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Full-Text Articles in Law
Neither Savior Nor Bogeyman: What Waits Behind The Door Of Third-Party Litigation Financing?, Jeremy Kidd
Neither Savior Nor Bogeyman: What Waits Behind The Door Of Third-Party Litigation Financing?, Jeremy Kidd
Jeremy Kidd
The arguments for and against third-party litigation financing are based on incorrect assumptions regarding the impacts on total litigation. A formal model incorporating the choices of plaintiff, lawyer, and financier shows only minimal impact on total litigation, largely positive. However, after addressing the potential for long-term, strategic behavior by financiers, it is obvious that some dangers remain. Divorced from the dramatic claims of proponents and opponents, litigation financing is merely a tool that can be used for good or bad, and differentiating by types of claims and the incentives of the parties allows that tool to be appropriately used.
Captured Legislatures And Public-Interested Courts, Patrick Luff
Captured Legislatures And Public-Interested Courts, Patrick Luff
Patrick A. Luff
According to public choice, the predominant paradigm of modern regulatory theory, legislative activity provides benefits to small, organized interests at the expense of larger groups. In practice, this means that interest groups are often able to benefit themselves at the expense of the public good. This model has been extended to the courts, which are described as implicit or explicit actors in the wealth-transfer process. Applying public-choice theory to the courts, however, overlooks the structural differences between the federal judiciary and Congress, as well as the insights of judicial decisionmaking theory. Not only do judges receive better and more complete …
Purposeless Construction, David M. Driesen
Purposeless Construction, David M. Driesen
David M Driesen
This Article critiques the Supreme Court’s tendency to embrace “purposeless construction”— statutory construction that ignores legislation’’ underlying goals. It constructs a new democratic theory supporting purposeful construction, defined as an approach to construction that favors construction of ambiguous text to advance a statute’s underlying goal. That theory maintains that statutory goals, especially those set out in the legislative text or frequently proclaimed in public, tend to reflect public values to a greater extent than other statutory provisions. Politicians carefully choose goals for statutes that “sell” the statute to the public. In order to do this, they must announce goals for …
Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding The Oecd's Campaign Against 'Harmful Tax Competition', Andrew P. Morriss, Lotta Moberg
Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding The Oecd's Campaign Against 'Harmful Tax Competition', Andrew P. Morriss, Lotta Moberg
Andrew P Morriss
Formed in 1961 to promote global economic and social well-being, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has become the collective voice of rich countries on international tax issues. After an initial focus on improving commerce through addressing double taxation issues, the organization shifted to a focus on restricting tax competition and increasing automatic exchanges of tax information. In this paper we analyze the reasons for this shift in policy focus. After describing the history of the OECD’s work on taxation, we examine the OECD's project against “harmful tax competition” as it has played out since its launch in …