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John Marshall And Felix Frankfurter: An Icon And A Disappointment?, William E. Nelson Jan 2024

John Marshall And Felix Frankfurter: An Icon And A Disappointment?, William E. Nelson

Touro Law Review

This article shows how Chief Justice John Marshall first developed the doctrine of judicial restraint in Marbury v. Madison to assure the public that the Supreme Court would not engage in politically oriented judicial review as colonial courts had in holding Parliament’s 1765 Stamp Act unconstitutional. Justice Felix Frankfurter, in contrast, adopted judicial restraint differently—by reading the scholarship of James Bradley Thayer. This article also shows that Frankfurter did not abandon his commitment to judicial restraint when during his years on the bench it began to serve conservative purposes rather than the progressive purposes it had once served.


The Roberts Court’S Anti-Democracy Jurisprudence And The Reemergence Of State Authoritarian Enclaves, Reginald Oh Jan 2023

The Roberts Court’S Anti-Democracy Jurisprudence And The Reemergence Of State Authoritarian Enclaves, Reginald Oh

Journal of Race, Gender, and Ethnicity

This Essay argues that the Roberts Court has been a pivotal institutional player in destabilizing constitutional democracy. It has enabled states to freely pursue agendas that are authoritarian in nature. And because authoritarianism is contrary to core principles of the Constitution, the Roberts Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has no basis in the Constitution and must ultimately be rejected.

Instead of taking steps to block authoritarian legislation and promote a fair and open political process, the Court has issued rulings catalyzing and reinforcing the authoritarian impulses of the former Jim Crow states. The Roberts Court has engaged in judicial review reinforcing authoritarianism, …


Seamen, Railroad Employees, And Uber Drivers: Applying The Section 1 Exemption In The Federal Arbitration Ace To Rideshare Drivers, Conor Bradley Jan 2021

Seamen, Railroad Employees, And Uber Drivers: Applying The Section 1 Exemption In The Federal Arbitration Ace To Rideshare Drivers, Conor Bradley

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or the Act) exempts “seamen, railroad employees, [and] any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” from arbitration. In 2019, the Supreme Court held in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira that this provision exempted independent contractors as well as employees. This decision expanded the reach of the section 1 exemption and may affect the relationship between ridesharing companies, such as Uber, and their drivers. Previously, ridesharing companies argued that courts must enforce the arbitration clauses in their employment contracts because their workers were independent contractors and, therefore, section 1 …


In Defense Of (Circuit) Court-Packing, Xiao Wang Oct 2020

In Defense Of (Circuit) Court-Packing, Xiao Wang

Michigan Law Review Online

Proposals to pack the Supreme Court have gained steam recently. Presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg endorsed a court-packing plan at the start of his campaign, and several other candidates also indicated a willingness to consider such a plan, including Senators Elizabeth Warren and Amy Klobuchar. Legal scholars have similarly called upon Congress to increase the size of the Supreme Court, particularly following the heated confirmations of Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh. These suggestions for Court reform have only gotten more pronounced with the recent passing of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the subsequent nomination of Judge Amy Coney Barrett, and the …


Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule Jun 2016

Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule

Michigan Law Review

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts review and set aside agency action that is “arbitrary [and] capricious.” In a common formulation of rationality review, courts must either take a “hard look” at the rationality of agency decisionmaking, or at least ensure that agencies themselves have taken a hard look. We will propose a much less demanding and intrusive interpretation of rationality review—a thin version. Under a robust range of conditions, rational agencies have good reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary. Although this claim is seemingly paradoxical or internally inconsistent, it simply rests on an …


Introduction: Is The Supreme Court Failing At Its Job, Or Are We Failing At Ours?, Suzanna Sherry May 2016

Introduction: Is The Supreme Court Failing At Its Job, Or Are We Failing At Ours?, Suzanna Sherry

