Law Commons^™

Constitutional Rights And Retrenchment: The Elusive Promise Of Equal Citizenship, Deborah L. Brake

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Who Is A Minister? Originalist Deference Expands The Ministerial Exception, Jared C. Huber

Notre Dame Law Review

The ministerial exception is a doctrine born out of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment that shields many religious institutions’ employment decisions from review. While the ministerial exception does not extend to all employment decisions by, or employees of, religious institutions, it does confer broad—and absolute—protection. While less controversy surrounds whether the Constitution shields religious institutions’ employment decisions to at least some extent, much more debate surrounds the exception’s scope, and perhaps most critically, which employees fall under it. In other words, who is a "minister" for purposes of the ministerial exception?

How Far Have Standards Of Decency Evolved In Fifteen Years? An Update On Atkins Jurisprudence In Mississippi, Alexander Kassoff

Mississippi College Law Review

In 2002, the United States Supreme Court handed down Atkins v. Virginia, holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of people with intellectual disability. In the years since that ruling, some change has occurred, but questions remain. This article will examine significant developments in Atkins jurisprudence during that time period. It will look at the two post-Atkins United States Supreme Court cases, and the development of the law - in Mississippi especially, but also to some extent in other jurisdictions that still have the death penalty.

State Sovereign Immunity And The New Purposivism, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark

William & Mary Law Review

Since the Constitution was first proposed, courts and commentators have debated the extent to which it alienated the States’ preexisting sovereign immunity from suit by individuals. During the ratification period, these debates focused on the language of the citizen-state diversity provisions of Article III. After the Supreme Court read these provisions to abrogate state sovereign immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia, Congress and the States adopted the Eleventh Amendment to prohibit this construction. The Court subsequently ruled that States enjoy sovereign immunity independent of the Eleventh Amendment, which neither conferred nor diminished it. In the late twentieth-century, Congress began enacting …

Historians Wear Robes Now? Applying The History And Tradition Standard: A Practical Guide For Lower Courts, Alexandra Michalak

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Never before has the Supreme Court relied on the history and tradition standard to such a magnitude as in the 2021 term to determine the scope of a range of constitutional rights. [...] In reaffirming this standard, the Supreme Court provided no guidance to lower courts on how to apply and analyze the history and tradition standard. Along with balancing the lack of resources in deciding cases with the history and tradition framework, lower courts must face the reality that this standard presents ample opportunity for one-sided historical analysis. To combat the temptation of conducting unbalanced and cursory reviews of …

An Originalist Approach To Prospective Overruling, John O. Mcginnis, Michael Rappaport

Notre Dame Law Review

Originalism has become a dominant jurisprudential theory on the Supreme Court. But a large number of precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and overturning them risks creating enormous disruption to the legal order. This article defends a prospective overruling approach that would harmonize precedent with originalism’s rise and reduce the disruption from overrulings. Under prospective overruling, the Court declares that an existing statute violates the original meaning but will continue to be enforced because declaring it unconstitutional would produce enormous costs; however, future statutes of this type will be voided as unconstitutional. Under our approach, the Court would …

Inactive Exercise & Unequal Protection: Espinoza & Carson Under The Equal Protection Clause, Griffith B. Bludworth

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Education, The First Amendment, And The Constitution, Erwin Chemerinsky

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

School Matters, Ronna Greff Schneider

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Activist Extremist Terrorist Traitor, J. Richard Broughton

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Abraham Lincoln had a way of capturing, rhetorically, the national ethos. The “house divided.” “Right makes might” at Cooper Union. Gettysburg’s “last full measure of devotion” and the “new birth of freedom.” The “mystic chords of memory” and the “better angels of our nature.” “[M]alice toward none,” “charity for all,” and “firmness in the right.” But Lincoln not only evaluated America’s character; he also understood the fragility of those things upon which the success of the American constitutional experiment depended, and the consequences when the national ethos was in crisis. Perhaps no Lincoln speech better examines the threats to …

Overruling Roe V. Wade: Lessons From The Death Penalty, Paul Benjamin Linton

Pepperdine Law Review

In Furman v. Georgia (1972), the Supreme Court struck down the Georgia and Texas death penalty statutes, thereby calling into question the validity of every other state death penalty statute. In their concurring opinions, Justices Brennan and Marshall expressed the view that, given society’s gradual abandonment of the death penalty, capital punishment violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” Justice Powell and three other justices dissented, arguing that the Court had misread the state of the law regarding society’s acceptance of the death penalty. Four years after Furman, in a quintet of cases, the Court held that …

Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny And A Better Way To Handle Speech Restrictions, Aaron Pinsoneault

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

When it comes to unprotected speech categories, the Roberts Court has taken an amoral and inaccurate approach. When the Court first created unprotected speech categories-- defined categories of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment-- it was unclear what rendered a category of speech unprotected. One school of thought argued that speech was unprotected if it provided little or no value to society. The other school of thought argued that speech was unprotected if it fell into a certain category of speech that was simply categorically unprotected. Then, in 2010, the Court strongly sided with the latter approach, …

From Civil Rights To Blackmail: How The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act Of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988) Has Perverted One Of America's Most Historic Civil Rights Statutes, Steven W. Fitschen

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

For fourteen years, members of Congress repeatedly introduced legislation directed at a single subject. A key underpinning for the necessity of the legislation was provided by the opinions of two Supreme Court justices. Yet, for the past nine years, Congress has gone silent on the same topic. This Article argues that it is past time for Congress to reconsider this topic, and that if it will not do so, the Supreme Court can rectify the situation without engaging in judicial legislation.

Perhaps the best view of Congress's efforts can be seen by examining the high-water mark of those efforts, which …

Against Congressional Case Snatching, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Atticus Deprospro

William & Mary Law Review

Congress has developed a deeply problematic habit of aggrandizing itself by snatching cases from the Article III courts. One form of contemporary case snatching involves directly legislating the outcome of pending litigation by statute. These laws do not involve generic amendments to existing statutes but rather dictate specific rulings by the Article III courts in particular cases. Another form of congressional case snatching involves rendering ongoing judicial proceedings essentially advisory by unilaterally permitting a disgruntled litigant to transfer a pending case from an Article III court to an executive agency for resolution. Both practices involve Congress reallocating the business of …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents and Special Thanks.

Charles Reich, New Dealer, John Q. Barrett

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Does Due Process Have An Age Limit? Why The Law Concerning The Parental Right To Freedom Of Intimate Association In The Relationship With An Adult Child Is A Mischaracterization Of A Circuit Split, Bryan Schenkman

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Predictive Facts, Brent Ferguson

Washington Law Review

A substantial portion of constitutional law rests on untested factual predictions made by the Supreme Court. Such forecasts have played a large role in a wide range of case outcomes, helping the Court decide questions such as whether corporations have the right to spend money on elections and what evidence may be used in criminal cases despite Fourth Amendment violations.

Scholars have not yet studied the frequency of such predictions, the problems they create, or the functions they serve. The literature has looked more closely at court decisions that depend on conclusions of legislative fact—facts not specific to a certain …

Burying Mcculloch?, David S. Schwartz

Arkansas Law Review

Kurt Lash is a superb constitutional historian trapped inside the body of an originalist. He is one of the few originalists bold enough to acknowledge that McCulloch v. Maryland needs to be ejected from the (conservative) originalist canon of great constitutional cases. While he attributes to me an intention “not to praise the mythological McCulloch, but to bury it,” it is Lash who seeks to bury McCulloch, which he views as a fraudulent “story of our constitutional origins.”

Mcculloch V. Madison: John Marshall's Effort To Bury Madisonian Federalism, Kurt Lash

Arkansas Law Review

In his engaging and provocative new book, The Spirit of the Constitution: John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of McCulloch v. Maryland, David S. Schwartz challenges McCulloch’s canonical status as a foundation stone in the building of American constitutional law. According to Schwartz, the fortunes of McCulloch ebbed and flowed depending on the politics of the day and the ideological commitments of Supreme Court justices. Judicial reliance on the case might disappear for a generation only to suddenly reappear in the next. If McCulloch v. Maryland enjoys pride of place in contemporary courses on constitutional law, Schwartz argues, then this …

Marshalling Mcculloch, Richard Primus

Arkansas Law Review

David Schwartz’s terrific new book is subtitled John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of McCulloch v. Maryland. But the book is about much more than Marshall and McCulloch. It’s bout the long struggle over the scope of national power. Marshall and McCulloch are characters in the story, but the story isn’t centrally about them. Indeed, an important part of Schwartz’s narrative is that McCulloch has mattered relatively little in that struggle, except as a protean symbol.

