Law Commons^™

Lawn Signs: A Fourth Amendment For Constitutional Curmudgeons, Stephen E. Henderson, Andrew G. Ferguson

Stephen E Henderson

Punishment Without Culpability, John F. Stinneford

John F. Stinneford

For more than half a century, academic commentators have criticized the Supreme Court for failing to articulate a substantive constitutional conception of criminal law. Although the Court enforces various procedural protections that the Constitution provides for criminal defendants, it has left the question of what a crime is purely to the discretion of the legislature. This failure has permitted legislatures to evade the Constitution’s procedural protections by reclassifying crimes as civil causes of action, eliminating key elements (such as mens rea) or reclassifying them as defenses or sentencing factors, and authorizing severe punishments for crimes traditionally considered relatively minor. The …

The Bill Of Rights And Originalism, Gerard V. Bradley

Gerard V. Bradley

Professor Bradley begins the final installment of the University of Illinois Law Review's year-long tribute to the Bill of Rights by proposing that the first ten Amendments, like the Constitution itself, be interpreted according to the original understanding of their ratifiers. Professor Bradley, though, narrows the scope of the exegetical inquiry to what he proposes is the only sound originalism - plain meaning, historically recovered. Professor Bradley argues that interpreting the Bill of Rights according to the text's plain meaning among persons politically active at the time of drafting avoids both the inflexibility and philosophical deficiencies of "snapshot" conservative originalism …

Rethinking Proportionality Under The Cruel And Unusual Punishments Clause, John F. Stinneford

John F. Stinneford

Although a century has passed since the Supreme Court started reviewing criminal punishments for excessiveness under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, this area of doctrine remains highly problematic. The Court has never answered the claim that proportionality review is illegitimate in light of the Eighth Amendment’s original meaning. The Court has also adopted an ever-shifting definition of excessiveness, making the very concept of proportionality incoherent. Finally, the Court’s method of measuring proportionality is unreliable and selfcontradictory. As a result, a controlling plurality of the Court has insisted that proportionality review be limited to a narrow class of cases. This …

The Lecture Notes Of St. George Tucker; A Framing Period View Of The Bill Of Rights, David T. Hardy

David T. Hardy

This article reflects a transcription of the lecture notes of St. George Tucker, relevant to the newly ratified Bill of Rights. Tucker lectured law at the College of William and Mary from 1790 to 1804, and was well informed on the legal events of his day, with a brother in the first Senate and a friend in the First House. Tucker's notes reflect an astonishingly modern, and broad, view of the Bill of Rights' protections. His notes recently came to some prominence, being debated last term by majority and dissent in District of Columbia v. Heller.

Equal Protection And Sexual Orientation, Jack Tsen-Ta Lee

Jack Tsen-Ta LEE

Equality is the thread running through the fundamental liberties enshrined in our Constitution. ... Equality, expressed in Art 12 of the [Singapore] Constitution, is also a specific right enforceable by the court. The difficulty comes in applying this deceptively simple concept to real-life situations. ... In considering the validity of legislation, Singapore and Malaysian courts have generally favored rational review, a modest conception of equal protection, unlike their American counterparts which have adopted a more expansive reading in the form of strict and intermediate review. This article examines how these three levels of equal protection review operate, and argues that …