Vanderbilt Law Review

It is a pleasure and a privilege to write an introduction to this Symposium celebrating Dean Erwin Chemerinsky's important new book, The Case Against the Supreme Court. Chemerinsky is one of the leading constitutional scholars of our time and a frequent advocate before the U.S. Supreme Court. If he thinks there is a case to be made against the Court, we should all take it very seriously indeed. Chemerinsky's thesis may be stated in a few sentences. The primary role of the Supreme Court, in his view, is to "protect the rights of minorities who cannot rely on the political …


Thinking About The Supreme Court's Successes And Failures, Erwin Chemerinsky May 2016

Thinking About The Supreme Court's Successes And Failures, Erwin Chemerinsky

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Supreme Court often has failed at its most important tasks and at the most important times. I set out this thesis at the beginning the book:

To be clear, I am not saying that the Supreme Court has failed at these crucial tasks every time. Making a case against the Supreme Court does not require taking such an extreme position. I also will talk about areas where the Court has succeeded in protecting minorities and in enforcing the limits of the Constitution. My claim is that the Court has often failed where and when it has been most needed. …


The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences Of King V. Burwell, Kristin E. Hickman Feb 2016

The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences Of King V. Burwell, Kristin E. Hickman

Pepperdine Law Review

The Supreme Court’s decision in King v. Burwell surprised many people, not because of its outcome but because, even as the Court ultimately agreed with the IRS’s interpretation of the statute, the Court expressly denied the IRS Chevron deference. As regards that result, this Essay makes three points. First, the Chevron discussion in King was not incidental, but the IRS and taxes were not foremost on the Court’s mind. Rather, King reflects a careful effort by Chief Justice Roberts to accomplish, through alternative framing, a broader curtailment of Chevron’s scope that he advocated unsuccessfully two terms earlier in City of …


Constitutional Avoidance As Interpretation And As Remedy, Eric S. Fish Jan 2016

Constitutional Avoidance As Interpretation And As Remedy, Eric S. Fish

Michigan Law Review

In a number of recent landmark decisions, the Supreme Court has used the canon of constitutional avoidance to essentially rewrite laws. Formally, the avoidance canon is understood as a method for resolving interpretive ambiguities: if there are two equally plausible readings of a statute, and one of them raises constitutional concerns, judges are instructed to choose the other one. Yet in challenges to the Affordable Care Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and other major statutes, the Supreme Court has used this canon to adopt interpretations that are not plausible. Jurists, scholars, and legal commentators have criticized …


Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power, Michael Kagan Sep 2015

Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power, Michael Kagan

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

For decades, scholars of immigration law have anticipated the demise of the plenary power doctrine. The Supreme Court could have accomplished this in its recent decision in Kerry v. Din, or it could have reaffirmed plenary power. Instead, the Court produced a splintered decision that did neither. This Essay examines the long process of attrition that has significantly gutted the traditional plenary power doctrine with regard to procedural due process, while leaving it largely intact with regard to substantive constitutional rights.


Three Variations Of The Supreme Court's Legal Mind, Albert Lebowitz Jul 2015

Three Variations Of The Supreme Court's Legal Mind, Albert Lebowitz

Akron Law Review

With their independence, the Justices emerged, not, as Madison imagined them, a unified definition of reason but with diverging strains of legal mindedness that, as they almost inevitably clashed with each other, developed that added strength which emerges from dialectic. Madison's vision may have been too simple.

Constitutional theory is heavily concentrated in the area of judicial review, and the three issues raised in Marbury v. Madison are still subjects of heated debate and controversy. It is remarkable how topical this opinion remains.


That Elusive Consensus: The Historiographic Significance Of William E. Nelson's Works On Judicial Review, Mark Mcgarvie Jun 2014

That Elusive Consensus: The Historiographic Significance Of William E. Nelson's Works On Judicial Review, Mark Mcgarvie

Chicago-Kent Law Review

This essay provides a historiographical context for Nelson’s work on judicial review. It argues that Nelson’s integration of intellectual and legal history not only rebutted the instrumentalist historiography that prevailed when he undertook his work on Marshall and judicial review, but also fostered an appreciation of the need to place legal actors in the intellectual context in which they acted. Highlighting the influence of Bernard Bailyn’s pathfinding work on popular sovereignty upon Nelson’s development of his consensus theory, the essay contends that Nelson’s work changed the course of academic readings of Marshall’s jurisprudence to be consistent with a broader acceptance …


