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Articles 1 - 16 of 16

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Fourth Amendment At Home, Thomas P. Crocker Oct 2020

The Fourth Amendment At Home, Thomas P. Crocker

Indiana Law Journal

A refuge, a domain of personal privacy, and the seat of familial life, the home holds a special place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Supreme Court opinions are replete with statements affirming the special status of the home. Fourth Amendment text places special emphasis on securing protections for the home in addition to persons, papers, and effects against unwarranted government intrusion. Beyond the Fourth Amendment, the home has a unique place within constitutional structure. The home receives privacy protections in addition to sheltering other constitutional values protected by the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. For example, under the Due …


Foreseeably Uncertain: The (In)Ability Of School Officials To Reasonably Foresee Substantial Disruption To The School Environment, Maggie Geren Sep 2020

Foreseeably Uncertain: The (In)Ability Of School Officials To Reasonably Foresee Substantial Disruption To The School Environment, Maggie Geren

Arkansas Law Review

“Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met.” While the name of this Facebook page is perhaps a bit harsh, most would hardly view it as grounds for school suspension. The very heart of the First Amendment, and indeed the notion for which our Framers drafted it, is the right of citizens to “think, speak, write and worship as they wish, not as the Government commands.” Without this fundamental freedom—one that has persevered despite countless efforts to narrow its reach—the American people would live in constant fear of backlash and suppression for merely voicing their opinions.


Compelled Speech And The Irrelevance Of Controversy, Seana Valentine Shiffrin Jun 2020

Compelled Speech And The Irrelevance Of Controversy, Seana Valentine Shiffrin

Pepperdine Law Review

NIFLA v. Becerra stealthily introduced a new First Amendment test for compelled speech that has injected chaos into the law of compelled disclosures. NIFLA reinterpreted the requirement that compelled disclosures contain only “purely factual and uncontroversial information” in a way that imbued independent force into the “uncontroversial” component of that test. Yet, the Court failed to supply criteria for what sort of purely factual information would fail to qualify as “uncontroversial information” and identified no important free speech concerns that this new prong protects. This Article distinguishes seven different interpretations of “uncontroversial information.” It then assesses them to ascertain whether …


The Nfl Player, The Schoolchild, And The Entertainer: When The Term "Free Speech" Is Too Freely Spoken, Exactly "Who's On First?", Christian Ketter Apr 2020

The Nfl Player, The Schoolchild, And The Entertainer: When The Term "Free Speech" Is Too Freely Spoken, Exactly "Who's On First?", Christian Ketter

Cleveland State Law Review

As America’s media and politicians continue to debate the free speech rights of NFL players, schoolchildren, and entertainers, the dialogue has confused many Americans as to what exactly the First Amendment protects. Chief Justice John G. Roberts ultimately assumes the role of an umpire in many of these issues, guiding the United States Supreme Court to incrementally “call balls and strikes.” In recent years, the Court has umpired employment rights and state action cases, and Roberts’s calls will likely further distance the Court that decided Morse v. Frederick from the one that decided Tinker v. Des Moines. Amid a …


First Amendment “Harms”, Stephanie H. Barclay Apr 2020

First Amendment “Harms”, Stephanie H. Barclay

Indiana Law Journal

What role should harm to third parties play in the government’s ability to protect religious rights? The intuitively appealing “harm” principle has animated new theories advanced by scholars who argue that religious exemptions are indefensible whenever they result in cognizable harm to third parties. This third-party harm theory is gaining traction in some circles, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s pending cases in Little Sisters of the Poor and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. While focusing on harm appears at first to provide an appealing, simple, and neutral principle for avoiding other difficult moral questions, the definition of harm …


Government Speech Doctrine—Legislator-Led Prayer's Saving Grace, Daniel M. Vitagliano Mar 2020

Government Speech Doctrine—Legislator-Led Prayer's Saving Grace, Daniel M. Vitagliano

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

This Note argues that Lund was decided incorrectly in part because the Fourth Circuit failed to analyze the type of speech at issue before assessing the constitutionality of the prayer practice. This Note is composed of four parts. Part I surveys the Supreme Court’s legislative prayer jurisprudence—Marsh and Town of Greece. Part II outlines Lund and Bormuth, and the Fourth and Sixth Circuits’ dissimilar applications of the Supreme Court’s precedent. Part III argues that courts must first classify legislative prayers as either government or private speech before assessing whether a prayer practice violates the Establishment Clause. It further argues …


State Of The Unions: The Impact Of Janus On Public University Student Fees, Jonathan Kaufman Jan 2020

State Of The Unions: The Impact Of Janus On Public University Student Fees, Jonathan Kaufman

Georgia Law Review

In Janus v. American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees, Council 31, the U.S.
Supreme Court overruled forty-one years of precedent
that had allowed public-sector unions to collect
agency-shop fees from nonmembers. The Court ruled this
mandatory fee collection unconstitutional as a violation
of nonmember First Amendment rights. This decision
may pose problems for other public entities, such as
public universities, who also collect mandatory fees that
support political speech.


