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The Life Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Ulan Galperin
The Life Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Ulan Galperin
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
Imagine if Congress, the President, and the industries they hoped to regulate all decided that neither politically isolated bureaucrats nor a popularly sanctioned President should wield the power to administer Congress’ laws, to make legislative-type policy, to enforce that policy, and to adjudicate disputes under it. Imagine if there were another experiment, one that has persisted, but few have noticed.
Imagine no longer. Overlooked by most, there is a model for federal administration that does not rely on isolated administrators or Presidential control, but instead on elected bureaucrats. Today, the United States Department of Agriculture houses over 7,500 elected farmer-bureaucrats …
The Death Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Ulan Galperin
The Death Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Ulan Galperin
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
Everybody agrees. Everybody is certain. There are no elected bureaucrats.
That pervasive certainty must come as quite a surprise to elected bureaucrats.
The federal bureaucracy presents examples of administrative elections, but the most significant is the United States Department of Agriculture’s elected farmer committees. There are over 7,500 elected farmers sitting on over 2,000 committees, and these committees carry out paradigmatic administrative duties including policymaking and adjudication.
Taking for granted that administrators are unelected, judges have shaped an ascendant doctrine of Presidentialism. This doctrine presumes that the administrative state is only legitimate insofar as it is under the direct control …
Procedural Fairness And Incentive Programs: Reflections On The Environmental Choice Program, David S. Cohen
Procedural Fairness And Incentive Programs: Reflections On The Environmental Choice Program, David S. Cohen
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
This paper explores the application of procedural fairness to the federal government’s Environmental Choice Program’s decision-making processes. While Canadian courts have traditionally required public bureaucrats to act “fairly” when implementing command models of regulation, they have only recently been confronted with demands that regulators implementing economic incentive programs also act in accordance with procedural fairness norms.