Walking The Class Action Maze: Toward A More Functional Rule 23, Robert G. Bone Jun 2013

Walking The Class Action Maze: Toward A More Functional Rule 23, Robert G. Bone

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Over roughly the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have limited access to class actions. Many of the more restrictive decisions-such as Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., and Wal- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes-are based on interpretations of Rule 23 and thus fall within the power of the Advisory Committee and rulemaking process to modify. This Article proposes revisions to Rule 23 designed to deal with some of these decisions and to make the class action a more pragmatic and functional device. It focuses on two areas: (1) the constraints imposed by …


Defining Corruption And Constitutionalizing Democracy, Deborah Hellman Jun 2013

Defining Corruption And Constitutionalizing Democracy, Deborah Hellman

Michigan Law Review

The central front in the battle over campaign finance laws is the definition of corruption. The Supreme Court has allowed restrictions on the giving and spending of money in connection with elections only when they serve to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption. The constitutionality of such laws, therefore, depends on how the Court defines corruption. Over the years, campaign finance cases have conceived of corruption in both broad and narrow terms, with the most recent cases defining it especially narrowly. While supporters and critics of campaign finance laws have argued for and against these different formulations, both sides …


Assessing Divisibility In The Armed Career Criminal Act, Ted Koehler Jun 2012

Assessing Divisibility In The Armed Career Criminal Act, Ted Koehler

Michigan Law Review

When courts analyze whether a defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act's "residual clause," they use a "categorical approach," looking only to the statutory language of the prior offense, rather than the facts disclosed by the record of conviction. But when a defendant is convicted under a "divisible" statute, which encompasses a broader range of conduct, only some of which would qualify as a predicate offense, courts may employ the "modified categorical approach." This approach allows courts to view additional documents to determine whether the jury convicted the defendant of the Armed Career …


Towards A Balanced Approach For The Protection Of Native American Sacred Sites, Alex Tallchief Skibine Apr 2012

Towards A Balanced Approach For The Protection Of Native American Sacred Sites, Alex Tallchief Skibine

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

Protection of "sacred sites" is very important to Native American religious practitioners because it is intrinsically tied to the survival of their cultures, and therefore to their survival as distinct peoples. The Supreme Court in Oregon v. Smith held that rational basis review, and not strict scrutiny, was the appropriate level of judicial review when evaluating the constitutionality of neutral laws of general applicability even when these laws impacted one's ability to practice a religion. Reacting to the decision, Congress enacted the Relgious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which reinstated the strict scrutiny test for challenges to neutral laws of general …


Yick Wo At 125: Four Simple Lessons For The Contemporary Supreme Court, Marie A. Failinger Apr 2012

Yick Wo At 125: Four Simple Lessons For The Contemporary Supreme Court, Marie A. Failinger

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

The 125th anniversary of Yick Wo v. Hopkins is an important opportunity to recognize the pervasive role of law in oppressive treatment of Chinese immigrants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is also a good opportunity for the Supreme Court to reflect on four important lessons gleaned from Yick Wo. First, the Court should never lend justification to the evil of class discrimination, even if it has to decline to rule in a case. Second, where there is persistent discrimination against a minority group, the Court must be similarly persistent in fighting it. Third, the Court needs to take …


Tax Exceptionalism: Wanted Dead Or Alive, Gene Magidenko Jan 2012

Tax Exceptionalism: Wanted Dead Or Alive, Gene Magidenko

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Caveat

Tax law has just not been the same since January 2011. Did Congress pass earthshaking legislation affecting the Internal Revenue Code? Did the IRS dramatically change regulations? If only it were that exciting. Instead, eight jurists sitting at One First Street in our nation’s capital transformed tax law in a less bloody, but no less profound, way. The thought must have gone through many a tax mind – is tax exceptionalism dead?


But How Will The People Know? Public Opinion As A Meager Influence In Shaping Contemporary Supreme Court Decision Making, Tom Goldstein, Amy Howe Apr 2011

But How Will The People Know? Public Opinion As A Meager Influence In Shaping Contemporary Supreme Court Decision Making, Tom Goldstein, Amy Howe

Michigan Law Review

Chief Justice John Roberts famously described the ideal Supreme Court Justice as analogous to a baseball umpire, who simply "applies" the rules, rather than making them. Roberts promised to "remember that it's my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat." At her own recent confirmation hearings, Elena Kagan demurred, opining that Roberts's metaphor might erroneously suggest that "everything is clear-cut, and that there's no judgment in the process." Based on his 2009 book, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution, Barry Friedman …


Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism In Trial Courts, Ori Aronson Jul 2010

Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism In Trial Courts, Ori Aronson

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The ongoing debates over the legitimacy of judicial review-the power of courts to strike down unconstitutional statutes-as well as the evolving school of thought called "popular constitutionalism, " are characterized by a preoccupation with the Supreme Court as the embodiment of judicial power This is a striking shortcoming in prevailing constitutional theory, given the fact that in the United States, inferior courts engage in constitutional adjudication and in acts of judicial review on a daily basis, in ways that are importantly different from the familiar practices of the Supreme Court. The Article breaks down this monolithic concept of "the courts" …


Pleading With Congress To Resist The Urge To Overrule Twombly And Iqbal, Michael R. Huston Jan 2010

Pleading With Congress To Resist The Urge To Overrule Twombly And Iqbal, Michael R. Huston

Michigan Law Review

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court changed the rhetoric of the federal pleading system. Those decisions have been decried by members of the bar, scholars, and legislators as judicial activism and a rewriting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such criticism has led members of both houses of Congress to introduce legislation to overrule the decisions and return to some variation of the "notice pleading" regime that existed before Twombly. This Note argues that both of the current proposals to overrule Twombly and Iqbal should be rejected. Although the bills take different …


There Were Great Men Before Agamemnon, William R. Casto Mar 2009

There Were Great Men Before Agamemnon, William R. Casto

Vanderbilt Law Review

John Marshall is the Agamemnon of Supreme Court history. He is universally considered the Court's greatest Justice, and rightly so. But there were great Justices before Marshall. One of those great Justices was James Iredell. No Justice in the Court's history has provided a more detailed or sophisticated explanation and justification of the doctrine of judicial review. Iredell needs a bard, and this Essay is my ode to his memory.


Evolving Objective Standards: A Developmental Approach To Constitutional Review Of Morals Legislation, Christian J. Grostic Jan 2006

Evolving Objective Standards: A Developmental Approach To Constitutional Review Of Morals Legislation, Christian J. Grostic

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence regarding morals legislation mirrors the findings of empirical research on moral and psychological development. Specifically, the Supreme Court upholds morals legislation only if it is justified by stage five reasoning. Part I examines significant Supreme Court cases related to morals legislation over the last 50 years and argues that the Supreme Court has consistently upheld morals legislation that is justified by stage five reasoning, while consistently striking down as unconstitutional morals legislation that is not. Part II argues that a developmental approach to constitutional review of morals legislation, while consistent with …


A Theory In Search Of A Court, And Itself: Judicial Minimalism At The Supreme Court Bar, Neil S. Siegel Aug 2005

A Theory In Search Of A Court, And Itself: Judicial Minimalism At The Supreme Court Bar, Neil S. Siegel

Michigan Law Review

According to the prevailing wisdom in academic public law, constitutional theory is a field that seeks to articulate and evaluate abstract accounts of the nature of the United States Constitution. Theorists offer those accounts as guides to subsequent judicial construction of constitutional provisions. As typically conceived, therefore, constitutional theory tends to proceed analytically from the general to the particular; its animating idea is that correct decisions in constitutional cases presuppose theoretical commitments to the methodological principles that should guide constitutional interpretation and the substantive values such interpretation should advance. In its enthusiasm for abstraction, constitutional theory has, at times, generated …


