SRD") (Directive 2007/36/EC). It is essentially an attempt to show that the deficit in the European corporate governance model with regard to the status of the shareholders persists even in the post-SRD era and that we still have a long distance to cover in order to truly empower shareholders in the EU. The SRD along with certain other Company Law Directives and the various European national corporate laws form a synthesis that falls short of providing shareholders with the full potential of getting their corporate governance voice through within listed corporations.

First …


A Japanese Calpers Or A New Model For Institutional Investor Activism? Japan's Pension Fund Association And The Emergence Of Shareholder Activism In Japan, Bruce Aronson Sep 2010

A Japanese Calpers Or A New Model For Institutional Investor Activism? Japan's Pension Fund Association And The Emergence Of Shareholder Activism In Japan, Bruce Aronson

Bruce Aronson

If activist institutional investors are arguably the primary external monitors of management under leading corporate governance systems in the United States and the United Kingdom, who might assume that role in other countries? And, more importantly, what activist shareholder strategies may be possible under different corporate governance systems and operating environments that are generally less supportive of shareholder activism than the United States and the United Kingdom? This Article seeks to address that question through a comparison of the well-known strategy of CalPERS with that of a rare, real-world example of institutional investor activism outside of the “Anglo-Saxon” model—Japan’s Pension …


Auditors' Multi-Layered Liability Regime, Paolo E. Giudici Aug 2010

Auditors' Multi-Layered Liability Regime, Paolo E. Giudici

Paolo E. Giudici

The proposals to limit auditor liability, principally aimed at protecting the Big-4 from the risk of a catastrophic exposure to damages, are grounded on the assumption that auditors are generally over-deterred. The 2008 EC Commission Recommendation on auditor liability relies heavily on this assumption and the economic rationale that underpins it, which is entirely focused on liability towards investors and the US narrative concerning securities class actions. However, the case is much more complex. Any discussion about auditor liability must investigate the following questions: who the auditor’s principals are; whether they are in a position to negotiate in order to …


"Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond The Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, Virginia E. Ho Mar 2010

"Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond The Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, Virginia E. Ho

Virginia E Ho

The global financial crisis has led to calls for greater corporate accountability and heightened controls over public corporations. As a result, the past year has seen a marked increase in regulatory initiatives that give shareholders a greater voice in corporate affairs. While debate continues to rage in the academy and beyond over the promise and pitfalls of shareholder empowerment, an important undercurrent in the controversy is the potential impact of "shareholder democracy" on corporate stakeholders.

This Article urges a vision of the corporation and its purpose that transcends the shareholder-stakeholder divide. Under this "enlightened shareholder value" approach, which has been …


"Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond The Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, Virginia E. Harper Ho Feb 2010

"Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond The Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, Virginia E. Harper Ho

Virginia E Ho

The global financial crisis has led to calls for greater corporate accountability and heightened controls over public corporations. As a result, the past year has seen a marked increase in regulatory initiatives that give shareholders a greater voice in corporate affairs. While debate continues to rage in the academy and beyond over the promise and pitfalls of shareholder empowerment, an important undercurrent in the controversy is the potential impact of "shareholder democracy" on corporate stakeholders.

This Article urges a vision of the corporation and its purpose that transcends the shareholder-stakeholder divide. Under this "enlightened shareholder value" approach, which has been …


Voluntary And Mandatory Skin In The Game:Understanding Outside Directors' Stock Holdings, Sanjai Bhagat Feb 2010

Voluntary And Mandatory Skin In The Game:Understanding Outside Directors' Stock Holdings, Sanjai Bhagat

Sanjai Bhagat

We examine the determinants of equity ownership by outside directors as well as the relationship between ownership and operating performance. Unlike previous studies of equity ownership by directors, we use hand-collected data on firm-level policies requiring director ownership for S&P 500 firms during the years 2003 and 2005. Ownership requirements allow us to shed further light on the determinants of director holdings and to separate voluntary from mandatory holdings of directors. If ownership requirements reflect optimal ownership levels, they provide a useful identification tool in the examination of ownership-performance relationships. Our primary findings are as follows: ownership requirements are more …


Corporate Governance And The Impact Of Controlling Shareholders, Bernard S. Sharfman Jan 2010

Corporate Governance And The Impact Of Controlling Shareholders, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

Good corporate governance practices at a publicly held firm will not necessarily be good practices at a publicly traded firm in which there is a controlling shareholder. This is because board independence, a key concept in structuring appropriate corporate governance practices, has a different meaning when a controlling shareholder is present.

However, identifying whether or not a board is truly independent is just the first step in evaluating the quality of corporate governance at a controlled corporation. After all, a controlling shareholder still has the power to dominate an independent board through his direct voting power and by threats of …