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Assessing The Costs & Benefits Of Credit Card Rewards: A Response To Who Gains And Who Loses From Credit Card Payments? Theory And Calibrations, Steven Semeraro
Assessing The Costs & Benefits Of Credit Card Rewards: A Response To Who Gains And Who Loses From Credit Card Payments? Theory And Calibrations, Steven Semeraro
Steven Semeraro
Abstract: Assessing the Costs & Benefits of Credit Card Rewards: A Response to Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations For two decades, economic and legal academics have speculated about the impact of the fees that merchants pay for credit card acceptance. Since all customers pay the same price, the theory goes, everyone pays for the benefits that go only to credit card users. A recent Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (FRBB) policy paper written by economists Scott Schuh, Oz Shy, and Joanna Stavins entitled Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments? Theory …
Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades Of Antitrust Uncertainty, Steven Semeraro
Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades Of Antitrust Uncertainty, Steven Semeraro
Steven Semeraro
This article re-examines the historical, economic, and legal analyses of credit card interchange fees, rejecting the standard assumptions that (1) collectively set interchange fees are unlikely to harm consumers and (2) these fees cannot feasibly be set in a competitive fashion. Through a new historical assessment and consideration of the most recent economic learning, this article shows that under current market conditions collusively set interchange fees are likely to harm consumers and thus violate the antitrust laws. In addition, a competitive remedy is feasible. The six largest Visa and MasterCard issuers, which are larger than the Discover Card System and …
Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades Of Antitrust Uncertainty, Steven Semeraro
Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades Of Antitrust Uncertainty, Steven Semeraro
Steven Semeraro
This article re-examines the historical, economic, and legal analyses of credit card interchange fees, rejecting the standard assumptions that (1) collectively set interchange fees are unlikely to harm consumers and (2) these fees cannot feasibly be set in a competitive fashion. Through a new historical assessment and consideration of the most recent economic learning, this article shows that under current market conditions collusively set interchange fees are likely to harm consumers and thus violate the antitrust laws. In addition, a competitive remedy is feasible. The six largest Visa and MasterCard issuers, which are larger than the Discover Card System and …