Law Commons^™

Supreme Court Justices, Empathy, And Social Change: A Comment On Lani Guinier's Demosprudence Through Dissent, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

Justice Souter's imminent retirement from the U.S. Supreme Court provides President Obama with his first opportunity for a judicial nomination to the high court. President Obama's remarks about the relevance of life experience and of empathy are sparking discussion of relevant judicial qualifications. This Essay examines Professor Lani Guinier's recent argument that dissenting justices, particularly through the use of oral dissents, may spur ordinary people to action and that such dissents may expand the range of democratic action, as part of what she and Gerald Torres call "demosprudence." That controversial decisions by the United States Supreme Court can spur dissenting …

Justice Ginsburg's Dissent In Bush V. Gore, Hugh Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, I examine Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in Bush v. Gore, the decision that ended the 2000 controversy over the winner of the presidency. I look critically at Justice Ginsburg's invocation of federalism-based deference to the Florida courts' interpretations of state election law in the recount controversy. I consider also Justice Ginsburg's criticisms of the Court's remedial decision to stop the recounts. Finally, I take up the much-debated question of how to understand Justice Ginsburg's final two words: "I dissent," rather than "I respectfully dissent." My conclusion is that the omission of "respectfully" is pointed, but not for …

Ascertaining The Parties' Intentions In Arbitral Design, George A. Bermann

Faculty Scholarship

Supreme Court case law teaches us that the federal interest in arbitration does not consist of enforcing agreements to arbitrate according to some sort of abstract or ideal arbitral model, but rather according to the particular arbitral model upon which the parties had agreed. This body of law is driven by the same notions of party autonomy that underlie the law of arbitration generally. That parties may agree to forego access to national courts in favor of arbitration is an initial manifestation of that attitude. By logical extension, the parties also enjoy extraordinary latitude in determining the features that "their" …

Constitutional Limits On Punitive Damages Awards: An Analysis Of Supreme Court Precedent, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has formulated new constitutional principles to constrain punitive damages awards imposed by state courts, invoking its authority under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This intervention has been controversial from the start, generating dissents from several Justices asserting that the actions of the Court are unwarranted and amount to unjustified judicial activism. Over the ensuing years lower courts and commentators have criticized the Court’s prescription of procedural and substantive limitations, finding them to be vague and unnecessarily restrictive of state common law prerogatives. Some observers with an economic orientation have …

Justice Ginsburg's Footnotes, Jay D. Wexler

Faculty Scholarship

In this short article written for the New England School of Law's March Symposium on Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, I report on what happened when I embarked on a project of trying to read every single footnote Justice Ginsburg has ever written as a justice on the Supreme Court. As the article relates, this project was impossible to complete because Justice Ginsburg, it turns out, has written a lot, lot, lot of footnotes. Instead, I ended up reading all of Justice Ginsburg's footnotes from three of her terms. In the article, I develop a nine-part taxonomy of Supreme Court footnotes …

On Capturing The Possible Significance Of Institutional Design And Ethos, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

At a recent conference, a new judge from one of the federal courts of appeal – for the United States, the front line in judicial control of administrative action-made a plea to the lawyers in attendance. Please, he urged, in briefing and arguing cases reviewing agency actions, help us judges to understand their broader contexts. So often, he complained, the briefs and arguments are limited to the particular small issues of the case. We get little sense of the broad context in which it arises – the agency responsibilities in their largest sense, the institutional issues that may be at …

The Supreme Common Law Court Of The United States, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court's primary role in the history of the United States, especially in constitutional cases (and cases hovering in the universe of the Constitution), has been to limit Congress's ability to redefine and redistribute rights in a direction most people would characterize as liberal. In other words, the Supreme Court, for most of the history of the United States since the adoption of the Constitution, has been a conservative force against change and redistribution. The Court has used five distinct devices to advance its control over the law. First, it has construed rights-creating constitutional provisions narrowly when those …

Rewriting Brown, Resurrecting Plessy, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

