Law Commons^™

State Sovereign Immunity And The New Purposivism, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark

William & Mary Law Review

Since the Constitution was first proposed, courts and commentators have debated the extent to which it alienated the States’ preexisting sovereign immunity from suit by individuals. During the ratification period, these debates focused on the language of the citizen-state diversity provisions of Article III. After the Supreme Court read these provisions to abrogate state sovereign immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia, Congress and the States adopted the Eleventh Amendment to prohibit this construction. The Court subsequently ruled that States enjoy sovereign immunity independent of the Eleventh Amendment, which neither conferred nor diminished it. In the late twentieth-century, Congress began enacting …

The Summary Judgment Revolution That Wasn't, Jonathan Remy Nash, D. Daniel Sokol

William & Mary Law Review

The U.S. Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases on summary judgment in 1986. Questions remain as to how much effect these cases have had on judicial decision-making in terms of wins and losses for plaintiffs. Shifts in wins, losses, and what cases get to decisions on the merits impact access to justice. We assemble novel datasets to examine this question empirically in three areas of law that are more likely to respond to shifts in the standard for summary judgment: antitrust, securities regulation, and civil rights. We find that the Supreme Court’s decisions had a statistically significant effect in …

Retconning Heller: Five Takes On New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. V. Bruen, Brannon P. Denning, Glenn H. Reynolds

William & Mary Law Review

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen was the first significant Second Amendment case that the Supreme Court had heard in nearly fifteen years since its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. This Article offers some preliminary observations about the opinion itself, as well as its likely effects, some of which are starting to manifest.

Our first take concerns the question of opinion assignment. Why did Chief Justice Roberts—whose support for the Second Amendment has been suspect—assign the opinion to Justice Thomas?

Takes Two and Three concern Justice Thomas’s substitution of text, history, and tradition …

Justice Alito's Laundry List: Highlights From Appendix C Of Bostock And A Roadmap For Lgbtq+ Legal Advocates, Peter Quinn

William & Mary Law Review

After a brief background on Bostock [v. Clayton County] in Part I, the bulk of this Note seeks to examine Justice Alito’s Bostock dissent and its potential future usefulness for LGBTQ+ advocates. Part II will analyze Justice Alito’s dissent and Appendix C, arguing that his concerns about Bostock’s consequences across other federal statutes fall into three primary categories of usefulness. The remaining Parts will survey these categories, including the “small potatoes” in Part III, the “blockbusters” in Part IV, and the “under-the-radar” areas in Part V. Part V takes particular notice of potential applications of Bostock’s …

Religious Liberty Interest Convergence, Asma T. Uddin

William & Mary Law Review

Americans are deeply polarized on a plethora of issues. One of the most prominent areas of polarization is religious liberty, which in recent years has increasingly pitted conservative, white Christians against a range of marginalized minorities, particularly Muslims. The divide threatens Muslims’ rights and the vitality of religious liberty more broadly. This Article assesses the extent to which self-interest— especially the self-interest of the conservative Justices of the Supreme Court—can help depolarize religious liberty.

Professor Derrick Bell’s theory of “interest convergence” helps connect different self-interests that, in turn, enable issue-specific coalitions strong enough to effect serious cultural and legal change. …

Ford V. Where Are We?: The Revival Of The Sliding Scale To Govern The Supreme Court's New "Relating To" Personal Jurisdiction, Zois Manaris

William & Mary Law Review

This Note proposes a test to govern “relating to” specific jurisdiction, a variation on a theme to those familiar with the doctrine: a “sliding scale” approach to contacts and relatedness, accompanied by a separate assessment of reasonableness factors the Supreme Court has outlined in previous cases to serve as a check on the sliding scale. Part I of this Note explains the “sliding scale” approach, its unpleasant first interaction with the Court, and its revival by the Ford majority. Part II defines this Note’s proposed test and demonstrates its consistency with Supreme Court precedent. Finally, Part III applies this Note’s …

The Qualitative Fourth Amendment: The Case For A Refined, Information-Focused Approach To Fourth Amendment Cases Involving Non-Trespassatory Government Surveillance, Joshua L. Wagner

