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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Hidden Costs Of Free Goods: Implications For Antitrust Enforcement, Michal Gal, Daniel Rubinfeld
The Hidden Costs Of Free Goods: Implications For Antitrust Enforcement, Michal Gal, Daniel Rubinfeld
Michal Gal
Today a growing number of goods and services are provided in the marketplace free of charge; indeed, free or the appearance of free, have become part of our ecosystem. More often than not, free goods and services provide real benefits to consumers and are clearly pro-competitive. Yet free goods may also create significant costs. We show that despite the fact that the consumer does not pay a direct price, there are indirect prices that reflect the opportunity cost associated with the consumption of free goods. These indirect costs can be overt or covert, in the same market in which the …
Below-Cost Price Alignment: Meeting Or Beating Competition, Michal Gal
Below-Cost Price Alignment: Meeting Or Beating Competition, Michal Gal
Michal Gal
May a dominant firm justify below-cost pricing by simply arguing that it aligned its prices with those of its rivals? In this essay I show that generally the answer is negative. I also argue, however, that such a rule should not be categorical and that in some circumstances a below-price meeting competition defense should be allowed, in order to protect competition. Such an exception is necessary in order to take account of the special economic characteristics of dynamic industries which differ from the brick-and-mortar industry model that assumes that scale economies are small and entry barriers are low. The article …
Regulation By Declaration: A Novel Method To Limit Abuse Of Market Power, Michal Gal
Regulation By Declaration: A Novel Method To Limit Abuse Of Market Power, Michal Gal
Michal Gal
In most jurisdictions the legal inquiry into whether a firm enjoys a monopoly position is an integral part of an inquiry into whether a firm has abused its market power, and a positive answer to the first is a precondition for conducting the second. This combination creates some inefficiencies. Most notably, market participants, including the would-be monopolist, are uncertain of the monopolist's market position until its conduct is challenged before the courts. This paper explores a novel regulatory mechanism which seeks to separate the two stages of inquiry and to empower the antitrust authorities to declare a firm a monopoly …
What Is An Agreement? (In Hebrew), Michal Gal
Monopoly Pricing As An Antitrust Offense In The U.S. And The Ec: Two Systems Of Belief About Monopoly?, Michal Gal
Monopoly Pricing As An Antitrust Offense In The U.S. And The Ec: Two Systems Of Belief About Monopoly?, Michal Gal
Michal Gal
Monopoly pricing per se, that is without need of proof of anti-competitive conduct or intent, is regulated very differently on both sides of the Atlantic, at least in theory. U.S. antitrust law sets a straightforward rule: monopoly pricing, as such, is not regulated. In contrast, under EC law excessive pricing is considered an abuse of dominance and is punishable by fine and subject to a prohibitory order. These approaches fit the divide between the regulation of exclusionary and exploitative conduct: whereas exclusionary conduct is an offense against antitrust law on both sides of the Atlantic, exploitative conduct generally only breaches …