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Full-Text Articles in Law
Lead Plaintiff Incentives In Aggregate Litigation, Charles R. Korsmo, Minor Myers
Lead Plaintiff Incentives In Aggregate Litigation, Charles R. Korsmo, Minor Myers
Faculty Publications
The lead plaintiff role holds out considerable promise in promoting the deterrence and compensation goals of aggregate litigation. The prevailing approach to compensating lead plaintiffs, however, provides no real incentive for a lead plaintiff to bring claims on behalf of a broader group. The policy challenge is to induce sophisticated parties to press claims not in their individual capacity but instead in a representative capacity, conferring a positive externality on all class members by identifying attractive claims, financing ongoing litigation, and managing the work of attorneys. We outline what an active and engaged lead plaintiff could add to the civil …
The Law Of Social Entrepreneurship – Creating Shared Value Through The Lens Of Sandra Day O’Connor’S Icivics, Anat Alon-Beck
The Law Of Social Entrepreneurship – Creating Shared Value Through The Lens Of Sandra Day O’Connor’S Icivics, Anat Alon-Beck
Faculty Publications
This article calls for harmonizing state law legislation on social enterprises, due to the potential discrepancy between the various states on the nature and legal structure of social enterprises. Since 2008, legislators in thirty-five (35) states across the United States of America and the District of Columbia, have enacted some form of innovative social enterprise legislation. This new revolution in corporate law is called social entrepreneurship, mirroring social movements in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Public opinion has led to a shift in prevalent corporate governance theory, from current share-holder centric corporate governance to collaborative corporate governance. A …
Selling Stock And Selling Legal Claims: Alienability As A Constraint On Managerial Opportunism, Charles R. Korsmo
Selling Stock And Selling Legal Claims: Alienability As A Constraint On Managerial Opportunism, Charles R. Korsmo
Faculty Publications
Scholars have long recognized the importance of market forces as a tool for disciplining the management of public corporations and reducing agency costs. If managers loot or otherwise mismanage the firm, the firm’s stock price will suffer, raising its cost of capital and leaving managers exposed to the threat of a hostile takeover. In recent decades, changing patterns of stock ownership have threatened the viability of this market check on mismanagement. Institutional investors, and particularly index funds, own an increasing portion of publicly traded firms, and face substantial liquidity and other barriers to simply selling their positions. To the extent …