Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Design Of International Agreements, Andrew T. Guzman
The Design Of International Agreements, Andrew T. Guzman
Andrew T Guzman
States entering into international agreements have at their disposal several tools to enhance the strength and credibility of their commitments, including the ability to make the agreement a formal treaty rather than soft law, provide for mandatory dispute resolution procedures, and establish monitoring mechanisms. Each of these strategies – referred to as ‘design elements’ – increases the costs associated with the violation of an agreement and, therefore, the probability of compliance. Yet even a passing familiarity with international agreements makes it clear that states routinely fail to include these design elements in their agreements. This article explains why rational states …
Saving Customary International Law, Andrew T. Guzman
Saving Customary International Law, Andrew T. Guzman
Andrew T Guzman
No abstract provided.
Power Plays And Capacity Constraints: The Selection Of Defendants In Wto Disputes, Andrew T. Guzman, Beth A. Simmons
Power Plays And Capacity Constraints: The Selection Of Defendants In Wto Disputes, Andrew T. Guzman, Beth A. Simmons
Andrew T Guzman
This paper examines the relationship between the wealth and power of states and their ability to participate fully within the World Trade Organization’s system of dispute resolution. Two alternative hypotheses are considered. The power hypothesis predicts that politically weak countries will refrain from filing complaints against politically powerful states for fear of costly retaliation. The capacity hypothesis predicts that low-income states will tend to complain about behavior by high-income states because the latter offer a higher expected return. We test these two hypotheses and find considerable support for the capacity hypothesis and no support for the power hypothesis. We conclude …