Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Confounding Ockham's Razor: Minilateralism And International Economic Regulation, Eric C. Chaffee Jan 2016

Confounding Ockham's Razor: Minilateralism And International Economic Regulation, Eric C. Chaffee

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

In Minilateralism: How Trade Alliances, Soft Law, and Financial Engineering Are Redefining Economic Statecraft, Professor Chris Brummer embraces the complexity of the global economic system and its regulation by exploring the emerging role and dominance of varying strands of economic collaboration and regulation that he collectively refers to as “minilateralism.” In describing the turn toward minilateralism, Brummer notes a number of key features of this new minilateral system, including a shift away from global cooperation to strategic alliances composed of the smallest group necessary to achieve a particular goal, a turn from formal treaties to informal non-binding accords and other …


Regulatory Incentive Realignment And The Eu Legal Framework Of Bank Resolution, Andromachi Georgosouli Jan 2016

Regulatory Incentive Realignment And The Eu Legal Framework Of Bank Resolution, Andromachi Georgosouli

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Risks associated with incentive misalignment are liable to seriously jeopardize the effectiveness of bank resolution, when not properly contained. This Article considers the management of misaligned incentives between regulators that are found in a vertical relationship of public governance. Using the EU legal framework of bank resolution as its case study, this Article explores the effectiveness of the quasi-enforcement powers of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and, where relevant, of the European Banking Authority (EBA) as an incentive realignment legal technique. Two principal difficulties are identified: on the one hand, the problematic interinstitutional dynamic of the SRB and the EBA …


Open Sesame: The Myth Of Alibaba's Extreme Corporate Governance And Control, Yu-Hsin Lin, Thomas Mehaffy Jan 2016

Open Sesame: The Myth Of Alibaba's Extreme Corporate Governance And Control, Yu-Hsin Lin, Thomas Mehaffy

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

In September 2014, Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Alibaba) successfully launched a $25 billion initial public offering (IPO), the largest IPO ever, on New York Stock Exchange. Alibaba’s IPO success witnessed a wave among Chinese Internet companies to raise capital in U.S capital markets. A significant number of these companies have employed a novel, but poorly understood corporate ownership and control mechanism—the variable interest entity (VIE) structure and/or the disproportional control structure. The VIE structure was created in response to the Chinese restriction on foreign investments; however, it carries the risk of being declared illegal under Chinese law. The disproportional control …