Law Commons^™

The Respectable Dignity Of Obergefell V. Hodges, Yuvraj Joshi

Yuvraj Joshi

In declaring state laws that restrict same-sex marriage unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy invoked “dignity” nine times—to no one’s surprise. References in Obergefell to “dignity” are in important respects the culmination of Justice Kennedy’s elevation of the concept, dating back to the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In Casey, “dignity” expressed respect for a woman’s freedom to make choices about her pregnancy. Casey laid the foundation for Lawrence v. Texas, which similarly respected the freedom of choice of homosexual persons. Yet, starting in United States v. Windsor and continuing in Obergefell, the narrative began to change. Dignity veered …

Constitutional Borrowing, Robert Tsai

Robert L. Tsai

Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter. It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. The authors' examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law …

Conjuring "Equal Dignity": Mapping The Constitutional Dialogue To And From Same-Sex Marriage, Julie Nice

Julie A. Nice

Deselecting Biased Juries, Scott W. Howe

Scott W. Howe

Critics of peremptory-challenge systems commonly contend that they inevitably inflict “inequality harm” on many excused persons and should be abolished. Ironically, the Supreme Court fueled this argument with its decision in Batson v. Kentucky by raising and endorsing the inequality claim sua sponte and then purporting to solve it with an approach that preserved peremptories. This Article shows, however, that the central problem is something other than inequality harm to excused persons. The central problem is the harm to disadvantaged litigants when their opponents use peremptories to secure a one-sided jury. This problem can arise often—whenever a venire is slanted …