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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Honoring Dan Meltzer, Bradford R. Clark
Honoring Dan Meltzer, Bradford R. Clark
Notre Dame Law Review
Dan Meltzer was a giant in the field of Federal Courts, and it is hard to overstate his influence on its development. He taught Federal Courts at Harvard Law School and was a long-time co-author of Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System (“Hart & Wechsler ”), the casebook that created the field and shaped how generations of judges, lawyers, and scholars think about complex questions of federal jurisdiction. In addition, Dan enriched the field immeasurably by writing seminal articles on a wide range of Federal Courts topics. His work was characterized by deep knowledge of the …
An Incomplete Discussion Of "Arising Under" Jurisdiction, David L. Shapiro
An Incomplete Discussion Of "Arising Under" Jurisdiction, David L. Shapiro
Notre Dame Law Review
My purpose in this brief Essay is to expand on this theme as it played out in Dan Meltzer’s role as collaborator, friendly critic, and keen analyst, and to do so by exploring a problem that in some ways lies at the heart of our elaborate system of judicial federalism, even though (perhaps because it does not arise that often) it has received somewhat less attention than it deserves. That problem addresses the nature of federal judicial authority—and especially the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—when a federal issue is embedded in, or when its determination may affect the resolution …
Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal And State Courts In Our Federal System, Judith Resnik
Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal And State Courts In Our Federal System, Judith Resnik
Notre Dame Law Review
This Essay pays tribute to Daniel Meltzer’s insight that, to the extent “lawyers have a common intellectual heritage, the federal courts are its primary source.” I do so by analyzing how that heritage is made and remade, as political forces press Congress to deploy federal courts to protect a wide array of interests and state courts absorb the bulk of litigation. The heritage that Meltzer celebrated and to which he contributed was the outcome of twentieth-century social movements that focused on the federal courts as hospitable venues, serving as vivid sources of rights and remedies. A competing heritage has since …
Law Enforcement As Political Question, Zachary S. Price
Law Enforcement As Political Question, Zachary S. Price
Notre Dame Law Review
Across a range of contexts, federal courts have crafted doctrines that limit judicial secondguessing of executive nonenforcement decisions. Key case law, however, carries important ambiguities of scope and rationale. In particular, key decisions have combined rationales rooted in executive prerogative with concerns about nonenforcement’s “unsuitability” for judicial resolution. With one nonenforcement initiative now before the Supreme Court and other related issues percolating in lower courts, this Article makes the case for the latter rationale. Judicial review of nonenforcement, on this account, involves a form of political question, in the sense of the “political question doctrine”: while executive officials hold a …
Stop The Reach: Solving The Judicial Takings Problem By Objectively Defining Property, Steven C. Begakis
Stop The Reach: Solving The Judicial Takings Problem By Objectively Defining Property, Steven C. Begakis
Notre Dame Law Review
The future of judicial takings may rest on the ability of the Court to define property in a robust and objective way. Property has essential characteristics that make it easily identifiable, the most significant of which are the rights to exclude and use. However, even when a property right does not fit within a neat categorical definition, should that right have a long, well established pedigree in state court precedent, that property right is similarly within the capacity of the reviewing court to identify. And once it is determined that, prior to the judgment, the petitioners possessed a clearly defined …
The Supreme Court's Quiet Revolution In Induced Patent Infringement, Timothy R. Holbrook
The Supreme Court's Quiet Revolution In Induced Patent Infringement, Timothy R. Holbrook
Notre Dame Law Review
The Supreme Court over the last decade or so has reengaged with patent law. While much attention has been paid to the Court’s reworking of what constitutes patent-eligible subject matter and enhancing tools to combat “patent trolls,” what many have missed is the Court’s reworking of the contours of active inducement of patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). The Court has taken the same number of § 271(b) cases as subject matter eligibility cases—four. Yet this reworking has not garnered much attention in the literature. This Article offers the first comprehensive assessment of the Court’s efforts to define active …
Originalist Or Original: The Difficulties Of Reconciling Citizens United With Corporate Law History, Leo E. Strine Jr., Nicholas Walter
Originalist Or Original: The Difficulties Of Reconciling Citizens United With Corporate Law History, Leo E. Strine Jr., Nicholas Walter
Notre Dame Law Review
In this Article, we focus on a specific question raised by Citizens United, which is whether the Supreme Court’s decision can be justified solely by application of the originalist method of constitutional interpretation, or whether it can only be explained by giving substantial weight to a more modern, evolved understanding of the relevant constitutional provisions. We conclude that however Citizens United is rationalized, it cannot be defended solely or primarily as the product of a disciplined application of the originalist method of constitutional interpretation. Because Citizens United takes a view at odds both with the historical understanding of business …