Law Commons^™

Fire, Aim, Ready! Militarizing Animus: “Unit Cohesion” And The Transgender Ban, Eric Merriam

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

President Trump’s currently litigated “transgender ban,” which excludes transgender persons from military service, is premised in part upon a claim that transgender persons’ presence in the military adversely affects “unit cohesion.” This use of identity- based “unit cohesion” as a justification for excluding a group from military service is the latest episode in a long history of the government asserting “unit cohesion” to justify excluding people from military service based on their identities. This Article contends that unit cohesion, when premised on identity, is always an impermissible justification for exclusion from military service because it is unconstitutional animus. Though …

The Uncertain Status Of The Manifest Disregard Standard One Decade After Hall Street, Stuart M. Boyarsky

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) enables parties to obtain quick and final resolution to disputes without incurring the costs, delays, and occasional publicity of litigation. Indeed, section 10 of the FAA enumerates four specific grounds on which courts may vacate arbitral awards: corruption, fraud, impartiality, and misconduct or incompetence. Yet over the past 60 years, a debate has raged over the existence of an additional ground: the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.

The Supreme Court first enounced this standard in dicta in its 1953 decision in Wilko v. Swan. Over next four decades, every federal circuit court slowly …

The Language Of Neutrality In Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, Carolyn Shapiro

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

At Justice Neil Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing, then-Judge Gorsuch repeatedly insisted that judging involves no more than examining the legal materials—like statutes and precedents— and applying them to the facts of the case. There is, he emphasized, no room for a Justice’s “personal views,” and he refused even to state his agreement (or disagreement) with such iconic cases as Loving v. Virginia and Griswold v. Connecticut. Instead, then Judge Gorsuch reiterated only that they were precedents of the Court and thus entitled to respect. Frustrating as his answers may have been to some senators, however, they differed from answers given …

But It’S Just A Little White Lie! An Analysis Of The Materiality Requirement Of 18 U.S.C. § 1425, Hanna E. Borsilli

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Once an individual becomes a naturalized citizen, the U.S. government can revoke citizenship only upon a discovery that the individual was not eligible to procure naturalization at the time of application. The process to revoke naturalization, referred to as denaturalization, may begin with a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425, a criminal statute broadly prohibiting any attempt to procure naturalization “contrary to law.”

This “contrary to law” language created confusion regarding the required statutory elements of § 1425. Most courts to address this issue, including the Supreme Court in Maslenjak v. United States, held that § 1425 requires proof …