William & Mary Law Review

In his 2001 majority opinion for Kyllo v. United States, Justice Scalia adopted his characteristic chiding tone to gently reproach what he saw as a notably liberal departure from the original textual interpretation of the Constitution. The Katz test for Fourth Amendment violations, to Scalia, was plainly “circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.” That it was one of the most influential and oft-discussed decisions the Supreme Court has ever handed down made little difference; regardless of whatever Justice Harlan and his successors had said, the Fourth Amendment was, at its heart, a protection against government interference with property and had …

Against Congressional Case Snatching, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Atticus Deprospro

William & Mary Law Review

Congress has developed a deeply problematic habit of aggrandizing itself by snatching cases from the Article III courts. One form of contemporary case snatching involves directly legislating the outcome of pending litigation by statute. These laws do not involve generic amendments to existing statutes but rather dictate specific rulings by the Article III courts in particular cases. Another form of congressional case snatching involves rendering ongoing judicial proceedings essentially advisory by unilaterally permitting a disgruntled litigant to transfer a pending case from an Article III court to an executive agency for resolution. Both practices involve Congress reallocating the business of …

Courts, Culture, And The Lethal Injection Stalemate, Eric Berger

William & Mary Law Review

The Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Bucklew v. Precythe reiterated the Court’s great deference to states in Eighth Amendment lethal injection cases. The takeaway is that when it comes to execution protocols, states can do what they want. Events on the ground tell a very different story. Notwithstanding courts’ deference, executions have ground to a halt in numerous states, often due to lethal injection problems. State officials and the Court’s conservative Justices have blamed this development on “anti-death penalty activists” waging “guerilla war” on capital punishment. In reality, though, a variety of mostly uncoordinated actors motivated by a range of …

Janus-Faced Judging: How The Supreme Court Is Radically Weakening Stare Decisis, Michael Gentithes

William & Mary Law Review

Drastic changes in Supreme Court doctrine require citizens to reorder their affairs rapidly, undermining their trust in the judiciary. Stare decisis has traditionally limited the pace of such change on the Court. It is a bulwark against wholesale jurisprudential reversals. But, in recent years, the stare decisis doctrine has come under threat.

With little public or scholarly notice, the Supreme Court has radically weakened stare decisis in two ways. First, the Court has reversed its long-standing view that a precedent, regardless of the quality of its reasoning, should stand unless there is some special, practical justification to overrule it. Recent …

The Court Should Not Let Politically Divided Times Affects Its Choices And Decisions, Erwin Chemerinsky

William & Mary Law Review

The Court should not let politically divided times affect its choices or decisions. Altering the Court’s role in politically divided times would require a definition of what qualifies as such an era and a theory of how to act in such times. Almost every era in American history could be deemed a politically divided time. Changing the Court’s role in politically divided times is inconsistent with its preeminent role: interpreting and enforcing the Constitution. This role does not change, and should not change, in politically charged moments. Indeed, history shows that the Court cannot know what is likely to lessen …

Crisis? Whose Crisis?, Jack M. Beermann

William & Mary Law Review

Every moment in human history can be characterized by someone as “socially and politically charged.” For a large portion of the population of the United States, nearly the entire history of the country has been socially and politically charged, first because they were enslaved and then because they were subjected to discriminatory laws and unequal treatment under what became known as “Jim Crow.” The history of the United States has also been a period of social and political upheaval for American Indians, the people who occupied the territory that became the United States before European settlement. Although both African-Americans and …

The Judicial Reforms Of 1937, Barry Cushman

William & Mary Law Review

The literature on reform of the federal courts in 1937 understandably focuses on the history and consequences of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ill-fated proposal to increase the membership of the Supreme Court. A series of decisions declaring various components of the New Deal unconstitutional had persuaded Roosevelt and some of his advisors that the best way out of the impasse was to enlarge the number of justiceships and to appoint to the new positions jurists who would be “dependable” supporters of the administration’s program. Yet Roosevelt and congressional Democrats also were deeply troubled by what they perceived as judicial obstruction …

Packing And Unpacking State Courts, Marin K. Levy

William & Mary Law Review

When it comes to court packing, questions of “should” and “can” are inextricably intertwined. The conventional wisdom has long been that federal court packing is something the President and Congress simply cannot do. Even though the Constitution’s text does not directly prohibit expanding or contracting the size of courts for political gain, many have argued that there is a longstanding norm against doing so, stemming from a commitment to judicial independence and separation of powers. And so (the argument goes), even though the political branches might otherwise be tempted to add or subtract seats to change the Court’s ideological makeup, …