Does Importance Equal Greatness? Reflections On John Marshall And Mcculloch V. Maryland, Sanford Levinson

Arkansas Law Review

David S. Schwartz’s The Spirit of the Constitution: John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of McCulloch v. Maryland, is a truly excellent book, for which I was happy to contribute the following blurb appearing on the back jacket: "David Schwartz has written an indispensable study of thesingle most important Supreme Court case in the canon. As such, he delineates not only the meaning and importance of the case in 1819, but also the use made of it over the next two centuries as it became a central myth and symbol of the very meaning of American constitutionalism.”

Mcculloch's "Perpetually Arising" Questions, David S. Schwartz

Arkansas Law Review

I’m truly honored to have my book be the subject of a symposium on Balkinization, and I’m deeply grateful to Jack Balkin and John Mikhail for organizing and hosting it. Among its many gratifications for me personally, the symposium guaranteed that at least eight people would read the book. That these readers have engaged with it so closely and insightfully is icing on the cake. My first article on McCulloch four years ago, which became the basis for a couple of the early chapters in the book, insisted that McCulloch was properly interpreted as far less nationalistic than we were …

Scholarship In Review: A Response To David S. Schwartz's The Spirit Of The Constitution: John Marshall And The 200-Year Odyssey Of Mcculloch V. Maryland, Law Review Editors

Arkansas Law Review

We are elated to introduce, and the Arkansas Law Review is honored to publish, this series discussing and applauding David S. Schwartz’s new book: The Spirit of the Constitution: John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of McCulloch v. Maryland. Schwartz sets forth meticulous research, coupled with unparalleled insight, into the opinion penned by Chief Justice John Marshall and details the winding path Marshall’s words have traveled over the past 200 years. Schwartz argues that the shifting interpretations of McCulloch, often shaped to satisfy the needs of the time, echoes the true spirit of the Constitution.

A Patent Reformist Supreme Court And Its Unearthed Precedent, Samuel F. Ernst

Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal

How is it that the Supreme Court, a generalist court, is leading a project of innovation reform in our times while the court of appeals established to encourage innovation is having its precedent stricken down time and again? This decade the Supreme Court has issued far more patent law decisions than in any decade since the passage of the Patent Act of 1952. In doing so, the Supreme Court has overruled the Federal Circuit in roughly threequarters of the patent cases in which the Supreme Court has issued opinions. In most of these cases, the Supreme Court has established rules …

The Lessons Of 1919, Lackland H. Bloom

SMU Law Review

One hundred years ago, the Supreme Court embarked on its first serious consideration of the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech. In 1919, the Court upheld four federal criminal convictions over First Amendment defenses. Three of the majority opinions were written by Justice Holmes. In the fourth, he offered a classic dissent. Two of the cases, Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v. United States, are of middling significance. The other two, Schenck v. United States and Abrams v. United States, are iconic. From these cases have sprung an expansive and complex jurisprudence of free speech. The …

Life In No Trump: Property And Speech Under The Constitution, Richard A. Esptein

Maine Law Review

The editors of the Maine Law Review have been kind enough to offer me the opportunity to respond to Laura Underkuffler's criticism of my work in her recent Godfrey Lecture, “When Should Rights ‘Trump’? An Examination of Speech and Property,” which appears in the preceding issue. In my earlier writings on constitutional law, more specifically, in my paper, Property, Speech and the Politics of Distrust, I took the position that modern Supreme Court jurisprudence had taken a turn for the worse insofar as it used different standards of review in passing on the constitutionality of legislation. The current position, roughly …

Rethinking The Dormant Commerce Clause?: Climate Change And Food Security, Michael Barsa

Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy

No abstract provided.

The Prevailing Culture Over Immigration: Centralized Immigration And Policies Between Attrition And Accommodation, Antonios Kouroutakis

Seton Hall Circuit Review

No abstract provided.

Lafler V. Cooper's Remedy: A Weak Response To A Constitutional Violation, Matthew T. Ciulla

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

The Lafler v. Cooper Court should have chosen the remedy of specific performance of the original plea bargain. The specific performance remedy, long implemented by federal courts in Lafler-like scenarios, and ordered by the district court in Lafler, precisely cures the Lafler injury—the accused regains the ability to accept the original plea offer, except he now has the benefit of effective assistance of counsel. The specific performance remedy, when coupled with the safeguards of the Strickland prongs, poses little risk of abuse, and gives heft to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel in the plea …