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The Rhetoric Of Constitutional Law, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

I spend much of my time dealing with Supreme Court opinions. Usually, I download and read them the day that they are announced by the Court. I edit them for my casebook and teach them to my students. I write about them, lecture about them, and litigate about them. My focus, like I am sure most everyone's, is functional: I try to discern the holding, appraise the reasoning, ascertain the implications, and evaluate the decision's desirability. Increasingly, though, I have begun to think that this functional approach is overlooking a crucial aspect of Supreme Court decisions: their rhetoric. I use …

Janus's Two Faces, Kate Andrias

Articles

In ancient Roman religion and myth, Janus is the god of beginnings, transitions, and endings. He is often depicted as having two faces, one looking to the future and one to the past. The Supreme Court’s Janus v AFSCME case of last Term is fittingly named.1 Stunning in its disregard of principles of stare decisis, Janus overruled the forty-yearold precedent Abood v Detroit Board of Education. 2 The Janus decision marks the end of the post–New Deal compromise with respect to public sector unions and the FirstAmendment.Looking to the future, Janus lays the groundwork for further attack on labor rights—as …

Letter To Supreme Court (Erwin Chemerinsky Is Mad. Why You Should Care), Barry Friedman

Vanderbilt Law Review

Whatever else you want to say about Erwin Chemerinsky, he's sincere. Chemerinsky is nothing if not sincere. As anyone who knows him will tell you so. And Chemerinsky is in pain. He informs us: "This book was far harder to write than I could have imagined." The question is why Chemerinsky is in pain? You'd think this would be the easiest thing in the world for him, going after a Court he sees as overly conservative. Like shooting fish in a barrel. The reason is because deep in his heart-despite his beefs with the outcomes of cases-Chemerinsky has always been …

Roe As We Know It, Cary Franklin

Michigan Law Review

The petitioners in last year’s historic same-sex marriage case cited most of the Supreme Court’s canonical substantive due process precedents. They argued that the right of same-sex couples to marry, like the right to use birth control and the right to guide the upbringing of one’s children, was among the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court in Obergefell v. Hodges agreed, citing many of the same cases. Not once, however, did the petitioners or the majority in Obergefell cite the Court’s most famous substantive due process decision. It was the dissenters in Obergefell who invoked Roe v. Wade.

The Supreme Court's Emerging Majority: Restraining The High Court Or Transforming Its Role?, Christopher E. Smith

Akron Law Review

This article will analyze the decisions and arguments about judicial restraint emanating from the increasingly dominant Reagan appointees on the Supreme Court in order to question whether these justices are achieving their purported goal or are merely continuing "activist"judicial behavior in the service of conservative political values.

The Demise Of Habeas Corpus And The Rise Of Qualified Immunity: The Court's Ever Increasing Limitations On The Development And Enforcement Of Constitutional Rights And Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, Stephen R. Reinhardt

Michigan Law Review

The collapse of habeas corpus as a remedy for even the most glaring of constitutional violations ranks among the greater wrongs of our legal era. Once hailed as the Great Writ, and still feted with all the standard rhetorical flourishes, habeas corpus has been transformed over the past two decades from a vital guarantor of liberty into an instrument for ratifying the power of state courts to disregard the protections of the Constitution. Along with so many other judicial tools meant to safeguard the powerless, enforce constitutional rights, and hold the government accountable, habeas has been slowly eroded by a …

Hobby Lobby And The Pathology Of Citizens United, Ellen D. Katz

Articles

Four years ago, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission held that for-profit corporations possess a First Amendment right to make independent campaign expenditures. In so doing, the United States Supreme Court invited speculation that such corporations might possess other First Amendment rights as well. The petitioners in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius are now arguing that for-profit corporations are among the intended beneficiaries of the Free Exercise Clause and, along with the respondents in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, that they also qualify as “persons” under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Neither suggestion follows inexorably from Citizens United, …

Election Law's Lochnerian Turn, Ellen D. Katz

Articles

This panel has been asked to consider whether "the Constitution [is] responsible for electoral dysfunction."' My answer is no. The electoral process undeniably falls well short of our aspirations, but it strikes me that we should look to the Supreme Court for an accounting before blaming the Constitution for the deeply unsatisfactory condition in which we find ourselves.

The Tao Of Pleading: Do Twombly And Iqbal Matter Empirically, Patricia W. Moore

Faculty Articles

In 2007, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, sending “shockwaves” through the federal litigation bar. Seemingly without prior warning, the Court abrogated “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”—the standard for deciding 12(b)(6) motions first stated fifty years earlier in Conley v. Gibson. To replace the old rule, the Court announced a new “plausibility” standard: that a complaint …

Formalism And Judicial Supremacy In Federal Indian Law, Alex Tallchief Skibine

American Indian Law Review

No abstract provided.

Overcoming Lochner In The Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights And Popular Sovereignty Seriously As We Seek To Secure Equal Citizenship And Promote The Public Good, Thomas B. Mcaffee

University of Richmond Law Review

Professor McAffee reviews substantive due process as the textual basis for modern fundamental rights constitutional decision-making. He contends that we should avoid both the undue literalism that rejects the idea of implied rights, as well as the attempt to substitute someone's preferred moral vision for the limits, and compromises, that are implicit in and intended by the Constitution's text. He argues, moreover, that we can largely harmonizethe variousgoals of our constitutionalsystem by taking rights se- riously and by understanding that securing rights does not ex-haustthe Constitution'spurposes.

