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Dan Kelly Presented “Allocating Property At Death: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Of Succession Law” At The Taiwan Law And Economic Analysis Conference On August 7, 2013, Daniel Kelly Mar 2014

Dan Kelly Presented “Allocating Property At Death: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Of Succession Law” At The Taiwan Law And Economic Analysis Conference On August 7, 2013, Daniel Kelly

Daniel B Kelly

Professor Dan Kelly was invited to the Taiwan Law and Economic Analysis Conference and presented “Allocating Property at Death: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Succession Law,” Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, August 7, 2013


Dan Kelly Presented “Estate Planning Devices In The United States: An Economic Analysis Of The Justifications For Restricting Testamentary Freedom” At The National Taiwan University College Of Law On August 5, 2013, Daniel Kelly Mar 2014

Dan Kelly Presented “Estate Planning Devices In The United States: An Economic Analysis Of The Justifications For Restricting Testamentary Freedom” At The National Taiwan University College Of Law On August 5, 2013, Daniel Kelly

Daniel B Kelly

Dan Kelly presented “Estate Planning Devices in the United States: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Restricting Testamentary Freedom” at the National Taiwan University College of Law on August 5, 2013


Dan Kelly Presented “Dividing Possessory Rights” At The Taiwan Law And Economic Analysis Conference On August 6, 2013, Daniel Kelly Mar 2014

Dan Kelly Presented “Dividing Possessory Rights” At The Taiwan Law And Economic Analysis Conference On August 6, 2013, Daniel Kelly

Daniel B Kelly

Professor Dan Kelly was invited to the Taiwan Law and Economic Analysis Conference and presented “Dividing Possessory Rights,” Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, August 6, 2013.


Dan Kelly Presented “Allocating Property At Death: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Of Succession Law” At The European Association Of Law And Economics, University Of Warsaw On September 26, 2013, Daniel Kelly Mar 2014

Dan Kelly Presented “Allocating Property At Death: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Of Succession Law” At The European Association Of Law And Economics, University Of Warsaw On September 26, 2013, Daniel Kelly

Daniel B Kelly

Dan Kelly presented “Allocating Property at Death: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Succession Law” at the European Association of Law and Economics, University of Warsaw on September 26, 2013


Dan Kelly Presented “Allocating Property At Death: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Of Succession Law” At The Notre Dame Law And Economics Workshop On October 14, 2013, Daniel Kelly Mar 2014

Dan Kelly Presented “Allocating Property At Death: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Of Succession Law” At The Notre Dame Law And Economics Workshop On October 14, 2013, Daniel Kelly

Daniel B Kelly

Dan Kelly presented “Allocating Property at Death: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Succession Law” at the The Notre Dame Law and Economics Workshop on October 14, 2013


Dan Kelly Presented “The Divisibility Of Property” At The North American Workshop On Private Law Theory, Mcgill University, Montreal, Quebec On October 4, 2013, Daniel Kelly Mar 2014

Dan Kelly Presented “The Divisibility Of Property” At The North American Workshop On Private Law Theory, Mcgill University, Montreal, Quebec On October 4, 2013, Daniel Kelly

Daniel B Kelly

Dan Kelly presented “The Divisibility of Property” at the North American Workshop on Private Law Theory, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec on October 4, 2013


Strategic Spillovers, Daniel B. Kelly Mar 2011

Strategic Spillovers, Daniel B. Kelly

Daniel B Kelly

The traditional problem with externalities is well known: self-interested individuals and profit-maximizing firms often generate harm as an unintended byproduct of their use of property. I examine situations in which individuals and firms purposely seek to generate harm, in order to extract payments in exchange for desisting. Situations involving such “strategic spillovers” have received relatively little systematic attention, but the underlying problem is a perennial one. From the “livery stable scam” in Chicago during the nineteenth century to “pollution entrepreneurs” in China in the twenty-first century, various parties have an incentive to engage in externality-generating activities they otherwise would not …