Summary Dispositions As Precedent, Richard C. Chen

William & Mary Law Review

The Supreme Court’s practice of summarily reversing decisions based on certiorari filings, without the benefit of merits briefing or oral argument, has recently come under increasing scrutiny. The practice is difficult to square with the Court’s stated criteria for granting certiorari and its norms against reviewing fact-bound cases to engage in mere error correction. Nonetheless, there is growing acceptance that the practice is likely to continue in some form, and the conversation has shifted to asking when the use of summary dispositions should be considered proper. Commentators have had no trouble identifying the Court’s tendencies: summary dispositions are most commonly …

A Brief History Of Judical Appointments From The Last 50 Years Through The Trump Administration, Donald F. Mcgahn Ii

William & Mary Law Review

Thank you so much for that kind introduction. I really appreciate the opportunity to be here today. I am going to talk about the confirmation process generally. There is no better place to talk about it than here. Let me begin with some numbers and statistics, before I turn to the main thrust of my talk, to give some context as to what recent Presidents have done with respect to judicial appointments. President Trump has appointed two Supreme Court Justices, Neil Gorsuch and Brett of Appeals; twenty-nine so far have been confirmed. The Senate Leader, Senator Mitch McConnell, has already …

The State Of Exactions, Timothy M. Mulvaney

William & Mary Law Review

In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, the Supreme Court slightly expanded the range of land use permitting situations in which heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate in a constitutional “exaction” takings case. In crafting a vision of regulators as strategic extortionists of private property interests, though, Koontz prompted many takings observers to predict that the case would provide momentum for a more significant expansion of such scrutiny in takings cases involving land use permit conditions moving forward, and perhaps even an extension into other regulatory contexts, as well.

Five years on, this Article evaluates the extent to which …

A Voice In The Wilderness: John Paul Stevens, Election Law, And A Theory Of Impartial Governance, Cody S. Barnett, Joshua A. Douglas

William & Mary Law Review

Justice John Paul Stevens retired from the Supreme Court almost a decade ago and turned ninety-eight years old in April 2018. How should we remember his legacy on the Supreme Court? This Article places his legacy within his election law jurisprudence. Specifically, Justice Stevens provided a consistent theory, which we term “impartial governance,” that has had a lasting impact on the field. This theory undergirds Justice Stevens’s creation of the important Anderson-Burdick-Crawford balancing test that federal courts use to construe the constitutionality of laws that impact the right to vote, such as voter ID laws. It is part of his …

Legislative Exhaustion, Michael Sant’Ambrogio

William & Mary Law Review

Legislative lawsuits are a recurring by-product of divided government. Yet the Supreme Court has never definitively resolved whether Congress may sue the executive branch over its execution of the law. Some scholars argue that Congress should be able to establish Article III standing when its interests are harmed by executive action or inaction just like private parties. Others, including most prominently the late Justice Antonin Scalia, argue that intergovernmental disputes do not constitute Article III “cases” or “controversies” at all. Rather, the Framers envisioned the political branches resolving their differences through nonjudicial means.

This Article proposes a different approach to …

Some Thoughts On The Study Of Judicial Behavior, Lee Epstein

William & Mary Law Review

Back in the 1940s the political scientist C. Herman Pritchett began tallying the votes and opinions of Supreme Court Justices. His goal was to use data to test the hypothesis that the Justices were not only following the “law,” but were also motivated by their own ideological preferences.

With the hindsight of nearly eighty years, we know that Pritchett’s seemingly small project helped to create a big field: Judicial Behavior, which I take to be the theoretical and empirical study of the choices judges make. Political scientists continue to play a central role, but they are now joined by economists, …

The Second Dimension Of The Supreme Court, Joshua B. Fischman, Tonja Jacobi

William & Mary Law Review

Describing the Justices of the Supreme Court as “liberals” and conservatives” has become so standard— and the left-right division on the Court is considered so entrenched— that any deviation from that pattern is treated with surprise. Attentive Court watchers know that the Justices are not just politicians in robes, deciding each case on a purely ideological basis. Yet the increasingly influential empirical legal studies literature assumes just that— that a left-right ideological dimension fully describes the Supreme Court. We show that there is a second, more legally-focused dimension of judicial decision making. A continuum between legalism and pragmatism also divides …

Neutral Principles And Some Campaign Finance Problems, John O. Mcginnis

William & Mary Law Review

This Article has both positive and normative objectives. As a positive matter, it shows that the Roberts Court’s campaign finance regulation jurisprudence can be best explained as a systematic effort to integrate that case law with the rest of the First Amendment, making the neutral principles refined in other social contexts govern this more politically salient one as well. It demonstrates that the typical Roberts Court majority in campaign finance cases follows precedent, doctrine, and traditional First Amendment theory, while the dissents tend to carve out exceptions at each of these levels.

