Law Commons^™

Anonymous Withholding Agreements And The Future Of International Cooperation In Taxing Foreign Financial Accounts : Testimony Before The Finance Committee Of The German Bundestag, September 24, 2012 (Statement By Associate Professor Itai Grinberg, Geo. U. L. Center), Itai Grinberg

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Chairwoman Reinemund and members of the Finance Committee, this testimony will make three key points:

• Automatic information exchange is superior to anonymous withholding for the purpose of combating tax evasion involving the use of foreign financial accounts.

• German ratification of the Swiss-German anonymous tax withholding agreement would stifle the emergence of a multilateral automatic information exchange system. As a result, Germany would be less able to address its own concerns with tax evasion through foreign accounts over the medium term. By ratifying this agreement, Germany would also slow the development of a multilateral system that would allow many …

The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, Itai Grinberg

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The international tax system is in the midst of a contest between automatic information reporting and anonymous withholding models for ensuring that nations have the ability to tax offshore accounts. At stake is the extent of many countries’ capacity to tax investment income of individuals and profits of closely held businesses through an income tax in an increasingly financially integrated world.

Incongruent initiatives of the European Union, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Switzerland, and the United States together represent an emerging international regime in which financial institutions act to facilitate countries’ ability to tax their residents’ offshore …

The Hidden Limits Of The Charitable Deduction: An Introduction To Hypersalience, Lilian V. Faulhaber

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Behavioral economics introduced the concept of salience to law and economics. In the area of tax policy, salience refers to the prominence of taxes in the minds of taxpayers. This article complicates the literature on salience and taxation by introducing the concept of “hypersalience,” which is in many ways the mirror image of hidden taxation. While a revenue-raising tax provision must be hidden for taxpayers to underestimate their tax bill, a revenue-reducing tax provision – such as a deduction, exclusion, or credit – must be more than fully salient for taxpayers to underestimate their tax bill. In other words, the …

The Tragedy Of The Carrots: Economics & Politics In The Choice Of Price Instruments, Brian Galle

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Externalities are one of the most fundamental market-failure justifications for government action, and pigouvian taxes and subsidies are standard tools for correcting them. Even so, neither the legal nor economic literatures offer any comprehensive account of when policy makers should prefer one to the other. This Article takes up that task. Prior efforts to distinguish between “carrots” and “sticks” have generally been limited to the context of pollution regulation, and I show here that even those are incomplete. I also extend the analysis to the case of positive externalities, where there is no prior literature to speak of. Overall I …

The Role Of Charity In A Federal System, Brian Galle

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article critiques the prevailing justification for subsidies for the charitable sector, and suggests a new alternative. According to contemporary accounts, charity corrects the failure of the private market to provide public goods, and further corrects the failure of government to provide goods other than those demanded by the median voter.

However, the claim that government can meet the needs only of a single “median voter” neglects both federalism and public choice theory. Citizens dissatisfied with the services of one government can move to or even create another. Alternatively, they may use the threat of exit to lobby for local …