It is an honor and a pleasure to ponder Cooper v. AaronI and the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education2 in general and to respond to David A. Strauss's wise and insightful Childress Lecture3 in particular. I want to address three topics. The first two are encapsulated in my title: Rewriting Brown, Resurrecting Plessy. I'll examine the widespread phenomenon of "rewriting Brown." And I'll document what I shall call "resurrecting Plessy": the phenomenon, evident in both liberal and conservative scholarship and opinions, of charging one's opponents with repeating the mistakes of Plessy v. Ferguson.4 I'll illustrate the liberal version …

What Lurks Beneath: Nsa Surveillance And Executive Power Symposium: The Role Of The President In The Twenty-First Century, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

It is not surprising that, nearly two and a quarter centuries after ratification of the Federal Constitution, people are still actively arguing about the extent of the American President's powers.' The concept of executive power is notoriously murky,2 so disputes about its scope and character are virtually unavoidable. It is, however, at least a tad surprising that, nearly two and a quarter centuries after ratification of the Federal Constitution, people are still arguing about the constitutional sources of presidential power. 3 It is one thing to disagree about how far the President's power extends, but it is quite another thing …

Crawford, Retroactivity, And The Importance Of Being Earnest, J. Thomas Sullivan

Faculty Scholarship

In this article Professor Sullivan examines the Supreme Court's evolving Confrontation Clause jurisprudence through its dramatic return to pre-Sixth Amendment appreciation of the role of cross-examination in the criminal trial reflected in its 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington. He discusses the past quarter century of the Court's confrontation decisions and their impact on his client, Ralph Rodney Earnest, recounting the defendant's conviction and twenty-four-year litigation journey through state and federal courts to his eventual release from prison in the only successful attempt to use Crawford retroactively known to date.

Moral Philosophy, Information Technology, And Copyright, Wendy J. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

A plethora of philosophical issues arise where copyright and patent laws intersect with information technology. Given the necessary brevity of the chapter, my strategy will be to make general observations that can be applied to illuminate one particular issue. I have chosen the issue considered in MGM v. Grokster,² a recent copyright case from the U.S. Supreme Court Grokster, Ltd., provided a decentralized peer-to-peer technology that many people, typically students, used to copy and distribute music in ways that violated copyright law. The Supreme Court addressed the extent to which Grokster and other technology providers should be held …

Introduction To Sandra Day O'Connor, George A. Bermann

Faculty Scholarship

There are many, many reasons to honor Justice Sandra Day O'Connor-and during the course of her brief but rich stay with us here at Columbia Law School, we have touched on only some of those many reasons. There remains this afternoon one more occasion to honor Justice O'Connor-an honor that has a very special resonance at this law school. It is the conferral of the Wolfgang Friedmann Memorial Award by the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, a recognition of contributions to international law that is deeply meaningful not only at Columbia Law School, but in international law circles generally.

Can Congress Authorize The Opponents Of Self-Financed Candidates To Receive Extra-Large Contributions?, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

Is the so-called Millionaires’ Amendment, which permits federal candidates who are running against self-funded opponents to receive contributions significantly above the standard federal statutory ceiling constitutional?

Federal law caps contributions to federal candidates, but the Supreme Court has ruled that limits on how much money a candidate can contribute to his or her own campaign are unconstitutional. This case tests the 2002 Millionaires’ Amendment, which enables candidates for Congress running against self-financing opponents to obtain contributions well above the ordinary statutory ceiling and also imposes additional reporting requirements on self-funding candidates.