First Amendment Traditionalism, Marc O. Degirolami Jan 2020

First Amendment Traditionalism, Marc O. Degirolami

Faculty Publications

Traditionalist constitutional interpretation takes political and cultural practices of long age and duration as constituting the presumptive meaning of the text. This Essay probes traditionalism's conceptual and normative foundations. It focuses on the Supreme Court's traditionalist interpretation of the First Amendment to understand the distinctive justifications for traditionalism and the relationship between traditionalism and originalism. The first part of the Essay identifies and describes traditionalism in some of the Court's Speech and Religion Clause jurisprudence, highlighting its salience in the Court's recent Establishment Clause doctrine.

Part II develops two justfications for traditionalism: "interpretive" and "democratic-populist." The interpretive justification is that …


"Inciting A Riot": Silent Sentinels, Group Protests, And Prisoners' Petition And Associational Rights, Nicole B. Godfrey Jan 2020

"Inciting A Riot": Silent Sentinels, Group Protests, And Prisoners' Petition And Associational Rights, Nicole B. Godfrey

Seattle University Law Review

This Article argues for increased legal protections for prisoners who choose to engage in group protest to shed light on the conditions of their incarceration. A companion piece to a similar article that focused on prisoner free speech rights, this Article uses the acts of protest utilized by the Silent Sentinels to examine why prisoners’ rights to petition and association should be strengthened. By strengthening these rights, the Article argues that we will advance the values enshrined by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause while simultaneously advancing the rights of the incarcerated millions with little to no political power.

The Article …


The Law Of Obscenity In Comic Books, Rachel Silverstein Jan 2020

The Law Of Obscenity In Comic Books, Rachel Silverstein

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Avoidance Creep, Charlotte Garden Jan 2020

Avoidance Creep, Charlotte Garden

Faculty Articles

At first glance, constitutional avoidance—the principle that courts construe statutes so as to avoid conflict with the Constitution whenever possible—appears both unremarkable and benign. But when courts engage in constitutional avoidance, they frequently construe statutory language in a manner contrary to both its plain meaning and to the underlying congressional intent. Then, successive decisions often magnify the problems of avoidance—a phenomenon I call “avoidance creep.” When a court distorts a statute in service of constitutional avoidance, a later court may amplify the distortion, incrementally changing both statutory and constitutional doctrine in ways that are unsupported by any existing rationale for …


Discrimination, The Speech That Enables It, And The First Amendment, Helen Norton Jan 2020

Discrimination, The Speech That Enables It, And The First Amendment, Helen Norton

Publications

Imagine that you’re interviewing for your dream job, only to be asked by the hiring committee whether you’re pregnant. Or HIV positive. Or Muslim. Does the First Amendment protect your interviewers’ inquiries from government regulation? This Article explores that question.

Antidiscrimination laws forbid employers, housing providers, insurers, lenders, and other gatekeepers from relying on certain characteristics in their decision-making. Many of these laws also regulate those actors’ speech by prohibiting them from inquiring about applicants’ protected class characteristics; these provisions seek to stop illegal discrimination before it occurs by preventing gatekeepers from eliciting information that would enable them to discriminate. …


The Arms Dealer Who Cries, :“First Amendment”, Gustave Passanante Jan 2020

The Arms Dealer Who Cries, :“First Amendment”, Gustave Passanante

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Dissent, Disagreement And Doctrinal Disarray: Free Expression And The Roberts Court In 2020, Clay Calvert Jan 2020

Dissent, Disagreement And Doctrinal Disarray: Free Expression And The Roberts Court In 2020, Clay Calvert

UF Law Faculty Publications

Using the United States Supreme Court’s 2019 rulings in Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, Nieves v. Bartlett, and Iancu v. Brunetti as analytical springboards, this Article explores multiple fractures among the Justices affecting the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press. All three cases involved dissents, with two cases each spawning five opinions. The clefts compound problems witnessed in 2018 with a pair of five-to-four decisions in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. Partisan divides, the Article argues, are only one problem with First Amendment …


The Majoritarian Press Clause, Sonja R. West Jan 2020

The Majoritarian Press Clause, Sonja R. West

Scholarly Works

In early 2018, stories began circulating that something troubling was happening at the United States-Mexico border. The reports claimed that the United States government was separating migrant families and then holding children (as well as adults) by the thousands in crowded, possibly inhumane environments. There were alarming accounts of children who were sick, dirty, hungry, neglected, and sleeping on concrete floors.

Americans, of course, demanded answers: What was happening at these migrant detention centers? Why was it happening? What were the official policies involved? Were the government's actions appropriate? Were they legal? In other words, this was a textbook example …


The Supreme Court’S Two Constitutions: A First Look At The “Reverse Polarity” Cases, Arthur D. Hellman Jan 2020

The Supreme Court’S Two Constitutions: A First Look At The “Reverse Polarity” Cases, Arthur D. Hellman

Articles

In the traditional approach to ideological classification, “liberal” judicial decisions are those that support civil liberties claims; “conservative” decisions are those that reject them. That view – particularly associated with the Warren Court era – is reflected in numerous academic writings and even an article by a prominent liberal judge. Today, however, there is mounting evidence that the traditional assumptions about the liberal-conservative divide are incorrect or at best incomplete. In at least some areas of constitutional law, the traditional characterizations have been reversed. Across a wide variety of constitutional issues, support for claims under the Bill of Rights or …