The Originalist And Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply To Professor Randy Barnett, Steven G. Calabresi

Michigan Law Review

In Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty, Professor Randy E. Barnett lays out a bold defense of the theory of originalism in constitutional interpretation. Professor Barnett's book is perhaps the most important book about originalism since Robert H. Bork's The Tempting of America. Barnett presents a normative case as to why contemporary Americans should agree to be governed by the original meaning of the Constitution, and, like most sophisticated originalists, he nicely distinguishes between original meaning and original intent. Barnett correctly notes that what really matters in constitutional interpretation is not what the Framers intended that provision …

Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power To Enforce The Fourteenth And Fifteenth Amendments In The Rehnquist And Waite Courts, Ellen D. Katz

Michigan Law Review

A large body of academic scholarship accuses the Rehnquist Court of "undoing the Second Reconstruction," just as the Waite Court has long been blamed for facilitating the end of the First. This critique captures much of what is meant by those generally charging the Rehnquist Court with "conservative judicial activism." It posits that the present Court wants to dismantle decades' worth of federal antidiscrimination measures that are aimed at the "reconstruction" of public and private relationships at the local level. It sees the Waite Court as having similarly nullified the civil-rights initiatives enacted by Congress following the Civil War to …

A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus And Deference On The Supreme Court, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has struck down federal statutes by a bare majority with unprecedented frequency. This Article shows that five-four decisions regularly overturning acts of Congress are a relatively recent phenomenon, whereas earlier Courts generally exercised judicial review by supermajority voting.

One option is to establish the following rule: The Supreme Court may not declare an act of Congress unconstitutional without a two-thirds majority. The Supreme Court itself could establish this rule internally, just as it has created its nonmajority rules for granting certiorari and holds, or one Justice who would otherwise be the fifth …

Reinforcing Representation: Enforcing The Fourteenth And Fifteenth Amendments In The Rehnquist And Waite Courts, Ellen D. Katz

Articles

A large body of academic scholarship accuses the Rehnquist Court of "undoing the Second Reconstruction," just as the Waite Court has long been blamed for facilitating the end of the First. This critique captures much of what is meant by those generally charging the Rehnquist Court with "conservative judicial activism." It posits that the present Court wants to dismantle decades' worth of federal antidiscrimination measures that are aimed at the "reconstruction" of public and private relationships at the local level. It sees the Waite Court as having similarly nullified the civil-rights initiatives enacted by Congress following the Civil War to …

The Rhetoric Of Constitutional Law, Erwin Chemerinsky

Michigan Law Review

I spend much of my time dealing with Supreme Court opinions. Usually, I download and read them the day that they are announced by the Court. I edit them for my casebook and teach them to my students. I write about them, lecture about them, and litigate about them. My focus, like I am sure most everyone's, is functional: I try to discern the holding, appraise the reasoning, ascertain the implications, and evaluate the decision's desirability. Increasingly, though, I have begun to think that this functional approach is overlooking a crucial aspect of Supreme Court decisions: their rhetoric. I use …

Dissing Congress, Ruth Colker, James J. Brudney

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist's recent leadership has invalidated numerous federal laws, arguably departing from settled precedent to do so. The Rehnquist Court has held that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in five instances during the 2000-01 Term, on four occasions during the 1999-2000 Term and in a total of twenty-nine cases since the 1994-95 Term. Commentators typically explain these decisions in federalism terms, focusing on the Court's use of its power to protect the States from an overreaching Congress. That explanation is incomplete and, in important respects, unpersuasive. The Rehnquist Court has not been as solicitous of …

The Constitution Besieged: The Rise And Demise Of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence, C. Ian Anderson

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence by Howard Gillman

A Heterodox Catechism, Paul Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.

Liberals And Balancing, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

Indigents And The Denial Of Due Process At Involuntary Treatment Hearings: The Need For Independent Psychiatric Assistance, Marcy H. Speiser

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Bad Judicial Activism And Liberal Federal-Courts Doctrine: A Comment On Professor Doernberg And Professor Redish, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

JUDUCIAL ACTIVISM IS often portrayed as a liberal vice. This perception is wrong both historically and, as Professor Redish argues, ³ currently as well. The federal judiciary has been and still is an activist institution, working with both substantive law and jurisdictional rules to achieve its own policy goals. It has done this in statutory, constitutional, and common-law matters. Specifically, the Supreme Court of the United States has actively-shaped the jurisdiction of the federal courts in a restrictive and generally conservative manner.

Professors Doernberg⁴ and Redish attack this last form of activism by the federal courts, activism in shaping …

Is The Burger Court Really Like The Warren Court?, Paul Bender

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't by Vincent Blasi

Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role Of The Supreme Court, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role of the Supreme Court by Arthur Selwyn Miller

On Complaining About The Burger Court, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

A Comment On The Burger Court And "Judicial Activism", Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

Justice Jackson And The Judicial Function, Paul A. Weidner

Michigan Law Review

Much of the pattern of division in the present Supreme Court is traceable to basic differences of opinion regarding the proper role of a judge in the process of constitutional adjudication. Some students of the Court, yielding to the current fashion of reducing even intricate problems to capsule terms, have tried to explain the controversy by classifying the justices as either "liberals" or "conservatives." A second school poses the disagreement largely in terms of judicial "activism" as opposed to judicial "restraint." It is this view that has the greater relevance for the present discussion. C.H. Pritchett, one of the leading …