As a normative matter, it argues that following …

The Supreme Court’S Quiet Revolution: Redefining The Meaning Of Jurisdiction, Erin Morrow Hawley

William & Mary Law Review

Over the last three decades, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have carried out a quiet revolution in the nature and meaning of jurisdiction. Historically, federal courts generally treated procedural requirements, like filing deadlines and exhaustion prerequisites, as presumptively “jurisdictional.” In case after case, the modern Court has reversed course. The result has been an unobtrusive but seminal redefinition of what jurisdiction means to begin with: the adjudicatory authority of the federal courts. This shift is momentous, but it has been obscured by the Court’s erstwhile imposition of a clear statement requirement. For courts to find a statutory requirement jurisdictional, Congress …

The Rhetoric Of Constitutional Absolutism, Eric Berger

William & Mary Law Review

Though constitutional doctrine is famously unpredictable, Supreme Court Justices often imbue their constitutional opinions with a sense of inevitability. Rather than concede that evidence is sometimes equivocal, Justices insist with great certainty that they have divined the correct answer. This Article examines this rhetoric of constitutional absolutism and its place in our broader popular constitutional discourse. After considering examples of the Justices’ rhetorical performances, this Article explores strategic, institutional, and psychological explanations for the phenomenon. It then turns to the rhetoric’s implications, weighing its costs and benefits. This Article ultimately argues that the costs outweigh the benefits and proposes a …

Oasis Or Mirage: The Supreme Court's Thirst For Dictionaries In The Rehnquist And Roberts Eras, James J. Brudney, Lawrence Baum

William & Mary Law Review

The Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries, virtually non-existent before 1987, has dramatically increased during the Rehnquist and Roberts Court eras to the point where as many as one-third of statutory decisions invoke dictionary definitions. The increase is linked to the rise of textualism and its intense focus on ordinary meaning. This Article explores the Court’s new dictionary culture in depth from empirical and doctrinal perspectives. We find that while textualist justices are heavy dictionary users, purposivist justices invoke dictionary definitions with comparable frequency. Further, dictionary use overall is strikingly ad hoc and subjective. We demonstrate how the Court’s patterns of …

Explaining The Supreme Court's Shrinking Docket, Ryan J. Owens, David A. Simon

William & Mary Law Review

In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has decided fewer cases than at any other time in its recent history. Scholars and practitioners alike have criticized the drop in the Court’s plenary docket. Some even believe that the Court has reneged on its duty to clarify and unify the law. A host of studies examine potential reasons for the Court’s change in docket size, but few rely on an empirical analysis of this change and no study examines the correlation between ideological homogeneity and docket size. In a comprehensive study, the authors analyze ideological and contextual factors to determine …

Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court And The Use Of Legislative History, David S. Law, David Zaring

William & Mary Law Review

Much of the social science literature on judicial behavior has focused on the impact of ideology on how judges vote. For the most part, however, legal scholars have been reluctant to embrace empirical scholarship that fails to address the impact of legal constraints and the means by which judges reason their way to particular outcomes. This Article attempts to integrate and address the concerns of both audiences by way of an empirical examination of the Supreme Court’s use of a particular interpretive technique— namely, the use of legislative history to determine the purpose and meaning of a statute. We analyzed …

The Common Law Genius Of The Warren Court, David A. Strauss

William & Mary Law Review

The Warren Court's most important decisions-on school segregation, reapportionment, free speech, and criminal procedure are firmly entrenched in the law. But the idea persists, even among those who are sympathetic to the results that the Warren Court reached, that what the Warren Court was doing was somehow not really law: that the Warren Court "made it up," and that the important Warren Court decisions cannot be justified by reference to conventional legal materials. It is true that the Warren Court's most important decisions cannot be easily justified on the basis of the text of the Constitution or the original understandings. …

The Supreme Court And Foreign Sources Of Law: Two Hundred Years Of Practice And The Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, Steven Calabresi, Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Bridging The Enforcement Gap In Constitutional Law: A Critique Of The Supreme Court's Theory That Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.