Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Aggregation (1)
- Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. (1)
- Calabresi (Guido) (1)
- Call option (1)
- Causation (1)
-
- Cognitive bias (1)
- Condorcet Jury Theorem (1)
- Conjunctive probability (1)
- Convexity (1)
- Correlated valuation (1)
- Dual-chooser (1)
- Entitlement (1)
- Factfinder (1)
- Independence (1)
- Interdependence (1)
- Judgement (1)
- Judicial panel (1)
- Liability (1)
- Litigant (1)
- Math-law divide (1)
- Mathematics (1)
- Melamed (Douglas) (1)
- Negligence (1)
- Nuisance (1)
- Numerosity (1)
- Optimal pivot value (1)
- Payoff (1)
- Plaintiff-presumption (1)
- Preponderance of the evidence standard (1)
- Product rule (1)
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Law
Optimal Delegation And Decoupling In The Design Of Liability Rules, Ian M. Ayres, Paul M. Goldbart
Optimal Delegation And Decoupling In The Design Of Liability Rules, Ian M. Ayres, Paul M. Goldbart
Michigan Law Review
Calabresi and Melamed began a scholarly revolution by showing that legal entitlements have two readily distinguishable forms of protection: property rules and liability rules. These two archetypal forms protect an entitlement holder's interest in markedly different ways - via deterrence or compensation. Property rules protect entitlements by trying to deter others from taking. Liability rules, on the other hand, protect entitlements not by deterring but by trying to compensate the victim of nonconsensual takings. Accordingly, the compensatory impetus behind liability rules focuses on the takee's welfare - making sure the sanction is sufficient to compensate the takee. The deterrent impetus …
Conjunction And Aggregation, Saul Levmore
Conjunction And Aggregation, Saul Levmore
Michigan Law Review
This Article begins with the puzzle of why the law avoids the issue of conjunctive probability. Mathematically inclined observers might, for example, employ the "product rule," multiplying the probabilities associated with several events or requirements in order to assess a combined likelihood, but judges and lawyers seem otherwise inclined. Courts and statutes might be explicit about the manner in which multiple requirements should be combined, but they are not. Thus, it is often unclear whether a factfinder should assess if condition A was more likely than not to be present - and then go on to see whether condition B …