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Full-Text Articles in Law
A Contractarian Approach To Unconscionability, Horacio Spector
A Contractarian Approach To Unconscionability, Horacio Spector
Chicago-Kent Law Review
In this paper I discuss two nonpaternalistic defenses of the doctrine of unconscionability in contract law. The first approach, proposed by Seana Shiffrin, relies on the moral ban to collaborate with other agents' immoral plans. Because this prohibition falls also on the judge, she must refrain from enforcing unfair or exploitative contracts. The second approach regards the unconscionability doctrine as one limitation on freedom of contract that rational contractors would choose in the course of adopting the fundamental terms of social cooperation. I assess the implications and merits of the two approaches. 'The contractarian approach is capable of justifying procedural …
Promises, Expectations, And Rights, Eduardo Rivera-Lopez
Promises, Expectations, And Rights, Eduardo Rivera-Lopez
Chicago-Kent Law Review
I address the problem of why promises create obligations. First, I spell out and object the so-called "expectational account" according to which the duty to keep our promises arises from the fact that, when we promise to do something, we create an expectation in the promisee, which we have the duty not to disappoint. It has been claimed that this account is circular since we can only raise the expectation, in the appropriate sense, if we already have the moral duty to keep our promise. I argue, against Scanlon and others, that such circularity is unavoidable. In the second section, …
Rational Choice And Reasonable Interactions, Bruce Chapman
Rational Choice And Reasonable Interactions, Bruce Chapman
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Game theory probably offers the most well-known account of how rational agents interact in strategic situations. The rational thought processes that are involved, while enormously sophisticated, remain very private for each agent. Less well known is the alternative account that is offered by law and legal theory, an account where agents interact, and understand their interaction, under the idea of public (or objective) reasonableness. This Article argues, using some simple examples, that the legal account does better than the game theoretic account in explaining the actual levels of cooperation and coordination we observe across rational individuals in strategic situations.