Law Commons^™

The Jewel In The Crown: Can India’S Strict Liability Doctrine Deepen Our Understanding Of Tort Law Theory?, Deepa Badrinarayana

Deepa Badrinarayana

The Fault Of Trespass, Avihay Dorfman, Assaf Jacob

Avihay Dorfman

The conventional wisdom has it that a property owner assumes virtually no responsibility for guiding others in fulfilling their duties not to trespass on the former's property. In other words, the entire risk of making an unauthorized use of the property in question rests upon the duty-holders. This view is best captured by the Keep-Off picture of property, according to which the content of the duty in question is that of excluding oneself from a thing that is not one's own. In this article, we argue that this view is mistaken. We advance conceptual, normative, and doctrinal arguments to show …

A Paralyzed Environmental Law: Critical Comments On Compensation For Environmental Damage In Indonesia, Andri Gunawan Wibisana

Andri Gunawan Wibisana

This article criticizes compensation mechanisms for the victims of environmental disaster in Indonesia. In particular, it attempts to answer the questions of how compensation mechanism is addressed in Indonesian environmental law, how the victims of environmental disasters are compensated, and what lessons can be learned from the application of law in practice. This article begins with discussions about the current Indonesian compensation system for damage resulting from pollution, focusing on the provisions in environmental management acts. In order to explain how these provisions have been applied in practice, this article discusses two major environmental disasters in Indonesia, i.e. the Mandalawangi …

Eliminating Proximate Cause As An Element Of The Prima Facie Case From Strict Products Liability, Peter Zablotsky

Peter Zablotsky

No abstract provided.

The Appropriate Role Of Plaintiff Misuse In Products Liability Causes Of Action, Peter Zablotsky

Peter Zablotsky

No abstract provided.

Copyright As Tort, Assaf Jacob, Avihay Dorfman

Avihay Dorfman

In these pages we seek to integrate two claims. First, we argue that, taken to their logical conclusions, the considerations that support a strict form of protection for tangible property rights do not call for a similar form of protection when applied to the case of copyright. More dramatically, these considerations demand, on pain of glaring inconsistency, a substantially weaker protection for copyright. In pursuing this claim, we show that the form of protecting property rights (including rights in tangibles) is, to an important extent, a feature of certain normal, though contingent, facts about the human world. Second, the normative …