Judging The Law Of Politics, Guy-Uriel Charles May 2005

Judging The Law Of Politics, Guy-Uriel Charles

Michigan Law Review

Election law scholars are currently engaged in a vigorous debate regarding the wisdom of judicial supervision of democratic politics. Ever since the Court's 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr, the Court has increasingly supervised a dizzying array of election-related matters. These include the regulation of political parties, access to electoral ballots, partisanship in electoral institutions, the role of race in the design of electoral structures, campaign financing, and the justifications for limiting the franchise. In particular, and as a consequence of the Court's involvement in the 2000 presidential elections in Bush v. Gore, a central task of election …


Foreword: A Silk Purse?, John T. Noonan Jr. Aug 2003

Foreword: A Silk Purse?, John T. Noonan Jr.

Michigan Law Review

On March 2, 1801, President John Adams appointed forty-two persons to be justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. John Marshall, doubling as Secretary of State as well as Chief Justice, failed to deliver the commissions. Adams's term expired. James Madison, Marshall's successor as Secretary of State, withheld seventeen of the commissions. In 1802, William Marbury and three other appointees to this minor office brought mandamus against Madison in the Supreme Court. Madison was ordered to show cause why the writ should not issue. Congress abolished the June sitting of the Court. Only in 1803 was the case …


The Irrepressible Myth Of Marbury, Michael Stokes Paulsen Aug 2003

The Irrepressible Myth Of Marbury, Michael Stokes Paulsen

Michigan Law Review

Nearly all of American constitutional law today rests on a myth. The myth, presented as standard history both in junior high civics texts and in advanced law school courses on constitutional law, runs something like this: A long, long time ago - 1803, if the storyteller is trying to be precise - in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court of the United States created the doctrine of "judicial review." Judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to decide the meaning of the Constitution and to strike down laws that the Court finds unconstitutional. As …


Judging The Next Emergency: Judicial Review And Individual Rights In Times Of Crisis, David Cole Aug 2003

Judging The Next Emergency: Judicial Review And Individual Rights In Times Of Crisis, David Cole

Michigan Law Review

As virtually every law student who studies Marbury v. Madison learns, Chief Justice John Marshall's tactical genius was to establish judicial review in a case where the result could not be challenged. As a technical matter, Marbury lost, and the executive branch won. As furious as President Jefferson reportedly was with the decision, there was nothing he could do about it, for there was no mandate to defy. The Court's decision offered no remedy for Marbury himself, whose rights were directly at issue, and whose rights the Court found had indeed been violated. But over time, it became clear that …


Alternative Forms Of Judicial Review, Mark Tushnet Aug 2003

Alternative Forms Of Judicial Review, Mark Tushnet

Michigan Law Review

The invention in the late twentieth century of what I call weak-form systems of judicial review provides us with the chance to see in a new light some traditional debates within U.S. constitutional law and theory, which are predicated on the fact that the United States has strong-form judicial review. Strong- and weak-form systems operate on the level of constitutional design, in the sense that their characteristics are specified in constitutional documents or in deep-rooted constitutional traditions. After sketching the differences between strong- and weak-form systems, I turn to design features that operate at the next lower level. Here legislatures …


Section Five Overbreadth: The Facial Approach To Adjudicating Challenges Under Section Five Of The Fourteenth Amendment, Catherine Carroll Feb 2003

Section Five Overbreadth: The Facial Approach To Adjudicating Challenges Under Section Five Of The Fourteenth Amendment, Catherine Carroll

Michigan Law Review

In February 1996, the New York State Department of Transportation fired Joseph Kilcullen from his position as a snowplow driver in the Department's Highway Maintenance training program. Alleging that the state discharged him because of his epilepsy and learning disability, Kilcullen sued his former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which abrogated states' sovereign immunity and permitted private suits for damages against states in a federal court. Kilcullen asserted only that he was not treated the same as similarly situated non-disabled employees; his claim did not implicate the ADA's requirement that employers provide "reasonable accommodation" to disabled employees. …