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All Or Nothing: Explaining The Size Of Supreme Court Majorities, Paul H. Edelman, Suzanna Sherry
All Or Nothing: Explaining The Size Of Supreme Court Majorities, Paul H. Edelman, Suzanna Sherry
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this Article, Professors Edelman and Sherry use a probabilistic model to explore the process of coalition formation on the United States Supreme Court. They identify coalition formation as a Markov process with absorbing states and examine voting patterns from twelve Court Terms. On the basis of their data, they conclude that Justices are reluctant to remain in small minorities. Surprisingly, however, they also find that a three-Justice minority coalition is less likely to suffer defections than a four-Justice minority coalition. This counterintuitive result suggests that while in general it is minority Justices rather than majority Justices who drive the …
Strategic Voting On Multimember Courts, Evan H. Caminker
Strategic Voting On Multimember Courts, Evan H. Caminker
Articles
In appellate adjudication, decisions are rendered by a multimember court as a collective entity, not by individual judges. Yet legal scholars have only just begun to explore the formal and informal processes by which individual votes are transformed into a collective judgment. In particular, they have paid insufficient attention to the ways in which the vote of each individual judge is influenced by the views of her colleagues on a multimember court.