Law Commons^™

Contingent Fee Lobbying: Inflaming Avarice Or Facilitating Constitutional Rights?, Thomas M. Susman

ExpressO

Contingent fee lobbying has long been a disfavored practice. Although some commentators argue that use of a contingent fee lobbying contract could open up federal legislative and regulatory processes to greater participation by Americans of limited means, many others, including the Supreme Court, have declared that lobbying a legislature or agency under a contingent fee contract is generally both illegal and unethical. However, the conclusion that the practice is illegal is often based on a declaration that the practice is unethical . . . without a thorough examination of the sources of law that led to the presumption of illegality …

Post-Katrina New Orleans: The Strangely Vacant Article Ii Actor Denying Or Delaying Right Or Justice, Cynthia A. Drew

ExpressO

Because this work is not literature but at its most essential is a mirror of the conundrum presented by the rapidly approaching moment of Constitutional politics in our present American national life, that mirror perforce shows but a pastiche, a mosaic not yet complete, a jigsaw puzzle whose pieces keep shifting in space before they can be placed. As yet no “final answer” has appeared on any horizon to the dilemmas posed by the consequences of the Presidential actions analyzed in the Leitmotif -- particularly the decidedly non-heroic failures to act that had such lethal consequences for so many of …

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

ExpressO

Legislation and Legitimation:

Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s

Abstract

Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …