Law Commons^™

Antitrust Balancing, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

Antitrust litigation often confronts situations where effects point in both directions. Judges sometimes describe the process of evaluating these factors as “balancing.” In its e-Books decision the Second Circuit believed that the need to balance is what justifies application of the rule of reason. In Microsoft the D.C. Circuit stated that “courts routinely apply a …balancing approach” under which “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm… outweighs the procompetitive benefit.” But then it decided the case without balancing anything.

The term “balancing” is a very poor label for what courts actually do in these cases. Balancing requires that …

Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally means a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost savings …

Antitrust And Information Technologies, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

Technological change strongly affects the use of information to facilitate anticompetitive practices. The effects result mainly from digitization and the many products and processes that it enables. These technologies also account for a significant portion of the difficulties that antitrust law encounters when its addresses intellectual property rights. Changes in the technologies of information also affect the structures of certain products, in the process either increasing or decreasing the potential for competitive harm. For example, digital technology affects the way firms exercise market power, but it also imposes serious measurement difficulties. In purely digital markets intellectual property rights are crucial …

Antitrust And The Patent System: A Reexamination, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

Since the federal antitrust laws were first passed they have cycled through extreme positions on the relationship between competition law and the patent system. Previous studies of antitrust and the patent system have generally assumed that patents are valid, discrete, and generally of high quality in the sense that they further innovation. As a result, increasing the returns to patenting increases the incentive to do socially valuable innovation. Further, if the returns to the patentee exceed the social losses caused by increased exclusion, the tradeoff is positive and antitrust should not interfere. If a patent does nothing to further innovation, …

The Rule Of Reason And The Scope Of The Patent, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

For a century and a half the Supreme Court has described perceived patent abuses as conduct that reaches "beyond the scope of the patent." That phrase, which evokes an image of boundary lines in real property, has been applied to both government and private activity and has many different meanings. It has been used offensively to conclude that certain patent uses are unlawful because they extend beyond the scope of the patent. It is also used defensively, however, to characterize activities as lawful if they do not extend beyond the patent's scope. In the first half of the twentieth century …

Patents, Antitrust, And The Rule Of Reason, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

Antitrust law has historically immunized many patent agreements if they fell within the "scope of the patent." Three dissenting Justices in the Actavis case advocated this test: a pharmaceutical pay-for-delay settlement falls within the scope of the patent if it delays a competitor's entry no longer than the remaining life of the patent. In that case the patentee will not be obtaining any more than it would from a valid patent -- namely, the right to exclude infringers for the full patent term.

The "scope of the patent" test is not useful for defining the boundaries of antitrust immunity in …

Tying Arrangements And Antitrust Harm, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

A tying arrangement is a seller’s requirement that a customer may purchase its “tying” product only by taking its “tied” product. In a variable proportion tie the purchaser can vary her purchases of the tied product. For example, a customer might purchase a single printer, but either a contract or technological design requires her to purchase varying numbers of printer cartridges from the same manufacturer. Such arrangements are widely considered to be price discrimination devices, but their economic effects have been controversial.

Price discrimination comes in various “degrees.” In third degree price discrimination the seller isolates two or more different …

Tying, Price Discrimination And Antitrust Policy, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

ABSTRACT

A tying arrangement is a seller’s requirement that a customer may purchase its “tying” product only by taking its “tied” product. In a variable proportion tie the purchaser can vary her purchases of the tied product. For example, a customer might purchase a single printer, but either a contract or technological design requires her to purchase varying numbers of printer cartridges from the same manufacturer. Such arrangements are widely considered to be price discrimination devices, but their economic effects have been controversial.

Price discrimination comes in various “degrees.” In third degree price discrimination the seller isolates two or more …

Ip And Antitrust: Errands Into The Wilderness, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

IP AND ANTITRUST: ERRANDS INTO THE WILDERNESS

ABSTRACT

Antitrust and intellectual property law both seek to promote economic welfare by facilitating competition and investment in innovation. At various times both antitrust and IP law have wandered off this course and have become more driven by special interests. Today, antitrust and IP are on very different roads to reform. Antitrust began an Errand into the Wilderness in the late 1970s with a series of Supreme Court decisions that linked the plaintiff’s harm and right to obtain a remedy to the competition-furthering goals of antitrust policy. Today, patent law has begun its …

The Neoclassical Crisis In U.S. Competition Policy, 1890-1960, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

ABSTRACT The development of marginalist, or neoclassical, economics led to a fifty-year long crisis in competition policy. Given an industrial structure with sufficient fixed costs, competition always became "ruinous," forcing firms to cut prices to marginal cost without sufficient revenue remaining to pay off investment. Early neoclassicists such as Alfred Marshall were not able to solve this problem. As a result many early twentieth century economists were hostile toward the antitrust laws. The ruinous competition debate came to an abrupt end in the early 1930's, when economists Joan Robinson in Great Britain and particularly Edward Chamberlin in the United States …