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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price Discrimination? The Law And Ethics Of Using Personal Information For Pricing, Akiva A. Miller
What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price Discrimination? The Law And Ethics Of Using Personal Information For Pricing, Akiva A. Miller
Akiva A Miller
New information technologies have dramatically increased sellers’ ability to engage in retail price discrimination. Debates over using personal information for price discrimination frequently treat it as a single problem, and are not sufficiently sensitive to the variety of price discrimination practices, the different kinds of information they require in order to succeed, and the different ethical concerns they raise. This paper explores the ethical and legal debate over regulating price discrimination facilitated by consumers’ personal information. Various kinds of “privacy remedies”—self-regulation, technological fixes, state regulation, and legislating private causes of legal action—each have their place. By drawing distinctions between various …
The Commons, Capitalism, And The Constitution, George Skouras
The Commons, Capitalism, And The Constitution, George Skouras
George Skouras
Thesis Summary: the erosion of the Commons in the United States has contributed to the deterioration of community and uprooting of people in order to meet the dynamic demands of capitalism. This article suggests countervailing measures to help remedy the situation.
Patent Trolls Among Us, Kent R. Acheson
Patent Trolls Among Us, Kent R. Acheson
Kent R Acheson
As Acheson (2012) suggested in A Study of the Need to Change United States Patent Policy, software should not be patented, but the Intellectual Property Rights should be protected in another manner that does not entail a Copyright, Trademark, or secrecy. A new form of protection should be created based on certain criteria, such as useful life of a patent, incremental innovation, value to society, and or value to life.
Fixing Frand: A Pseudo-Pool Approach To Standards-Based Patent Licensing, Jorge Contreras
Fixing Frand: A Pseudo-Pool Approach To Standards-Based Patent Licensing, Jorge Contreras
Jorge L Contreras
Technical interoperability standards are critical elements of mobile telephones, laptop computers, digital files, and thousands of other products in the modern networked economy. Most such standards are developed in so-called voluntary standards-development organizations (SDOs) that require participants to license patents essential to the standard on terms that are “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND). FRAND commitments are thought to avoid the problem of patent hold-up: the imposition of excessive royalty demands after a standard has been widely adopted in the market. While, at first blush, FRAND commitments seem to assure product vendors that patents will not obstruct the manufacture and sale …
Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, With Applications To Financial Regulation, D. Bruce Johnsen
Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, With Applications To Financial Regulation, D. Bruce Johnsen
D. Bruce Johnsen
As Coase convincingly showed, transaction costs inhibit the ability of market participants to achieve first-best outcomes. This paper proposes a novel and relatively simple alternative to traditional cost-benefit analysis when regulated parties face sufficiently low transaction costs that they can bargain directly or rely on competitive markets to set efficient terms of trade. In these settings, the only informational burdens financial market regulators need bear to assess corrective rules is to identify the relevant parties, the “good” they hope to exchange, and the transaction costs that inhibit them from maximizing joint gains from trade. A rule is justified only if …