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Worldwide Corporate Governance Convergence Within A Pluralistic Business Legal Order---Company Law And Independent Director System In Contemporary China , Chi-Wei Huang

Chi-Wei Huang

Worldwide Corporate Governance Convergence within A Pluralistic Business Legal Order—Company Law and Independent Director System in Contemporary China

Chi-Wei Huang, S.J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School March 29, 2007

Abstract:

A deeper tendency across developed market jurisdictions has been a convergence toward a single, standard corporate structure. The essential legal features of a shareholder-oriented ideology are well established among those developed market jurisdictions and noticeably dominate the development of worldwide corporate forms. Striving to increase long-term shareholder value has become the most competitive corporate governance theory among developed economies. A series of examinations of worldwide corporate governance and ownership have …

The Case For For-Profit Charities, Anup Malani, Eric Posner

Anup Malani

Nonprofit firms may earn profits, but they may not distribute them to any affiliated persons. If a nonprofit firm has a “charitable” purpose under § 501(c)(3) of the tax code, the firm receives numerous tax advantages. For example, donors may deduct their donations to the firm from their taxable personal income. For-profit firms may distribute profits to affiliated persons, but receives no tax advantages for engaging in “charitable” activities. We argue that the law should not link tax benefits to corporate form in this way. There may be good arguments for recognizing the nonprofit form and good arguments for providing …

Unofficial Official Comments, Nigel Stark

Nigel Stark

My Note examines Justice Antonin Scalia’s “plain meaning” theory and asks whether, assuming that theory is correct, whether official comments should be used to interpret a statute. Specifically, I examine the use of the UCC’s Official Comments and its various state variations. I conclude that, under Justice Scalia’s theory, the use of official comments is to interpret the statute is improper and should be avoided.

The Fetishization Of Independence, Usha Rodrigues

Usha Rodrigues

According to conventional wisdom, a supermajority independent board of directors is the ideal corporate governance structure. Debate nevertheless continues: empirical evidence suggests that independent boards do not improve firm performance. Independence proponents respond that past studies reflect a flawed definition of independence. Remarkably, neither side in the independence debate has looked to Delaware, the preeminent state source for corporate law. Comparing Delaware’s notions of independence with those of Sarbanes-Oxley and its attendant reforms reveals two fundamentally different conceptions of independence. Sarbanes-Oxley equates independence with outsider status: an independent director is one who lacks financial ties to the corporation and is …

New Governance, Compliance, And Principles-Based Securities Regulation, Cristie L. Ford

Cristie L. Ford

The UK securities regulator, the Financial Services Authority, claims that its "principles-based" approach to securities regulation is simply "better" than what it characterizes as the prescriptive, rules-based American approach. The striking shift in financial sector business from New York to London over the last two years has brought the question of the wisdom of principles-based regulation into sharp relief. In fact, an FSA-style regulatory approach may also be taking hold in Canada, through the agency of the province of British Columbia. This paper examines BC's innovative proposals for a principles-based securities regime through the lens of New Governance theory. I …

Corporate Governance, Director Liability, And Good Faith, Elizabeth Nowicki

Elizabeth Nowicki

Corporate directors are obligated to act “in good faith,” and directors face personal monetary liability to their shareholders for acts “not in good faith.” Yet no modern court has imposed liability accordingly. Every time the issue of a director’s good faith comes up in court, the court forces the complaining shareholder to prove that her directors acted affirmatively in bad faith as opposed to merely in the absence of good faith. The judiciary completely misses the point that acts lacking good faith are not always the same as acts affirmatively taken in bad faith. A director can act in the …