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Full-Text Articles in Law
What Else Matters For Corporate Governance?: The Case Of Bank Monitoring, Frederick Tung
What Else Matters For Corporate Governance?: The Case Of Bank Monitoring, Frederick Tung
Faculty Scholarship
We address a crucial but underappreciated question: what else besides corporate law matters for corporate governance? We take the novel view that corporate governance must involve more than corporate law. Corporate scholars focus almost exclusively on corporate law mechanisms for controlling managerial agency costs. We contend, however, that contracting parties also attempt to control agency costs in their contracts with the firm. In particular, we hypothesize that banks, by monitoring firms in connection with their loans, enhance firm value for the benefit of shareholders.
We examine over one-thousand public firms for the period 1990-2004 to test the value of bank …
The New Death Of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties For Creditors, Frederick Tung
The New Death Of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties For Creditors, Frederick Tung
Faculty Scholarship
The article identifies a worrisome trend in corporate law and scholarship. Across seemingly unrelated issue areas, courts and scholars have lost faith in private corporate bargains. They invite judicial intervention into private contract, proposing to expand fiduciary duties beyond their traditional shareholder centered focus to protect non-shareholder claimants from managerial opportunism. When conflict between claimant classes becomes acute, managers pursuing shareholder value may make inefficient investments that benefit shareholders but harm other claimants and the firm generally. I argue that claimants' private contracts with the firm are superior to expanded duty for constraining this opportunism. I focus on one specific …