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Full-Text Articles in Law

Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee Sep 2015

Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy. If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …


A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert J. Rhee Sep 2015

A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

Conventional wisdom says that economic surplus is created when the cost of litigation is foregone in favor of settlement, a theory flowing from the Coase Theorem. The cost-benefit analysis weighs settlement against the expected value of litigation net of transaction cost. This calculus yields the normative proposition that settlement is a superior form of dispute resolution and so most trials are considered errors. While simple in concept, the prevailing economic model is flawed. This article is a theoretical inquiry into the selection criteria of settlement and trial. It applies principles of financial economics to construct a pricing theory of legal …


Loss Of Chance, Probabilistic Cause, And Damage Calculations: The Error In Matsuyama V. Birnbaum And The Majority Rule Of Damages In Many Jurisdictions More Generally, Robert J. Rhee Sep 2015

Loss Of Chance, Probabilistic Cause, And Damage Calculations: The Error In Matsuyama V. Birnbaum And The Majority Rule Of Damages In Many Jurisdictions More Generally, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This short commentary corrects an erroneous understanding of probabilistic causation in the loss-of-chance doctrine and the damage calculation method adopted in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is not alone. Many other common law courts have made the same error, including Indiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oklahoma. The consistency in the mistake suggests that the error is the majority rule of damages. I demonstrate here that this majority rule is based on erroneous mathematical reasoning and the fallacy of probabilistic logic.


The Socratic Method And The Mathematical Heuristic Of George Pólya, Robert J. Rhee Sep 2015

The Socratic Method And The Mathematical Heuristic Of George Pólya, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

A number of commentators have observed the decline of the Socratic method. This is unfortunate as the Socratic method can be an effective teaching tool. But this article recognizes that the Socratic method can be monochromatic. This article argues that the Socratic method should not be conceived simply as a method to teach analytic skills. Rather, once learned, it can be a concrete analytic tool for the students to use without the help of professors. In other words, it is an end to itself rather than a means. To do this, we can adopt George Polya's heuristic for teaching mathematical …


Catastrophic Risk And Governance After Hurricane Katrina: A Postscript To Terrorism Risk In A Post-9/11 Economy, Robert J. Rhee Sep 2015

Catastrophic Risk And Governance After Hurricane Katrina: A Postscript To Terrorism Risk In A Post-9/11 Economy, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This essay inquires into the political economy and system of governance that have made catastrophes more frequent and severe. The system of governance that is designed to mitigate risk and respond to catastrophes can be ineffective, or worse, increase the risk of harm through unintended consequences. Human influence must be considered a source of collateral risk, the kind that leads to a systemic crisis or exacerbates one. This essay concludes with some brief proposals, discussion topics more than completed ideas, which may facilitate further academic and political dialogue on effective governance and public risk management. They include a catastrophe tax, …


Specialization In Law And Business: A Proposal For A J.D./'Mbl' Curriculum, Robert J. Rhee Sep 2015

Specialization In Law And Business: A Proposal For A J.D./'Mbl' Curriculum, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This paper provides the specific details of how an interdisciplinary program of law and business can be structured in a three-year J.D. program. The program envisioned is a J.D./”M.B.L.”, which is distinguished from the better known J.D./M.B.A. The “M.B.L.” stands for “masters of business law,” which is simply an idea tag. The moniker can represent a program conferring a supplemental degree in law and business, or simply a specialized course of study to complete a J.D. Either way, the program is an interdisciplinary program of concentrated study in core transaction-oriented law courses and core business courses. The most effective education …


Bond Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee Sep 2015

Bond Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

Limited liability is considered a “birthright” of corporations. The concept is entrenched in legal theory, and it is a fixed reality of the political economy. But it remains controversial. Scholarly debate has been engaged in absolute terms of defending the rule or advocating its abrogation. Though compelling, these polar positions, often expressed in abstract arguments, are associated with disquieting effects. Without limited liability, efficiency may be severely compromised. With it, involuntary tort creditors bear some of the cost of an enterprise. Most other proposals for reforming limited liability have been incremental, such as modifying veil piercing. However, neither absolutism nor …


Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee Feb 2015

Employee Say-On-Pay: Monitoring And Legitimizing Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader economy. If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive managers in particular …