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Puzzles In Controlling Shareholder Regimes And China: Shareholder Primacy And (Quasi) Monopoly, Sang Yop Kang Aug 2015

Puzzles In Controlling Shareholder Regimes And China: Shareholder Primacy And (Quasi) Monopoly, Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Professor Mark Roe explained that the shareholder wealth maximization norm (“the norm”) is not fit for a country with a (quasi) monopoly, because the norm encourages managers to maximize monopoly rents, to the detriment of the national economy. This Article provides new findings and counter-intuitive arguments as to the tension created by the norm and (quasi) monopoly by exploring three key corporate governance concepts that Roe did not examine—(1) “controlling minority structure” (CMS), where dominant shareholders hold a fractional ownership in their controlled-corporations, (2) “tunneling” (i.e., illicit transfer of corporate wealth to controlling shareholders), and (3) Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). …


Avenues To Foreign Investment In China’S Shipping Industry—Have Lease Financing Arrangements And The Free Trade Zones Opened Markets For Foreign Non-Bank Investment?, Rick Beaumont Jun 2015

Avenues To Foreign Investment In China’S Shipping Industry—Have Lease Financing Arrangements And The Free Trade Zones Opened Markets For Foreign Non-Bank Investment?, Rick Beaumont

Rick Beaumont

No abstract provided.


The Moral Undercurrent Beneath The Regulatory Regime Of Investor Protection, Huhnkie Lee May 2015

The Moral Undercurrent Beneath The Regulatory Regime Of Investor Protection, Huhnkie Lee

Huhnkie Lee

No abstract provided.


Law, Fugitive Capital, And Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation, Walter J. Kendall Lll Feb 2015

Law, Fugitive Capital, And Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation, Walter J. Kendall Lll

Walter J. Kendall lll

No abstract provided.


Legal And Institutional Remedies For Middle East States Wishing To Develop And Increase Foreign Direct Investment, Griffin Weaver Sep 2014

Legal And Institutional Remedies For Middle East States Wishing To Develop And Increase Foreign Direct Investment, Griffin Weaver

Griffin Weaver

The cost to overhaul a legal system is astronomical. For example, before and after the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1980’s several states received billions of dollars in loans to help change their “legal systems” and make them more western friendly. A couple of these states were West Germany and Japan, which received roughly 1.5 billion and 2.4 billion USD in loans. Considering most of this money was given in the 1950’s, the value today is probably three times or more those amounts. Without this aid both states would have been unable to make the changes to their …


The Imf’S Reassessment Of Capital Controls After The 2008 Financial Crisis: Heresy Or Orthodoxy?, Philip J. Macfarlane Sep 2014

The Imf’S Reassessment Of Capital Controls After The 2008 Financial Crisis: Heresy Or Orthodoxy?, Philip J. Macfarlane

Philip J. MacFarlane

While the IMF allows countries to limit the flow of capital through the use of capital controls, it has since the 1980s discouraged this practice and instead promoted capital account liberalization as a means for developing countries to attract the foreign investment needed for economic growth. The 2008 financial crisis, however, prompted the IMF to reconsider this view and increasingly support the use of capital controls for countries that were vulnerable to the effects of volatile capital flows. In 2012, the IMF changed its official position on the use of capital controls from permitted but discouraged to accepted in certain …


Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson Aug 2014

Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Crises, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper uses “institutional analysis”—the study of the relative capacities of markets, courts, and regulators—to make three claims about financial crises.

First, financial crises are increasingly a problem of “regulatory displacement.” Through the ad hoc rescues of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank reforms of 2010, regulators displace market and judicial processes that ordinarily prevent financial distress from becoming financial crises. Because regulators are vulnerable to capture by large financial services firms, however, they cannot address the pathologies that create crises: market concentration and complexity. Indeed, regulators may inadvertently aggravate these conditions through resolution tactics that consolidate firms, and the volume and …


The Law And Economics Of Microfinance, Katherine Helen Mary Hunt Aug 2014

The Law And Economics Of Microfinance, Katherine Helen Mary Hunt

Katherine Helen Mary Hunt

Financial inclusion may be jargon which appeals to international donors and academics, but the strategic implementation in developing countries is often based on international du jour priorities, such as microfinance. The topic of microfinance is highly debated in the academic literature, although little empirical work has been published. Further, no literature to date has considered microfinance from a law and economics perspective. This paper seeks to contribute to the gap in the literature by considering how microfinance has evolved to address the credit market failure, and how microfinance regulation should be designed to promote long term financial inclusion via financially …


Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, With Applications To Financial Regulation, D. Bruce Johnsen Mar 2013

Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, With Applications To Financial Regulation, D. Bruce Johnsen

D. Bruce Johnsen

As Coase convincingly showed, transaction costs inhibit the ability of market participants to achieve first-best outcomes. This paper proposes a novel and relatively simple alternative to traditional cost-benefit analysis when regulated parties face sufficiently low transaction costs that they can bargain directly or rely on competitive markets to set efficient terms of trade. In these settings, the only informational burdens financial market regulators need bear to assess corrective rules is to identify the relevant parties, the “good” they hope to exchange, and the transaction costs that inhibit them from maximizing joint gains from trade. A rule is justified only if …


The Stock Market Reaction To Class Action Filings Post Pslra, Mark S. Klock Feb 2013

The Stock Market Reaction To Class Action Filings Post Pslra, Mark S. Klock

Mark S Klock

Using a substantially larger sample than has been used before, and a sample that includes the Great Financial Crisis and its ensuing recession, I investigate the stock market reaction to securities class action filings following the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act through the first quarter of 2012. I find that on average, even after adjusting for market downturns, there is a statistically significant negative abnormal return at the time of filing. There is also a statistically significant negative abnormal return during the weeks preceding the filing indicating that the market partially, but not fully, anticipates these filings. …