Law Commons^™

The Reaffirmation Of Federalism As A Viable Limitation Upon The Commerce Power, Randy R. Koenders

Akron Law Review

"Throughout its history, the constitutional basis of the FLSA has remained anchored in the Commerce Clause. However, despite the legitimacy of that purpose, the FLSA has been the subject of constant attacks since its inception, the most fervent of which has been the challenge to its constitutionality on state sovereignty grounds.

"Two recent United States Supreme Court cases construing the constitutionality of the FLSA and its amendments reflect not only the changing judicial posture toward extension of the Act to matters of state concern, but also the differing attitudes toward extension of the Commerce Clause itself."

Reflections On Comity In The Law Of American Federalism, Gil Seinfeld

Articles

Comity is a nebulous concept familiar to us from the law of international relations. Roughly speaking, it describes a set of reciprocal norms among nations that call for one state to recognize, and sometimes defer to, the laws, judgments, or interests of another. Comity also features prominently in the law of American federalism, but in that context, it operates within limits that have received almost no attention from scholarly commentators. Specifically, although courts routinely describe duties that run from one state to another, or from the federal government to the states, as exercises in comity, they almost never rely on …

The Future Of Federalism, From The Bottom Up, Anthony Johnstone

Montana Law Review

No abstract provided.

Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent On The Meaning Of Federal Law?, Amanda Frost

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The conventional wisdom is that state courts need not follow lower federal court precedent when interpreting federal law. Upon closer inspection, however, the question of how state courts should treat lower federal court precedent is not so clear. Although most state courts now take the conventional approach, a few contend that they are obligated to follow the lower federal courts, and two federal courts of appeals have declared that their decisions are binding on state courts. The Constitution’s text and structure send mixed messages about the relationship between state and lower federal courts, and the Supreme Court has never squarely …

Will Uncooperative Federalism Survive Nfib?, Abigail R. Moncrieff, Jonathan Dinerstein

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

In the end, the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence seems to run contrary to its stated goals. The New Federalism era, up to and including NFIB, creates an incentive for the national government to flex its own muscles more, not less. Maybe that result will be good for voters' clarity and for uniformity of national policy, but it is not good for uncooperative federalism or for states' autonomy—the values that the Supreme Court seems to be trying to protect.

The Roberts Court And Penumbral Federalism, Edward Cantu

Faculty Works

For several decades the Court has invoked “state dignity” to animate federalism reasoning in isolated doctrinal contexts. Recent Roberts Court decisions suggest that a focus on state dignity, prestige, status, and similar ethereal concepts — which derive from a “penumbral” reading of the Tenth Amendment — represent the budding of a different doctrinal approach to federalism generally. This article terms this new approach “penumbral federalism,” an approach less concerned with delineating state from federal regulatory turf, and more concerned with maintaining the states as viable competitors for the respect and loyalty of the citizenry.

After fleshing out what “penumbral federalism” …

The Separation-Of-Powers And The Least Dangerous Branch, Edward Cantu

Faculty Works

A snapshot of controversies currently surrounding the President highlights a sobering, even if acceptable, reality: we live in an age of extremely amplified president power. From the executive use of military force with little or no congressional approval, to the use of executive orders to effectively make federal policy without congressional involvement, virtually all of these controversies have a common source: the Court’s relegation of enforcement of the separation-of-powers to the political process.

This Article provides an account of this relegation. It argues that all of the Court’s separation-of-powers decisions — even those seeming to strictly enforce the boundaries of …