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Full-Text Articles in Law

Why Does The Complainant Always Win At The Wto?: A Reputation-Based Theory Of Litigation At The World Trade Organization, Matthew C. Turk Jan 2011

Why Does The Complainant Always Win At The Wto?: A Reputation-Based Theory Of Litigation At The World Trade Organization, Matthew C. Turk

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

World Trade Organization (WTO) litigation presents an empirical puzzle: complaining parties "win" close to 90 percent of cases, while standard theories of litigation predict a strong tendency towards a 50 percent plaintiff win-rate. This Article explains the high win-rate by examining the reputational costs and benefits of filing a case. The WTO's lack of centralized enforcement means that the consequence of a judgment is merely to disseminate information that alters a party's reputation for compliance with its trade obligations. Such a "reputational sanction" applies to both losing respondents and complainants. The result is that only cases with a very high …


Making Wto Sps Dispute Settlement Work: Challenges And Practical Solutions, Eric Gillman Jan 2011

Making Wto Sps Dispute Settlement Work: Challenges And Practical Solutions, Eric Gillman

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) represents an effort by the Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to balance competing interests in liberalizing trade, on one hand, and protecting human, animal, and plant life from risks posed by the free flow of goods on the other. SPS disputes center around a core question: Does the imported product at issue present a sufficiently serious threat to national health to warrant the imposition of trade-restrictive measures? Over twelve years and six disputes, panels and the Appellate Body (AB) have addressed this question by evaluating respondents' risk assessments. The …


Efficient Contracting Between Foreign Investors And Host States: Evidence From Stabilization Clauses, Sam Foster Halabi Jan 2011

Efficient Contracting Between Foreign Investors And Host States: Evidence From Stabilization Clauses, Sam Foster Halabi

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

Bilateral investment treaties are agreements between sovereign states that give broad protections to investors and investments made within the jurisdiction of the other state. The prevailing view in the academy and practice is that developing countries sign bilateral investment treaties in order to reassure investors from developed states that their investments will be safe from changes in domestic law. Without these "credible commitments," investors would be deterred from making investments, depriving developing countries of foreign capital. This Article disputes that view by demonstrating that foreign investors and host states effectively contract around the risk of changes in the law. This …


Beyond Culture Vs. Commerce: Decentralizing Cultural Protection To Promote Diversity Through Trade, Sean A. Pager Jan 2011

Beyond Culture Vs. Commerce: Decentralizing Cultural Protection To Promote Diversity Through Trade, Sean A. Pager

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

For the past three decades, culture defenders and free traders have fought a pitched battle over global regulation of audiovisual industries, a collision of seemingly incompatible worldviews whose destructive repercussions policy-makers and scholars have struggled to contain. The battle has played out at multiple levels of international trade law, investment treaties, and UNESCO conventions. Now, the culture-trade war threatens to engulf e-commerce. Fortunately, there is a better way. The extraordinary flowering of Korean popular culture in recent decades—commonly known as the "Korean Wave"—can be traced directly to a set of decentralized policies enacted by South Korea's government in the 1990s. …


The Trade Litigant's Gauntlet: The Hanging Judge And The Teflon Tribunal, Jay Charles Campbell Jan 2011

The Trade Litigant's Gauntlet: The Hanging Judge And The Teflon Tribunal, Jay Charles Campbell

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

The two U.S. agencies charged with conducting antidumping investigations may justifiably be labeled a "hanging judge" and a "Teflon tribunal." The Department of Commerce (DOC) investigates whether foreign firms have engaged in "dumping" exports to the United States. Since assuming responsibility for dumping investigations in 1980, the DOC has found that over 90% of the firms it investigated were "guilty." Such one-sided results subject far too many foreign firms to antidumping duty orders - which impair their ability to sell to the U.S. market - and send the wrong message to the United States' trading partners. Because the U.S. antidumping …


More Than Best Friends: Expansion Of Global Law Firms Into The Indian Legal Market, Chris Vena Jan 2011

More Than Best Friends: Expansion Of Global Law Firms Into The Indian Legal Market, Chris Vena

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

Over the past half century, there has been an accelerating trend towards liberalization in the legal services industry. International free trade agreements have sought to promote open markets for legal services. The United States, United Kingdom, many European countries, Australia, Japan, Russia, China, and Singapore have all opened their legal markets to foreign law firms. India is something of an anomaly in this regard. Although it has one of the world's largest economies and has benefited greatly from liberalization in many industries, India's legal industry remains closed. Competition for foreign capital with other developing nations, particularly China, makes this an …


The Revolving Door Of Emigration: The Economic Influences Of Remittances In Developing Countries, Laura L. Norris Jan 2011

The Revolving Door Of Emigration: The Economic Influences Of Remittances In Developing Countries, Laura L. Norris

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

Economic incentives play an integral role in many individuals' choices to leave their country of origin. While a person may independently make the decision to migrate, some governments have developed extensive programs to promote the export of workers. Developing nations often initiate such programs for the purpose of acquiring additional sources of foreign exchange and external financing, as emigrants in transnational families can play a critical role in development through remittances. Remittances to developing countries totaled $325 billion in 2010, and they will likely continue to increase along with emigration. The following Comment considers the palpable contribution remittances have on …