Ordinary Powers In Extraordinary Times: Common Sense In Times Of Crisis Symposium: Extraordinary Powers In Ordinary Times, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution was written, debated, ratified, and implemented in the shadow of crisis. The country was birthed in war. In the aftermath of ratification, opponents of the Constitution could have precipitated a civil war that would have jeopardized the survival of the fledgling national government. I Throughout the founding era, any number of European powers were perceived to pose a serious threat of invasion. 2 Well into the 1800s, especially in certain northeastern states, substantial homegrown support for realignment with England persisted; the possibility of an internal rebellion in those areas was quite real.3 Individuals interested more in power …

Subverting The Marriage-Amendment Crusade With Law And Policy Reform, Anita Bernstein

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Federalism And Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, And The New Federalism, Timothy Meyer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Slow Dancing With Death: The Supreme Court And Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, James S. Liebman

Faculty Scholarship

This Article addresses four questions:

Why hasn't the Court left capital punishment unregulated, as it has other areas of substantive criminal law? The Court is compelled to decide the death penalty's constitutionality by the peculiar responsibility it bears for this form of state violence.

Why didn't the Court abolish the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia after finding every capital statute and verdict unconstitutional? The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was too opaque to reveal whether the death penalty was unlawful for some or all crimes and, if not, whether there were law-bound ways to administer it. So the Court …

Two-Dimensional Doctrine And Three-Dimensional Law: A Response To Professor Weinstein, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Weinstein examines how the IRB laws would fare under Supreme Court doctrine, and whereas it is my view that these laws should be considered unconstitutional, he reaches largely the opposite conclusion. His article therefore offers a valuable opportunity for further exploration of the constitutional questions, and although there is not sufficient space here to discuss all of his analysis, it seems important at least to draw attention to the major points on which we take different perspectives.

Getting Permission, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Institutional Review Boards ("IRBs") are the instruments of a system of licensing – a system under which scholars, students, and other researchers must get permission to do research on human subjects. Although the system was established as a means of regulating research, it regulates research by licensing speech and the press. It is, in fact, so sweeping a system of licensing speech and the press that it is reminiscent of the seventeenth century, when Galileo Galilei had to submit to licensing and John Milton protested against it. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the constitutionality of IRB licensing and, more …

The New Constitutional Order And The Heartening Of Conservative Constitutional Aspirations, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

The basic question for this conference is whether we as a people have entered, or are on the verge of entering, a new constitutional order. In 2003, Mark Tushnet published a terrific book, The New Constitutional Order, an expansion of his insightful Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Ambition in the Harvard Law Review.2 The title of that book was an inspiration for the title of this conference. And the title of that article is the basis for the title of my article. For years, liberals and progressives have been anticipating or announcing a conservative revolution …

Grutter V. Bollinger, Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action And The Treachery Of Originalism: "The Sun Don't Shine Here In This Part Of Town", André Douglas Pond Cummings

Faculty Scholarship

Careful examination of Justice Clarence Thomas's dissenting opinion in the landmark affirmative action case Grutter v. Bollinger is important for a number of reasons: First, as one of the youngest members of the U.S. Supreme Court, Thomas stands a reasonable chance of still being a member of the court in 25 years, the self imposed implosion date (sunset provision) established by Justice O'Connor's majority opinion. No doubt, Thomas relishes the idea of writing the majority opinion that kills affirmative action and racial preferences for good.

Second, much as Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson was used as a …

Brief Amicus Curiae Of Professors Keith N. Hylton, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Mark F. Grady, Jeffrey L. Harrison, Mark G. Kelman, And Thomas Ulen In Support Of Respondents In Philip Morris Usa V. Mayola Williams, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

There is no dispute that the punitive damages award that was upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court in this case satisfies the most rigorous law and economic standards for rationality. The Court need not credit the analysis of the undersigned amici on this score; the fact that Petitioner’s own amici – most notably law and economics scholars A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell – have been unable to find anything economically amiss in the decision below speaks volumes. To be sure, Professors Polinsky and Shavell have filed an amicus brief in support of Philip Morris in this case, just as …

Representative Government, Representative Court? The Supreme Court As A Representative Body, Angela Onwuachi-Willig

Faculty Scholarship

In this Symposium Essay, I propose, as a thinking matter, that we expand the number of Supreme Court justices to increase the representation of various demographic groups on the Court. In Part I, I advance the argument that the Court should be regarded as a demographically representative body of the citizens of the United States, and in Part II, I argue that the Court should be enlarged to ensure diverse representation of all voices on the most powerful judicial body of our nation.

