Law Commons^™

Systemic Racism In The U.S. Immigration Laws, Kevin R. Johnson

Indiana Law Journal

This Essay analyzes how aggressive activism in a California mountain town at the tail end of the nineteenth century commenced a chain reaction resulting in state and ultimately national anti-Chinese immigration laws. The constitutional immunity through which the Supreme Court upheld those laws deeply affected the future trajectory of U.S. immigration law and policy.

Responding to sustained political pressure from the West, Congress in 1882 passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, an infamous piece of unabashedly racist legislation that commenced a long process of barring immigration from all of Asia to the United States. In upholding the Act, the Supreme Court …

Hernández V. Mesa: A Case For A More Meaningful Partnership With The Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, Peyton Jacobsen

Seattle University Law Review

Through an in-depth examination of Hernández, the Inter-American Human Rights System, and the success of Mexico’s partnership with said system, this Note will make a case for embracing human rights bodies— specifically, the Inter-American System on Human Rights—as an appropriate and necessary check on the structures that form the United States government. Part I will look closely at the reasoning and judicially created doctrine that guided the decision in Hernández, with the goal of providing a better understanding of the complicated path through the courts that led to a seemingly straightforward yet unsatisfying result. Part II will illustrate the scope …

Deconstructing Invisible Walls: Sotomayor's Dissents In An Era Of Immigration Exceptionalism, Karla Mckanders

William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice

No abstract provided.

Duress In Immigration Law, Elizabeth A. Keyes

Seattle University Law Review

The doctrine of duress is common to other bodies of law, but the application of the duress doctrine is both unclear and highly unstable in immigration law. Outside of immigration law, a person who commits a criminal act out of well-placed fear of terrible consequences is different than a person who willingly commits a crime, but American immigration law does not recognize this difference. The lack of clarity leads to certain absurd results and demands reimagining, redefinition, and an unequivocal statement of the significance of duress in ascertaining culpability. While there are inevitably some difficult lines to be drawn in …

But It’S Just A Little White Lie! An Analysis Of The Materiality Requirement Of 18 U.S.C. § 1425, Hanna E. Borsilli

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Once an individual becomes a naturalized citizen, the U.S. government can revoke citizenship only upon a discovery that the individual was not eligible to procure naturalization at the time of application. The process to revoke naturalization, referred to as denaturalization, may begin with a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425, a criminal statute broadly prohibiting any attempt to procure naturalization “contrary to law.”

This “contrary to law” language created confusion regarding the required statutory elements of § 1425. Most courts to address this issue, including the Supreme Court in Maslenjak v. United States, held that § 1425 requires proof …