'There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause': An Appreciation Of Justice Stevens's Equal Protection Jurisprudence, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

"There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases."1 These words open Justice John Paul Stevens's famous concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren.2 That was the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court applied "intermediate" scrutiny to gender-based classifications and thus carved out a third tier of equal protection analysis between strict scrutiny and deferential rational basis scrutiny. Craig was decided in 1976, at the beginning of Justice Stevens's long and distinguished …

Leading A Constitutional Court: Perspectives From The Federal Republic Of Germany, Peter E. Quint

Faculty Scholarship

This article, which was a contribution to a Symposium on the office of the Chief Justice of the United States, compares that office with the office of President of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The article concludes that, while the American Chief Justice possesses more authority in most formal respects, the President of the German Court has on occasion exercised an informal public or private influence that goes well beyond anything of the sort that has been attempted (recently at least) by the American Chief Justice.

Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts In A Conservative Era, Mark A. Graber

Faculty Scholarship

This essay explores the likelihood that conservative federal courts in the near future will be agents of conservative social change. In particular, the paper assesses whether conservative justices on some issues will support more conservative policies than conservative elected officials are presently willing to enact and whether such judicial decisions will influence public policy. My primary conclusion is that, as long as conservatives remain politically ascendant in the elected branches of government, the Roberts Court is likely to influence American politics at the margins. The new conservative judicial majority is likely to be more libertarian than conservative majorities in the …

Against Idols: The Court As A Symbol-Making Or Rhetorical Institution, Marie Failinger

Faculty Scholarship

Symbolic politics can be quite powerful. This article pursues the question of how the Supreme Court signifies itself, how it discovers and enacts the metaphors from which it will play its part in the American political drama aimed at containing some of the nightmares of human existence, while affirming and encouraging the possibilities for human flourishing. Embedded in this inquiry is the question of how the Court can signify itself while still preserving the truth-telling and humility necessary to legitimize Court decisions.

Less Is Better: Justice Stevens And The Narrowed Death Penalty, James S. Liebman, Lawrence C. Marshall

Faculty Scholarship

In a recent speech to the American Bar Association, Justice John Paul Stevens "issued an unusually stinging criticism of capital punishment." Although he "stopped short of calling for an end to the death penalty," Justice Stevens catalogued a number of its "'serious flaws,'" including several procedures that the full Court has reviewed and upheld over his dissent – selecting capital jurors in a manner that excludes those with qualms about the death penalty, permitting elected state judges to second-guess jurors when they decline to impose the death penalty, permitting states to premise death verdicts on "victim impact statements," tolerating sub-par …

Jackson V. Birmingham Board Of Education: Title Ix's Implied Private Right Of Action For Retaliation, Elizabeth Mccuskey

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has penned countless words about the sound of statutory silence.' On March 29, 2005, the Court once again grappled with the meaning of silence in a statute, splitting along familiar 5-4 lines in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education.² When the dust cleared, a male coach of a high school girls' basketball team, who was fired in retaliation for protecting his players' Title IX³ rights, possessed a private right of action arising from the statute itself.⁴ Although the Court has retreated from its high-water mark of implying private rights of action,⁵ in …

Aggravating Youth: Roper V Simmons And Age Discrimination, Elizabeth F. Emens

Faculty Scholarship

In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court confronted a difficult question: Given that being younger than eighteen is merely a proxy for diminished culpability, why not let jurors decide whether youth mitigates the culpability of an individual sixteen- or seventeen-year-old offender? The Court's subtle answer draws on psychological literature about the differences between juveniles and adults, but ultimately depends as much on concerns about the mind of the adult juror as on the distinctive traits of juveniles. Read in its best light, Kennedy's opinion seems to turn on the insight that while age-based classifications are rational – they are a …